Opinion
No. 569450
September 13, 2004
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
The defendant, Electrical Contractors, Inc., has moved to strike the third and sixth counts of the complaint on the grounds that Connecticut does not recognize claims for parental consortium. The argument is based primarily on The Supreme Court case of Mendillo v. Board of Education, 246 Conn. 456, 477, 496 (1998). In that case, the children's mother brought an action for wrongful discharge which caused the mother to live out of the home and away from her children for a period of time. In the present case, the father sustained life-altering physical injuries. Some sixteen decisions prior to Mendillo were cited in the plaintiffs' brief in which Superior Courts ruled on the issue. All had facts distinguishable from Mendillo. The rulings were that parental consortium claims were valid. Unlike Mendillo, where the separation of the parent from the child was temporary and not due to injury, the cases cited alleged injury or death of the parent as a basis for the decision to allow parental consortium.
In Chung v. Place Motors, Inc., Sup. Ct. Judicial District of New London, Docket No. 560074 (February 11, 2003, Hurley, J.) ( 34 Conn. L. Rptr. 140), the mother was killed in a car accident and as a result, the children were forever deprived of the love, support and companionship of their mother. Loss of parental consortium was allowed. Other cases since Mendillo have been distinguished from Mendillo and allowed parental consortium. Pacelli v. Dorr, Superior Court Judicial District of New Haven, Docket No. 0382547 (July 30, 1998, Hartman, J.); Collins v. Dunlap, Superior Court Judicial District of Danbury, Docket No. 0328146 (March 16, 1999, Radcliff, J.) ( 24 Conn. L. Rptr. 257).
In his dissent to the majority opinion in Mendillo, Justice Berdon predicted that the decision in Mendillo would prevail only under those facts and that cases involving death or serious physical injuries would be distinguished from Mendillo which involved only a temporary separation for wrongful discharge (see Dissent pp. 496-514). He points out at p. 503 that the majority asserts that this court should not adopt the loss of parental consortium causes of action because the weight of judicial authority is opposed to it.
"Contrary to the majority's assertion, there is an emerging national trend to recognize such claims by children. Before 1980, none of the jurisdictions accepted this claim; yet today, in 1998, fifteen jurisdictions recognize it . . . Furthermore, many of our state trial judges, relying on the underlying logic of such cases as Hopson and Clohessey, have made a determination that the fundamental policy of the law supports extending a tortfeasor's responsibility to the child of an innocent victim." Id. 505. (Footnote 12 lists 18 judges in Connecticut who have recognized a child's cause of action for parental consortium.)
Accordingly, the motion to strike the third and sixth count of the revised complaint dated July 6, 2004 is denied.
D. Michael Hurley, JTR