Petitions for Certiorari to the Court of Appeals

14 Citing cases

  1. State v. Stewart

    40 N.C. App. 693 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979)   Cited 6 times

    1977 N.C. Sess. Laws Chs. 106 and 167. The purpose of the General Assembly in enacting the chapter clearly was to facilitate the protection of wildlife from indiscriminate slaughter. As the State's wildlife population is a natural resource of the State held by it in trust for its citizens, the enactment of laws reasonably related to the protection of such wildlife constitutes a valid exercise of the police power vested in the General Assembly. Baldwin v. Montana Fish and Game Comm'n., 436 U.S. 371, 56 L.Ed.2d 354, 98 S.Ct. 1852 (1978); State v. Lassiter, 13 N.C. App. 292, 185 S.E.2d 478 (1971); cert. denied, 280 N.C. 495, 186 S.E.2d 514; appeal dismissed, 280 N.C. 724, 186 S.E.2d 926 (1972). In reviewing an exercise of the police power by the General Assembly, the only duty of the courts is to ascertain whether the act violates any constitutional limitation, the question of public policy being solely one for the legislature.

  2. Wilson v. Commonwealth

    225 Va. 33 (Va. 1983)   Cited 9 times
    Holding that "a presumption is not unconstitutional if, as applied in this case, there was a rational connection between the proved and presumed facts"

    Statutes in other states with presumptions similar to the first presumption in Sec. 29-144.2 have generally been upheld. See State v. Lassiter, 13 N.C. App. 292, 185 S.E.2d 478 (1971), cert. denied, 280 N.C. 495, 186 S.E.2d 514, appeal dismissed, 280 N.C. 724, 186 S.E.2d 926 (1972); Williams v. State, 239 So.2d 583 (Fla. 1970); State v. Person, 56 Wn.2d 283, 352 P.2d 189 (1960); Annot., 81 A.L.R.2d 1093 (1962). But see State v. Rogers, 83 Wn.2d 553, 520 P.2d 159, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1053 (1974).

  3. Mason v. Erwin

    157 N.C. App. 284 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003)   Cited 17 times

    However, once that contract is adopted as a consent order, the trial court may modify the terms of the order according to G.S. § 50-13.7. In re Custody of Mason, 13 N.C. App. 334, 185 S.E.2d 433 (1971), cert. denied, 280 N.C. 495, 186 S.E.2d 513 (1972). Therefore, the trial court's findings and conclusions that defendant paid inadequate child support provides justification for the trial court acting within its discretion to order defendant to pay appropriate attorney fees.

  4. In re Stumbo

    143 N.C. App. 375 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001)   Cited 1 times

    "A search ordinarily involves prying into hidden places, and a seizure contemplates forcible dispossession." State v. Fry, 13 N.C. App. 39, 44, 185 S.E.2d 256, 259-60 (1971), cert. denied, 280 N.C. 495, 186 S.E.2d 514 (1972). Here, we need not reach respondents' contention that social workers conducting a DSS investigation of child neglect are state actors for Fourth Amendment purposes because this case involves neither a search nor a seizure and, therefore, does not implicate respondents' Fourth Amendment rights.

  5. State v. Hairston

    137 N.C. App. 352 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000)   Cited 35 times

    This Court has concluded that in order for a prima facie evidence rule to be constitutional there must be a rational connection between the fact proved and the ultimate fact presumed so that the inference of the one from proof of the other is not unreasonable or arbitrary. State v. Lassiter, 13 N.C. App. 292, 297, 185 S.E.2d 478, 482 (1971), cert. denied, 280 N.C. 495, 186 S.E.2d 514, appeal dismissed, 280 N.C. 724, 186 S.E.2d 926 (1972). Applying the rational connection test to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-7.4, it is clear that there is a rational connection between the fact of three prior felony convictions under the same name as an alleged habitual felon, and the ultimate fact that the person so named in the three prior felony convictions is the same as the alleged habitual felon.

  6. Hedrick v. Hedrick

    90 N.C. App. 151 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988)   Cited 7 times
    Holding adoptive stepfather was not a necessary party to action for visitation under N.C.G.S. § 50-13.2A, where adoption was not yet finalized when grandparents filed motion to intervene and "[w]hatever rights [the stepfather] was to gain in becoming an adoptive parent had not vested at the time of the hearing"

    The decision of the trial judge in the case sub judice should not be upset on appeal absent a clear showing of abuse of discretion. See In re Mason, 13 N.C. App. 334, 185 S.E.2d 433 (1971), cert. denied, 280 N.C. 495, 186 S.E.2d 513 (1972). Respondent emphasized that the grandparents had not maintained contact with the grandchildren since April of 1986, one year prior to the hearing, and that all previous contact with the grandchildren was intermittent. It is clear from the record that April 1986 is the precise time that the respondent prohibited the grandparents from visiting her children.

  7. King v. Demo

    40 N.C. App. 661 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979)   Cited 16 times

    The decision of the trial judge in child custody proceedings ought not to be upset on appeal absent a clear showing of abuse of discretion. See In re Mason, 13 N.C. App. 334, 185 S.E.2d 433 (1971), cert. denied, 280 N.C. 495, 186 S.E.2d 513 (1972). Except as stated with respect to visitation rights, we find no error in the trial judge's exercise of discretion.

  8. State v. Thompson

    37 N.C. App. 628 (N.C. Ct. App. 1978)   Cited 4 times

    Chief Judge Mallard, writing for this court, quoted from Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 29 L.Ed.2d 564, 91 S.Ct. 2022 (1971), in which it is said that "[w]hat the plain view cases have in common is that the police officer in each of them had a prior justification for an intrusion in the course of which he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused." State v. Fry, 13 N.C. App. 39, 45, 185 S.E.2d 256, 260 (1971), cert. denied, 280 N.C. 495, 186 S.E.2d 514 (1972). In Fry the police officer was investigating a traffic violation and opened the door of a van to see the occupants therein.

  9. State v. Carr

    21 N.C. App. 470 (N.C. Ct. App. 1974)   Cited 12 times
    In Carr, record evidence showed that a stolen vehicle was actually owned by an electronics business, while the charging document alleged the car was property owned by the business owner's son.

    When police officers lawfully enter a person's premises and observe evidence of a crime in plain view, they may seize it without obtaining a search warrant. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); State v. Duboise, 279 N.C. 73, 181 S.E.2d 393; State v. Bell, 270 N.C. 25, 153 S.E.2d 741; State v. Fry, 13 N.C. App. 39, 185 S.E.2d 256, cert. denied and appeal dismissed, 280 N.C. 495, 186 S.E.2d 514. Defendant Davis contends that even if the pipes and tapes were properly admitted, the court should have instructed the jury to consider these items of evidence only against defendant Carr and not against Davis. The court properly refused to give such an instruction, for the pipes and tapes were relevant to the case against each defendant.

  10. State v. Young

    204 S.E.2d 556 (N.C. Ct. App. 1974)   Cited 2 times

    When police officers discover evidence of a crime in plain view, without the necessity of a search, they may seize the evidence without obtaining a search warrant. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); State v. Duboise, 279 N.C. 73, 181 S.E.2d 393; State v. Bell, 270 N.C. 25, 153 S.E.2d 741; State v. Fry, 13 N.C. App. 39, 185 S.E.2d 256, cert. denied and appeal dismissed, 280 N.C. 495, 186 S.E.2d 514. In this case defendant's car was in plain view when the police officers went to Brookwood Trailer Park to find defendant.