The focus, then, narrows to whether defendant was motivated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve Reddaway. Because this case comes to us on appeal from a summary judgment in favor of defendant, our task is to determine whether the record, viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, would permit an objectively reasonable juror to find or infer that defendant, in engaging in the conduct alleged, was solely motivated by a purpose to serve himself. ORCP 47 C; Sims v. Software Solutions Unlimited, Inc., 148 Or. App. 358, 364-65, 939 P.2d 654, rev den 326 Or. 57 (1997). In doing so, we view the entire record in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the nonmoving party.

Argued and submitted February 14, 1997.Affirmed June 11, petition for review denied September 23, 1997 ( 326 Or. 57). Appeal from the Circuit Court, Washington County, Jon B. Lund, Judge.

Argued and submitted March 17, 1997.Affirmed June 18, petition for review denied September 23, 1997 ( 326 Or. 57). Appeal from the Circuit Court, Deschutes County, Stephen N. Tiktin, Judge.

" Boers, 141 Or. App. at 242-43 (emphasis in original). In Sims v. Software Solutions Unlimited, Inc., 148 Or. App. 358, 939 P.2d 654, rev den 326 Or. 57 (1997), the plaintiff asserted a claim for intentional interference with economic relations against Rodenbeck, the president of Software Solutions. The defendants moved for summary judgment and argued "that Rodenbeck, as an employee of Software, could not interfere with plaintiff's economic relations with Software as a matter of law, because he was acting within the scope of his employment." Id. at 360.

Actual agency, in turn, "depends on whether the functions performed are on behalf of the public body and whether the public body has the right to control the agent." Bridge By & Through Severson v. Carver, 148 Or.App. 503, 941 P.2d 1039, rev. denied, 326 Or. 57, 944 P.2d 947 (1997). PACE asserts that, under Vaughn v. First Transit, Inc., 346 Or. 128, 206 P.3d 181 (2009) - holding the OTCA makes a public body liable for "only those [torts] for which the agent's principal would be liable under common-law standards" - the District cannot be vicariously liable for Mr. Fahlgren's acts.

. Actual agency, in turn, “depends on whether the functions performed are on behalf of the public body and whether the public body has the right to control the agent.” Bridge By & Through Severson v. Carver, 148 Or.App. 503, 941 P.2d 1039, rev. denied, 326 Or. 57, 944 P.2d 947 (1997). PACE asserts that, under Vaughn v. First Transit, Inc., 346 Or. 128, 206 P.3d 181 (2009) -holding the OTCA makes a public body liable for “only those [torts] for which the agent's principal would be liable under common-law standards” - the District cannot be vicariously liable for Mr. Fahlgren's acts.

Even assuming that allegation is true, Oregon law is clear that so long as the actor's actions are within the scope of his authority and are undertaken at least in part to further the employer's interests, “it is immaterial that the actor has additional motives—even improper ones.” Mannex Corp. v. Bruns, 250 Or.App. 50, 54–55, 279 P.3d 278, 282 (2012) (citing Sims v. Software Solutions Unlimited, Inc., 148 Or.App. 358, 364–65, 939 P.2d 654, 658, rev. den., 326 Or. 57, 944 P.2d 947 (1997)). Hoy's own testimony forecloses the argument that Warden was acting solely for his own benefit.

Two of our cases illustrate the foregoing principles. In Bridge v. Carver , 148 Or. App. 503, 509-10, 941 P.2d 1039, rev. den. , 326 Or. 57, 944 P.2d 947 (1997), we concluded that the evidence supported a finding that a county-run health care program had actual authority over a physician. Although the physician was not a county employee, a written agreement between the parties evidenced their mutual consent to an agency relationship.

As we long have recognized, "failures by local governments to follow substantive or procedural requirements for a land use decision * * * ‘are reviewable * * *by the land use appeal process.’ " Crist v. City of Beaverton , 143 Or.App. 79, 84, 922 P.2d 1253 (1996), rev. den. , 326 Or. 57, 944 P.2d 947 (1997) (quoting Sauvie Island Agricultural v. GGS (Hawaii), Inc. , 107 Or.App. 1, 7, 810 P.2d 856 (1991) ). In all events, LUBA's determinations—whether petitioner's application for nine property line adjustments was subject to approval through the ministerial process and whether all of petitioner's requested property line adjustments could be approved in the context of a single application—are determinations that require the exercise of legal interpretation.

Thus, so long as the actor's conduct is within the scope of his or her authority and is undertaken at least in part to further the best interests of the employer, it is immaterial that the actor has additional motives-even improper ones. Sims v. Software Solutions Unlimited, Inc., 148 Or.App. 358, 364–65, 939 P.2d 654,rev. den.,326 Or. 57, 944 P.2d 947 (1997). In contrast, when the actor acts against the best interests of the employer or solely for her own benefit, she could be held liable in tort for the harm done to the other contracting party.