Argued and submitted December 17, 1987Affirmed January 11, 1989 reconsideration denied March 24, petition for review denied May 2, 1989 ( 307 Or. 719) Appeal from the Circuit Court, Washington County, Alan C. Bonebrake, Judge.

Argued and submitted December 16, 1988 Affirmed February 8, 1989 reconsideration denied March 10, petition for review denied May 2, 1989 ( 307 Or. 719) Appeal from the Circuit Court, Clackamas County, Hugh C. Downer, Jr., Judge.

"The Oregon Court of Appeals has indicated that it will scrutinize closely any claim of an 'actual emergency.' "Attorney General's Public Records and Meetings Manual 147 (2014) (citing Oreg. Assoc. of Classified Emp. v. Salem-Keizer, 95 Or App 28, 32, 767 P2d 1365, rev den, 307 Or 719 (1989) (reversing trial court ruling finding that the circumstances presented an actual emergency)). When the trial court struck this claim, it necessarily concluded both (a) that the anti-SLAPP statute applied, meaning that defendants had shown that the claim arises out of a statement in a public forum or made in the exercise of a constitutional right of speech or petition, ORS 31.150(2), and then (b) that, under that statute, plaintiff had failed to show "substantial evidence to support a prima facie case," ORS 31.150(3).

Argued and submitted April 4, 1988 Remanded for reconsideration on attorney fee claim; otherwise affirmed January 11, Kordon's reconsideration and Mercer's reconsideration denied March 24, Kordon's petition for review denied May 2, 1989 ( 307 Or. 719) Mercer Industries' petition for review on attorney fees allowed May 2, 1989 ( 307 Or. 719) See later issue Oregon Reports Judicial Review from Workers' Compensation Board.

Id, citing e.g., Empire Fire & Marine Ins. v. Fremont Indemnity, 90 Or.App. 56, 62, 750 P,2d 1178 (1988). The court went on to elaborate by stating that "Improper means" must be independently wrongful by reason of statutory or common law, beyond the mere fact of the injury complained of. Id, citing Conklin v. Karban Rock, Inc., 94 Or.App. 593, 601, 767 P.2d 444, rev den, 307 Or. 719, 773 P.2d 774 (1989). Examples of improper means the court gave included "violence, threats, intimidation, deceit, misrepresentation, bribery, unfounded litigation, defamation and disparaging falsehood."

We went on to explain that "improper means" could include " ‘violence, threats, intimidation, deceit, misrepresentation, bribery, unfounded litigation , defamation and disparaging falsehood.’ " Id. (quoting Conklin v. Karban Rock, Inc. , 94 Or.App. 593, 601, 767 P.2d 444, rev. den. , 307 Or. 719, 773 P.2d 774 (1989) (emphasis added)).As plaintiffs point out, the incidental language in Church suggesting that unfounded litigation can satisfy the "wrongful" element of an elder abuse claim is arguably dictum because it was not necessary to the holding of that case, and was included as an example of an independent statutory or common law "wrong."

We, therefore, turned to previous cases that discussed the tort of intentional interference with contractual relations for interpretive context. Id. (citing Empire Fire & Marine Ins. v. Fremont Indemnity, 90 Or.App. 56, 62, 750 P.2d 1178 (1988); Conklin v. Karban Rock, Inc., 94 Or.App. 593, 601, 767 P.2d 444 (1988), rev. den., 307 Or. 719, 773 P.2d 774 (1989)). To prove that tort, a plaintiff must show that, “beyond the fact of the interference itself,” the defendant possessed an improper motive or used improper means.

Under Oregon law, equitable estoppel may provide grounds to avoid a statute of frauds defense, including in cases arising under the Uniform Commercial Code. Potter v. Hatter Farms, 56 Or. App. 254, 260-63, 641 P.2d 628 (1982). In Conklin v. Karban Rock, Inc., 94 Or. App. 593, 767 P.2d 444, rev den, 307 Or 719 (1989), however, this court held that a party asserting estoppel to avoid the statute of frauds must show that the party asserting the statute of frauds made a misrepresentation "beyond the contractual promise itself and gained an advantage from the misrepresentation and detrimental reliance. Id. at 597-98.

"Improper means" must be independently wrongful by reason of statutory or common law, and include "violence, threats, intimidation, deceit, misrepresentation, bribery, unfounded litigation, defamation and disparaging falsehood." Conklin v. Karban Rock, Inc., 94 Or App 593, 601, 767 P2d 444, rev den, 307 Or 719 (1989). That is, the means must be wrongful in some manner other than simply causing the damages claimed as a result of the conduct.

See, e.g., Empire Fire Marine Ins. v. Fremont Indemnity, 90 Or. App. 56, 62, 750 P.2d 1178 (1988) (defining "wrongful" interference with contractual relations in those terms). "Improper means" must be independently wrongful by reason of statutory or common law, beyond the mere fact of the injury complained of. Conklin v. Karban Rock, Inc., 94 Or. App. 593, 601, 767 P.2d 444, rev den, 307 Or. 719 (1989). Improper means, for example, include "violence, threats, intimidation, deceit, misrepresentation, bribery, unfounded litigation, defamation and disparaging falsehood."