Petitions for Review

57 Citing cases

  1. State v. Walraven

    214 Or. App. 645 (Or. Ct. App. 2007)   Cited 15 times
    Holding that conviction for felony murder merged with conviction of aggravated murder of the same victim

    ORS 161.067(1). Following Barrett, in State v. Beason, 170 Or App 414, 12 P3d 560 (2000), rev den, 331 Or 692 (2001), we concluded, in a similar fashion, that when a person is convicted of multiple counts of murder pursuant to ORS 163.115, based on different theories concerning the killing of the same victim, those convictions should merge pursuant to ORS 161.067(1). We reasoned that merger was required because the legislature envisioned intentional murder, felony murder, and murder by abuse not to be separate crimes, but to be alternative theories for the crime of murder.

  2. State v. Luers

    211 Or. App. 34 (Or. Ct. App. 2007)   Cited 37 times
    Holding that, under the plain text of ORS 166.382, a device without an explosive charge may still constitute a “bomb” if it has an incendiary or poison gas component

    Further, the circumstance at issue in each offense does not require proof of an "element" that the other circumstances do not. In State v. Beason, 170 Or App 414, 429-30, 12 P3d 560 (2000), rev den, 331 Or 692 (2001), we concluded that where the prefatory language of subsection (1) of the murder statute, ORS 163.115, referred to acts that "constitute murder," that fact suggested that each of the following paragraphs merely described separate ways of committing that single offense. Here, defendant was convicted of three counts of arson based on ORS 164.325(1)(b).

  3. Spain v. Jones

    257 Or. App. 777 (Or. Ct. App. 2013)   Cited 9 times
    Denying summary judgment on actual control after a subcontractor painter fell at jobsite because a jury could have found defendant-indirect employer actually controlled "the 'work involving a risk or danger'— specifically, the work involving a risk of falling—[which] included not only plaintiff's installation of plumbing fixtures on the second floor, but also his walk along the unprotected second-floor hallway."

    Fazzolari, 303 Or. at 17, 734 P.2d 1326. George v. Myers, 169 Or.App. 472, 487 n. 13, 10 P.3d 265 (2000), rev. den.,331 Or. 692, 26 P.3d 149 (2001) (“Recast in post-Fazzolari terms, Yowell's rule is that the relationship between a possessor of land or contractor and a specialized subcontractor embodies a special ‘status' or ‘relationship,’ taking precedence over application of ordinary principles of general foreseeability. Fazzolari[, 303 Or. at 17, 734 P.2d 1326].”).

  4. Boothby v. D.R. Johnson Lumber Co.

    184 Or. App. 138 (Or. Ct. App. 2002)   Cited 10 times
    Construing Fortney

    Fazzolari, 303 Or. at 17. In George v. Myers, 169 Or. App. 472, 487 n 13, 10 P.3d 265 (2000), rev den, 331 Or. 692 (2001), we noted that, "[r]ecast in post- Fazzolari terms, Yowell's rule is that the relationship between a contractor and a specialized subcontractor embodies a special `status' or `relationship,' taking precedence over application of ordinary principles of general foreseeability." See also Fortney v. Crawford Door Sales Corp., 97 Or. App. 276, 280, 775 P.2d 910 (1989) (citing Fuhrer v. Gearhart By The Sea, Inc., 306 Or. 434, 760 P.2d 874 (1988)) ("although Fazzolari has changed the role of duty in negligence law, it has not eliminated the rule that a defendant must have some responsible involvement with an event in order to be found negligent for its occurrence").

  5. Gode v. SAIF Corp.

    178 Or. App. 413 (Or. Ct. App. 2001)   Cited 1 times

    Affirmed. SAIF v. Lewis, 170 Or. App. 201, 12 P.3d 498 (2000), rev allowed 331 Or. 692 (2001). Wollheim, J., concurring.

  6. Harlow v. Allstate Insurance Company

    33 P.3d 363 (Or. Ct. App. 2001)   Cited 1 times

    The legislative history of the 1981 amendment leads us to conclude that plaintiff's interpretation of the statute is correct. Allstate argues, however, that two of our decisions — Estate of Linda Greenslitt v. Farmers Ins. Co., 156 Or. App. 75, 964 P.2d 1129 (1998), rev dismissed 331 Or. 692 (2001), and Pitchford v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 147 Or. App. 9, 934 P.2d 616 (1997) — point in a different direction. We discuss those decisions briefly and begin with Pitchford, on which Allstate primarily relies.

  7. Fairbank v. Underwood

    986 F. Supp. 2d 1222 (D. Or. 2013)   Cited 23 times
    Determining that pro se plaintiff did not have full and fair opportunity to litigate FDCPA claim in previous action where previous action was dismissed without leave to amend and without oral argument

    (5) The prior proceeding was the type of proceeding to which this court will give preclusive effect.Stevens v. Horton, 161 Or.App. 454, 461, 984 P.2d 868 (1999), rev. denied,331 Or. 692, 26 P.3d 149 (2001). The third, fourth, and fifth elements of issue preclusion are not seriously disputed.

  8. Nelson v. Hill

    03:07-cv-297-MA (D. Or. Feb. 21, 2012)

    The Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed from the bench, and the Oregon Supreme Court denied review. State v. Nelson, 170 Or. App. 159, 10 P.3d 335 (2000), rev. denied, 331 Or. 692 (2001). Petitioner sought state post-conviction relief, raising ineffective assistance of counsel and due process claims.

  9. Horsley v. Belleque

    Civil No. 05-1034-BR (D. Or. Jun. 15, 2009)

    The Court of Appeals affirmed in a written opinion, and the Oregon Supreme Court denied review. State v. Horsley, 169 Or. App. 438, 8 P.3d 1021 (2000), rev. denied, 331 Or. 692, 26 P.3d 149 (2001). Petitioner then filed a petition for state post-conviction relief ("PCR").

  10. Janes v. Hall

    CV 03-1460-MA (D. Or. Aug. 25, 2005)

    Petitioner directly appealed his convictions, but the Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed without opinion, State v. Janes, 169 Or. App. 652, 10 P.3d 336 (2000), and the Oregon Supreme Court denied review. 331 Or. 692, 26 P.3d 149 (2001). Petitioner next sought state post-conviction relief.