The direction given was to "vacate the order, cause the appropriate finding to be made, and enter a new order thereon after which the losing party shall be free to enter another appeal." Petkas v. Piedmont-Lindberg Corp., 151 Ga. App. 323, 324 ( 259 S.E.2d 713) (1979). The trial court vacated its previous order and entered a new order, reciting that it had carefully considered the defendants' motion for expenses and attorney fees in light of our decision in Petkas, supra, and had studied all briefs and the entire record.
No direct authority from Arizona or any other jurisdiction involving a substantially identical statute has been cited in support of this contention. However, we do note that in Petkas v. Piedmont-Lindberg Corporation, 151 Ga. App. 323, 259 S.E.2d 713 (1979), in considering whether attorney's fees could be awarded under a statute substantially identical to A.R.S. ยง 10-049(B), the court held that a judgment of dismissal based upon the minority stockholders' voluntary dismissal after one day of trial was a final judgment so as to give the court authority to award attorney's fees to the defendants. Likewise, in Sackett v. Mitchell, 264 Or. 396, 505 P.2d 1136 (1973), the court held that a judgment of dismissal without prejudice constituted a final determination of the rights of the parties and a "final judgment" for the purpose of meeting the requirements of an Oregon statute allowing the award of attorney's fees in contract actions.