This contention is without merit because it overlooks the applicable statutes and case law and ignores the finding by the court that the child "is a delinquent child within the meaning of the law and that she is in need of the discipline and supervision of the state." See In re Burrus, 275 N.C. 517, 169 S.E.2d 879 (1969), affirmed, 403 U.S. 528, 29 L.Ed.2d 647, 91 S.Ct. 1976; In re Whichard, 8 N.C. App. 154, 174 S.E.2d 281 (1970), appeal dismissed, 276 N.C. 727; and G.S. 7A-285 and G.S. 7A-286. The record reveals that at the conclusion of the adjudicatory part of the hearing, the court proceeded to the disposition of the child as authorized by the provisions of G.S. 7A-285.
In the Juvenile Code, the General Assembly enacted procedural protections for juvenile offenders with the aim that delinquent children might be rehabilitated and reformed and become useful, law-abiding citizens. In re Whichard, 8 N.C. App. 154, 161, 174 S.E.2d 281, 285, appeal dismissed, 276 N.C. 727 (1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 940, 29 L.Ed.2d 719 (1971). These safeguards evince conceptual distinctions between the purpose of juvenile proceedings and that of adult criminal prosecutions.
However, the trial court was free to disbelieve respondent's testimony. See In re Whichard, 8 N.C. App. 154, 160, 174 S.E.2d 281, 285, appeal dismissed, 276 N.C. 727 (1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 940, 29 L. Ed. 2d 719 (1971) ("As the trier of the facts, the [district] court ha[s] the duty to determine the weight and credibility to be given to the evidence presented, and [it] could believe or disbelieve the testimony of any witness."). The court was not required to credit respondent's assertions that he had called DSS or that he directed his mother to provide items to Sara if it did not find them credible.
See also Boyd v. L.G. DeWitt Trucking Co., 103 N.C. App. 396, 401-403, 405 S.E.2d 914, 918-19, disc. rev. denied, 330 N.C. 193, 412 S.E.2d 53 (1991). On its facts this case is distinguishable from Brake v. Harper, 8 N.C. App. 327, 174 S.E.2d 74, cert. denied, 276 N.C. 727 (1970), in which an investigating officer's opinion about the driver's intoxication was supported in the record by nothing more than the officer's memory that the breathalyzer reading was below 0.10. Similarly, in Howard v. Parker, 95 N.C. App. 361, 382 S.E.2d 808 (1989), the allegations of intoxication without more would have been the sole basis for the jury's punitive damage award.
Unlike Brake v. Harper, 8 N.C. App. 327. 174 S.E.2d 74, cert. denied, 276 N.C. 727 (1970), where this Court refused to submit the issue of punitive damages to the jury, primarily because no basis was given for the officer's opinion that the defendant was impaired, the evidence in the case sub judice to that effect is ample. Defendant's intentional act of driving while impaired in violation of G.S. Sec. 20-138.1 is sufficiently wanton within the meaning of Hinson, supra, and Brewer v. Harris, 279 N.C. 288, 297, 182 S.E.2d 345, 350 (1971) (quoting Foster v. Hyman, 197 N.C. 189, 191, 148 S.E. 36, 37-38 (1929)) which states "[a]n act is wanton when it is done of wicked purpose, or when done needlessly, manifesting a reckless indifference to the rights of others."
We have found only one case in our jurisdiction where the issue of punitive damages in an automobile case involving a drinking driver was discussed. In Brake v. Harper, 8 N.C. App. 327, 174 S.E.2d 74, cert. denied, 276 N.C. 727 (1970), Judge Vaughn (now Chief Judge), writing for the Court, concluded that punitive damages were proper to punish intentionally wrongful conduct. The court held, however, "that under the facts of this case the court properly declined to submit the issues as to punitive damages."
In the case sub judice, however, the defendant was before the district court on a juvenile petition, and we have noted that when the institution to which a juvenile is committed is not of a penal character "`such investigation is not one to which the constitutional guaranty of a right to trial by jury extends, nor does the restraint put upon the child amount to a deprivation of liberty . . ., nor is it a punishment for crime.'" In re Whichard, 8 N.C. App. 154, 161, 174 S.E.2d 281, 285 (1970), appeal dismissed, 276 N.C. 727 (1970), quoting from In re Watson, 157 N.C. 340, 72 S.E. 1049 (1911). Indeed, our juvenile Court Act "treats `delinquent children not as criminals, but as wards and undertakes . . . to give them the control and environment that may lead to their reformation and enable them to become law-abiding and useful citizens, a support and not a hindrance to the Commonwealth.'"
The purpose of Article 23 as set out in G.S. 7A-277 is "to provide procedures and resources for children under the age of sixteen years which are different in purpose and philosophy from the procedures applicable to criminal cases involving adults." See In re Whichard, 8 N.C. App. 154, 174 S.E.2d 281, appeal dismissed 276 N.C. 727 (1970). G.S. 7A-285 provides that "The juvenile hearing shall be a simple judicial process designed to adjudicate the existence or nonexistence of any of the conditions defined by G.S. 7A-278 (1) through (5) which have been alleged to exist, . . ."