Meyer v. Walls, 122 N.C. App. 507, 514, 471 S.E.2d 422, 427 (1996). In support of this statement, the Court of Appeals cited Vaughn v. N.C. Dep't of Human Resources, 296 N.C. 683, 690, 252 S.E.2d 792, 797 (1979); EEE-ZZZ Lay Drain Co. v. N.C. Dep't of Human Resources, 108 N.C. App. 24, 28, 422 S.E.2d 338, 341 (1992); and Coleman v. Cooper, 102 N.C. App. 650, 657-58, 403 S.E.2d 577, 581-82, disc. rev. denied, 329 N.C. 786, 408 S.E.2d 517 (1991). In Vaughn and Gammons, the plaintiffs sued the Department of Human Resources ("DHR") in the Industrial Commission under the Tort Claims Act.
On 5 August 1993, the deputy commissioner denied defendant's motion for summary judgment, and on 12 August 1993, defendant appealed to the full Commission. On 30 March 1994, the full Commission ordered that defendant's motion for summary judgment be denied, concluding that this case is controlled by Coleman v. Cooper, 102 N.C. App. 650, 403 S.E.2d 577, disc. rev. denied, 329 N.C. 786, 408 S.E.2d 517 (1991). From this order, on 29 April 1994, defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the decision of the full Commission.
21(b)(4), "incorporates by reference the definition of `persons insured' that is found in" G.S. § 20-279.21(b)(3)), disc. review denied, 329 N.C. 786, 408 S.E.2d 515 (1991). Accordingly, although Dutch was not the named insured nor a member of the named insured's household, he would qualify as a "person insured" under the Act for purposes of the USAA policy if he "was `using' the [insured] vehicle at the time of the accident."
Coleman v. Cooper, 89 N.C. App. 188, 366 S.E.2d 2, disc. review denied, 322 N.C. 834, 371 S.E.2d 275 (1988). See also Coleman v. Cooper, 102 N.C. App. 650, 403 S.E.2d 577, disc. review denied, 329 N.C. 786, 408 S.E.2d 517 (1991). Based on the case law of this state, it is clear that under some circumstances, negligence claims by abused or neglected juveniles against agencies and employees charged with their care may be actionable.
Griffin presented the Universal policy as its applicable coverage, and the statutory requirements must be read into the policy. See Brown v. Truck Ins. Exchange, 103 N.C. App. 59, 64, 404 S.E.2d 172, 175 (provisions of the FRA are written into every automobile liability policy as a matter of law and where provisions of insurance policy conflict with provisions of the FRA, the statute prevails), disc. review denied, 329 N.C. 786, 408 S.E.2d 515 (1991) and American Tours, 315 N.C. at 344, 338 S.E.2d at 95 ("[w]hen a statute is applicable to the terms of a policy of insurance, the provisions of that statute become part of the terms of the policy to the same extent as if they were written in it"). While an automobile owner's policy may "exclude coverage in the event the driver of a vehicle is covered under some other policy for the minimum amount of liability coverage" required by the FRA, see Jeffreys, 128 N.C. App. at 172-73, 493 S.E.2d at 769, that is not the circumstance sub judice.
This Court held that the county was acting as an agent of the Social Services Commission and DHR in its delivery of child protective services. Coleman v. Cooper, 102 N.C. App. 650, 403 S.E.2d 577, disc. review denied, 329 N.C. 786, 408 S.E.2d 517 (1991). We examined the relevant statutes and concluded that the county DSS director was required to submit reports of abuse to the central registry under policies adopted by the Social Services Commission.
Enforcing the policy as written and declining to rewrite its terms, Fidelity, 318 N.C. at 380, 348 S.E.2d at 796, we reject defendant's contention that the term "driver" is synonymous with "named insured." Dispositive on this issue is Brown v. Truck Ins. Exchange, 103 N.C. App. 59, 404 S.E.2d 172, disc. review denied, 329 N.C. 786, 408 S.E.2d 515 (1991), wherein this Court held that listing the plaintiff as an "additional insured" on a policy of insurance did not operate to qualify him as a "named insured" within that policy. Id. at 62-63, 404 S.E.2d at 174-75.
"[A] subordinate division of the state, or agency exercising statutory governmental functions . . ., may be sued only when and as authorized by statute." Coleman v. Cooper, 102 N.C. App. 650, 658, 403 S.E.2d 577, 581 (quoting Smith v. Hefner, 235 N.C. 1, 6, 68 S.E.2d 783, 787 (1952)), disc. review denied, 329 N.C. 786, 408 S.E.2d 517 (1991). Over time, the General Assembly has enacted several different statutes which authorize suit against certain governmental entities and partially waive the defense of sovereign immunity with respect to those entities.
Id. In Coleman v. Cooper, 102 N.C. App. 650, 403 S.E.2d 577, disc. review denied, 329 N.C. 786, 408 S.E.2d 517 (1991), plaintiff brought a wrongful death action in superior court against the Wake County DSS and a DSS worker. This Court held that the Wake County DSS was an agent of the DHR when providing child protective services.
The deputy commissioner denied defendant's motion and defendant appealed to the Full Commission. The Full Commission also denied defendant's motion and held that this case was controlled by Coleman v. Cooper, 102 N.C. App. 650, 403 S.E.2d 577, disc. review denied, 329 N.C. 786, 408 S.E.2d 517 (1991). From this order, defendant appeals.