"(b) $100,000 to any claimant as general and special damages for all other claims arising out of a single accident or occurrence unless those damages exceed $100,000, in which case the claimant may recover additional special damages, but in no event shall the total award of special damages exceed $100,000." Based on those amendments, in Anglin v. Dept. of Corrections , 160 Or App 463, 478, 982 P.2d 547, rev. den. , 329 Or. 357, 994 P.2d 124 (1999), we concluded that a different analysis applied to former ORS 30.270(1)(b) (1987), which expressly referred to the liability limitation as consisting of general and special damages. As we explained in Anglin , 160 Or App at 478, 982 P.2d 547, "[i]n order for defendants to prevail on their argument that attorney fees must be included within the liability limitation of that statute, they would need to demonstrate that either ‘general damages,’ or ‘special damages,’ or both, as those terms are used in that statute, include attorney fee awards."

See McGanty, 321 Or. at 549-50.See, e.g., Kraemer v. Harding, 159 Or. App. 90, 976 P.2d 1160, rev den 329 Or. 357 (1999) (directed verdict properly denied where the defendants accused the plaintiff of sexually molesting schoolchildren under circumstances permitting an inference that the defendants either did not believe or lacked reasonable grounds to believe the charges and were instead trying to force the plaintiff's reassignment); Dalby v. Sisters of Providence, 125 Or. App. 149, 865 P.2d 391 (1993) (IIED claim improperly dismissed where complaint supported an inference that the defendant, knowing that it had no basis to believe its employee committed theft, accused the employee of theft and encouraged a police investigation and arrest, all as retribution for the employee's report of the defendant's failure to comply with legal requirements in keeping drug inventory records); Woods v. First American Title Ins. Co., 102 Or. App. 343, 794 P.2d 454, adhered to on recons 104 Or. App. 100, 798 P.2d 1121 (1990), rev den 311 Or. 151 (1991) (dismissal reversed where allegations permitted an inference that th

Moreover, this court finds that the conditions surrounding plaintiff's release from the Deschutes County Jail did not constitute an "extraordinary transgression of the bounds of socially tolerable conduct." See Kraemer v. Harding, 159 Or. App. 90, 110, 976 P.2d 1160, rev. denied, 329 Or. 357, 994 P.2d 124 (1999) ("extraordinary conduct [is conduct] which a reasonable jury could find beyond the farthest reaches of socially tolerable behavior") (internal citations omitted). Defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted on plaintiff's IIED claim.

Following an evidentiary hearing, the PCR trial court denied relief. Again the Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed without opinion, and the Oregon Supreme Court denied review. Ramsey v. Thompson, 160 Or. App. 289, 981 P.2d 400, rev. denied, 329 Or. 357, 994 P.2d 124 (1999). Petitioner filed this action on February 22, 2000.

Watte v. Edgar Maeyens, Jr., 112 Or. App. 234, 239, 828 P.2d 479, 481 (1992), rev. denied, 314 Or. 176, 836 P.2d 1345 (1992) (quoting Hall v. The May Dept Stores, 292 Or. 131, 135, 637 P.2d 126, 129 (1984)). In addition, Oregon cases which have allowed claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress to proceed typically involve acts of psychological and physical intimidation, racism, or sexual harassment. See Kraemer v. Harding, 159 Or. App. 90, 976 P.2d 1160 (continued accusations that a school bus driver was a child sex abuser after multiple investigations concluded that no inappropriate conduct occurred), rev. denied, 329 Or. 357 (1999); Wheeler v. Marathon Printing, Inc., 157 Or. App. 290, 974 P.2d 207 (1998) (co-worker continued harassment including sexual remarks even after plaintiff attempted suicide); Lathrope-Olson v. Dept. of Transportation, 128 Or. App. 405, 408, 876 P.2d 345 (1994) (calling a Native American woman a squaw, telling her that a squaw was supposed to walk behind her man, stating that all women were good for was between their legs, locking her out of the work van in the rain and snow, and threatening to push her into the path of oncoming vehicles); Mains v. II Morrow, Inc., 128 Or. App. 625, 877 P.2d 88 (1994) (daily physical assaults and sexual comments by supervisor); Franklin v. Portland Community College, 100 Or. App. 465, 787 P.2d 489 (1990) (supervisor called an African-American male by the name "boy," issued false reprimands, shoved him, locked him in an office, and suggested that he apply elsewhere for employment). Whether conduct constitutes an extraordinary transgression of the bounds

In that regard, it is a question of law for the court to determine whether a complaint sufficiently alleges conduct that constituted an extraordinary transgression of the bounds of socially tolerable conduct. Babick v. Oregon Arena Corp., 160 Or. App. 140, 150, 980 P.2d 1147, 1153, rev allowed, 329 Or. 357 (1999). D. Sufficiency of Allegations

The Oregon courts have recognized wrongful discharge claims in two situations: 1) when an employee is terminated for performing an important public duty or societal obligation; and 2) when an employee is terminated for exercising private statutory rights that relate to the employment and reflect an important public policy. Babick v. Oregon Arena Corp., 980 P.2d 1147, reh'g granted, 329 Or. 357 (1999). Defendants contend that Rice was neither terminated because she was fulfilling an important societal obligation; nor is there a causal connection between Rice's complaints about mismanagement of public funds and the District's decision to lay her off. Defendants contend that Rice's complaints about mismanagement of funds cannot support a wrongful termination claim for fulfilling an important societal obligation.

Following his return to custody, Petitioner filed a state post-conviction proceeding to challenge the legality of the Escape conviction. The post-conviction trial court denied relief. The Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of state post-conviction relief without opinion, and the Oregon Supreme Court denied review. Burgess v. Baldwin, 161 Or. App. 667, 984 P.2d 959, rev. denied, 329 Or. 357, 994 P.2d 124 (1999). Petitioner filed this action on February 28, 2000.

"The gravamen of the tort of defamation is the injury to the plaintiff's reputation caused by a statement communicated to someone other than to the plaintiff." Kraemer v. Harding, 159 Or. App. 90, 102, 976 P.2d 1160, 1169 (internal quotation omitted), rev. denied, 329 Or. 357, 994 P.2d 124(1999). To establish a claim for defamation, plaintiff must first show that defendants made defamatory statements about her. Wallulis v. Dymowski, 323 Or. 337, 342-43, 918 P.2d 757, 758 (1996).

Some states have found, as we have, the right to self-defense constitutes a substantial public policy. See, e.g., Babick v. Oregon Arena Corp., 160 Or. App. 140, 980 P.2d 1147, review allowed, 329 Or. 357, 994 P.2d 123 (1999) (unpublished table decision) (finding claim of imminent danger renders wrongful discharge claim justiciable); Ellis v. City of Seattle, 142 Wn.2d 450, 13 P.3d 1065 (2000) (en banc) (upholding employee's claim of wrongful discharge against employer who fired him after he refused to disable fire alarm system that interfered with quality of arena's sound system); Gardner v. Loomis Armored Inc., 128 Wn.2d 931, 913 P.2d 377 (1996) (en banc) (answering, in the affirmative, certified question inquiring "whether an employer contravenes public policy when it terminates an at-will employee who violated a company rule in order to go to the assistance of a citizen who was in danger of serious physical injury or death?"). However, other courts have declined to adopt this position.