Second, the other person may be unaware of a contact or a series of contacts, but when the person later learns of the contact(s), the person becomes alarmed. See Boyd v. Essin, 170 Or. App. 509, 517, 12 P.3d 1003 (2000), rev den 331 Or. 674 (2001) ("It is sufficient if the act, when learned, gives rise to an unwanted relationship or association between the petitioner and the respondent." (Emphasis added.)). Finally, instances may arise where the other person initially believes a contact to be innocuous but, upon obtaining further information about the person initiating the contact or the true nature of the contact itself, later understands the contact in a new light and only then becomes alarmed.

In the insurance context, subrogation permits an insurer in certain instances to recover what it has paid to its insured by, in effect, standing in the shoes of the insured and pursuing a claim against the wrongdoer. Furrer v. Yew Creek Logging Co. , 206 Or. 382, 388, 292 P.2d 499 (1956) ; Safeco Ins. Co. v. Russell , 170 Or.App. 636, 640, 13 P.3d 519 (2000), rev. den. , 331 Or. 674, 21 P.3d 96 (2001). The subrogated party acquires precisely the same rights as the party for whom it substitutes, and no more than that.

Subrogation permits an insurer in certain instances to recover what it has paid to its insured, "in effect, by standing in the shoes of the insured and pursuing a claim against the wrongdoer." Safeco Ins. Co. v. Russell, 170 Or. App. 636, 640 (2000), rev. den., 331 Or. 674 (2001). OR. REV. STAT. 742.518 to OR. REV. STAT. 742.544 govern PIP coverage, including an insurer's recovery of amounts paid to its insured as PIP benefits.

If so, they are ambiguous, and it would follow that the relevant city provisions are not 'clear and objective[.]'" Tirumali v. City of Portland, 169 Or.App. 241, 246, 7 P.3d 761 (2000), rev den, 331 Or. 674 (2001).

M. D. O. v. Desantis, 302 Or.App. 751, 761-62, 461 P.3d 1066 (2020). "[Contacts that might appear innocuous when viewed in isolation often take on a different character when viewed either in combination or against the backdrop of one party's assaultive behavior towards the other." Boyd v. Essin, 170 Or.App. 509, 518, 12 P.3d 1003 (2000), rev den, 331 Or. 674 (2001).

See Boyd v. Essin, 170 Or.App. 509, 515, 515 n 7, 12 P.3d 1003 (2000), rev den, 331 Or. 674 (2001) (husband's assault on son constituted an unwanted contact even though it occurred in their family home before husband and wife (the petitioner) separated); cf. D. A. v. White, 253 Or.App. 754, 764, 292 P.3d 587 (2012) (the trial court did not err in finding that, even though the petitioner continued to work with the respondent after a rift, the respondent's later physical threats were unwanted contacts). In this case, we agree with the trial court that respondent "should have known" that throwing what appeared to be a bomb at petitioner's home and apparently trying to run over petitioner were unwanted contacts.

That is because ‘contacts that might appear innocuous in isolation often take on a different character when viewed either in combination or against the backdrop of one party's assaultive behavior towards the other ,’ something that bears on the reasonableness of the victim's response to the defendant's conduct." State v. Martin , 315 Or App 689, 691, 501 P3d 554 (2021) (quoting Boyd v. Essin , 170 Or App 509, 518, 12 P3d 1003 (2000), rev. den. , 331 Or. 674, 21 P.3d 96 (2001) (emphasis in Martin )). For example, in S. L. L. , we evaluated the "contextual factors" of the parties' relationship and concluded that the respondent's telephonic threat to "fuck [the petitioner] up" constituted an imminent threat.

However, in comparable circumstances, we have looked to the dictionary definition of the noun "contact" to determine its meaning. SeeBoyd v. Essin , 170 Or.App. 509, 516, 12 P.3d 1003 (2000), rev. den. , 331 Or. 674, 21 P.3d 96 (2001) (looking to the dictionary definition of contact to determine whether the respondent's actions constituted a prohibited contact).

As we understand their view, a standard cannot be clear and objective if any of its terms, considered apart from their context, are capable of a meaning different from the one advanced by the local government. In support of that view, they rely on Tirumali v. City of Portland , 169 Or. App. 241, 7 P.3d 761 (2000), rev. den. , 331 Or. 674, 21 P.3d 96 (2001). As explained below, we disagree with petitioners’ characterization of our holding in Tirumali . At the outset, we observe that, in that case, we were construing ORS 197.015(10)(b)(B), which addresses LUBA's subject-matter jurisdiction.

As we noted in S. A. B. v. Roach , 249 Or.App. 579, 587, 277 P.3d 628 (2012), for purposes of ORS 30.866 —the civil analog to ORS 163.732 —"[t]he victim's situation includes all of the circumstances of the parties’ relationship." Similarly, we explained in Boyd v. Essin , 170 Or. App. 509, 518, 12 P.3d 1003 (2000), rev. den. , 331 Or. 674, 21 P.3d 96 (2001), that the factual context of the parties’ relationship is probative evidence in a stalking case. That is because "contacts that might appear innocuous in isolation often take on a different character when viewed either in combination or against the backdrop of one party's assaultive behavior towards the other ," something that bears on the reasonableness of the victim's response to the defendant's conduct.