Argued and submitted June 14, 1985.Affirmed December 26, 1985. Reconsideration denied February 14, 1986. Petition for review denied March 4, 1986 ( 300 Or. 563). Appeal from Circuit Court, Marion County, Dale Jacobs, Judge.

The trial court's decision to first determine the validity of the 2018 amendments, before reaching the undue influence claim, was not improper or even unusual. See, e.g., Williams v. Overton, 76 Or.App. 424, 430-31, 709 P.2d 1115 (1985), rev den, 300 Or. 563 (1986) (explaining that the trial court properly approached the will contest "in the traditional manner" by first determining that the will had been duly executed and then turning to undue influence). Indeed, if there were no validly executed 2018 trust amendments, there would be no basis for concluding that respondents had unduly influenced the purported execution of non-existent amendments.

This case presents a slightly different situation: Here, rather than bringing an equitable claim and a legal claim, plaintiffs brought a claim that adds a single equitable overlay—the right of the shareholders to bring a claim on behalf of the corporation—to an otherwise legal claim for damages for breach of fiduciary duties. See Kollman v. Cell Tech International, Inc. , 250 Or. App. 163, 171, 279 P.3d 324 (2012), rev. den. , 353 Or. 410, 298 P.3d 1226 (2013) (where economic damages were sought on a claim for breach of fiduciary duty, "the nature of the relief sought" required the trial court to try the claim "at law," that is, by jury); Hoekstre v. Golden B. Products , 77 Or. App. 104, 107, 712 P.2d 149 (1985), rev. den. , 300 Or. 563, 715 P.2d 94 (1986) ("[A] shareholder's derivative suit is in equity."); see also Aronson v. Lewis , 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984) ("The nature of the action is two-fold. First, it is the equivalent of a suit by the shareholders to compel the corporation to sue.

An exception exists when the claimant came into possession based on an alleged parol gift of the land, even though the possession originated with the landowner’s permission. See Miller v. Conley , 96 Or. 413, 417-19, 190 P. 301 (1920) ; Schrenk v. Garvin , 76 Or. App. 523, 526, 709 P.2d 762 (1985), rev. den. , 300 Or. 563, 715 P.2d 95 (1986). Because a parol gift is not at issue here, the exception does not apply.

To establish that element in a legal malpractice action, the plaintiff must show that the plaintiff “would have obtained a more favorable result in the earlier action if the attorney had not been negligent.” Jeffries v. Mills, 165 Or.App. 103, 122, 995 P.2d 1180 (2000) ; see also Hoekstre v. Golden B. Products, 77 Or.App. 104, 106, 712 P.2d 149 (1985), rev. den., 300 Or. 563, 715 P.2d 94 (1986) (“When a defendant attorney is negligent in the conduct of an appeal, the plaintiff in the malpractice case must prove that the result of the appeal would likely have been favorable in order to prove that the defendant's negligence caused the plaintiff's damages.”). In Jeffries, we explained:

Id.In Hoekstre v. Golden B. Products, Inc., 77 Or.App. 104, 712 P.2d 149 (1985), rev. den.,300 Or. 563, 715 P.2d 94 (1986), an individual defendant in a shareholder's derivative action brought an action against the attorney who had represented him in the derivative action, charging the defendant with negligence in his representation at trial and on appeal. One of the issues on appeal from a judgment for the plaintiff was whether interest that had accrued on the judgment in the derivative action was an element of the plaintiff's damages arising from the defendant's malpractice. The defendant argued that the plaintiff's entitlement to interest presented a jury question and, relying on Langfus, the defendant asserted that interest must appear in the jury's verdict to be recoverable.

As we stated in the opinion, "[w]here a claim for prejudgment interest depends on the resolution of disputed facts, those facts are within the province of the jury to decide." Id. at 557 (citing Hoekstre v. Golden B. Products, 77 Or App 104, 108-09, 712 P2d 149 (1985), rev den, 300 Or 563 (1986) (discussing Langfus, Inc. v. Queriolo, 64 Or App 493, 497, 669 P2d 1245, rev den, 296 Or 237 (1983))). Thus, the trial court could have awarded prejudgment interest only if there were no disputed facts after the jury returned its verdict, and the court could have easily calculated the prejudgment interest based on the undisputed facts.

The effect of either motion is the same, and, on appeal, the standard for reviewing the trial court's ruling on a request for a peremptory instruction would be the same as our review of the directed verdict ruling; the question is whether, based on the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to defendant, plaintiff was entitled to a determination as a matter of law that there was a physician-patient relationship. See Hoekstre v. Golden B. Products, 77 Or App 104, 109, 712 P2d 149 (1985), rev den, 300 Or 563 (1986). In reviewing the trial court's denial of plaintiffs motion, we consider the evidence, including any inferences, in the light most favorable to defendant as the party who obtained the favorable verdict; the verdict cannot be set aside "unless we can affirmatively say that there is no evidence from which the jury could have found the facts necessary" to support it.

Where a claim for prejudgment interest depends on the resolution of disputed facts, those facts are within the province of the jury to decide. See Hoekstre v. Golden B. Products, 77 Or App 104, 108-09, 712 P2d 149 (1985), rev den, 300 Or 563 (1986) (discussing Langfus, Inc. v. Queirolo, 64 Or App 493, 497, 669 P2d 1245, rev den, 296 Or 237 (1983)); see also Miller v. C. C. Meisel Co., Inc., 183 Or App 148, 181, 51 P3d 650 (2002) (concluding that it was appropriate for the trial court not to submit the issue of prejudgment interest to the jury where the record contained "only one possible date" from which interest would accrue). Here, although it appears that interest would begin to accrue following defendant's last payment to plaintiff, the evidence as to the correct date was in dispute.

I. BACKGROUND On de novo review, Williams v. Overton, 76 Or App 424, 426, 709 P2d 1115 (1985), rev den, 300 Or 563 (1986), we find the following facts. Comins and Jourdan first met in approximately 1975, when both were working in the Multnomah County Courthouse. At the time, Comins, a grand juror bailiff, was in her mid-50s, and Jourdan, a court-room bailiff, was in her early 20s.