Div. 2016) (quoting Casino Reinvestment Dev. Auth. v. Lustgarten, 332 N.J. Super. 472, 488 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 165 N.J. 607 (2000)). We generally defer to a trial judge's discretionary dispositions unless convinced "the court has abused its discretion or its determination is based on a mistaken understanding of the applicable law."

On appeal, Curley contends that Klem is not entitled to immunity from liability for the state law claims because actions involving the discharge of police firearms fall outside the ambit of the immunity provisions of the New Jersey Tort Claims Act. Curley's argument relies upon Alston v. City of Camden, 332 N.J.Super. 240, 753 A.2d 171 (2000), cert. granted, 165 N.J. 607, 762 A.2d 221 (2000), a case decided by the Appellate Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey. After the briefs for this appeal had already been filed, however, the New Jersey Supreme Court reversed the Appellate Division, holding that the putative exception created by the Appellate Division for injuries resulting from the use and handling of police firearms was inconsistent with the Tort Claims Act, its legislative history, case law, and subsequent amendments to the Act.

See N.J. Ct. R. 2:9-1(a) ("The appellate court may at any time entertain a motion for directions to the court or courts or agencies below or to modify or vacate any order made by such courts or agencies or by any judge below."); see also, Musto v. Vidas, 333 N.J. Super. 52, 67 (App. Div.) (remanded to trial court to consider motion to supplement while appeal was pending), certif. denied, 165 N.J. 607 (2000). "Factors to be considered on a motion to supplement include (1) whether at the time of the hearing or trial, the applicant knew of the information he or she now seeks to include in the record, and (2) if the evidence were included, whether it is likely to affect the outcome."

"[T]he basic issue to consider in deciding whether to sever counts from one another is whether evidence of the offenses sought to be severed would be admissible under N.J.R.E. 404(b) in the trial of the remaining charge." State v. Keys, 331 N.J.Super. 480, 491 (Law.Div.1998), aff'd, 331 N.J.Super. 429 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 165 N.J. 607 (2000)."Central to the inquiry is 'whether, assuming the charges were tried separately, evidence of the offenses sought to be severed would be admissible under N.J.R.E. 404(b) in the trial of the remaining charges.'"

Div.) certif. denied, 177 N.J. 492, 828 A.2d 919 (2003) (noting the importance of making more than a generalized claim of prejudice resulting from a violation of the Vienna Convention); State v. Cevallos-Bermeo, 333 N.J. Super. 181, 185-86, 754 A.2d 1224 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 165 N.J. 607, 762 A.2d 221 (2000) (same). Defendant, after his arrest, had the services of an able criminal defense attorney at his disposal.

The New Jersey Supreme Court denied certification on October 31, 2000. State v. Cevallos-Bermeo, 165 N.J. 607 (2000). Thereafter, on or about December 11, 2000, petitioner filed a state action for post-conviction relief ("PCR"), which was denied by the court on October 11, 2001.

(remanded to trial court to consider motion to supplement while appeal was pending), certifs. denied,165 N.J. 607, 762 A.2d 221 (2000). Although we have not previously addressed this issue, we note that in the context of an application to supplement the record from an appeal from an administrative agency pursuant to Rule 2:5-5(b), our Appellate Division has provided guidance in determining when the court should grant such a motion.

In re Estate of Lash, 169 N.J. 20, 34, 776 A.2d 765 (2001). Unless the award "represents a manifest denial of justice," an appellate court should not interfere. Musto v. Vidas, 333 N.J.Super. 52, 74, 754 A.2d 586 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 165 N.J. 607, 762 A.2d 221 (2000). Both the trial court and the Appellate Division concluded that awarding prejudgment interest to the County was appropriate, but they differed on the starting date. It is obvious that the County's cause of action for unjust enrichment/disgorgement is an equitable claim.

We thought that issue was laid to rest in Mogull v. CB Commercial Real Estate Group,Inc., 162 N.J. 449, 472, 744 A.2d 1186, 1199-1200, certif.denied, 165 N.J. 607, 762 A.2d 221 (2000). There, we specifically approved of the Appellate Division's contrary holding in Baker, supra, 312 N.J.Super. at 288,711 A.2d at 927, to the effect that it is unnecessary to charge the jury on the elements of the prima facie case.

Alston v. City of Camden, 332 N.J. Super. 240, 249 (2000). This Court granted certification, 165 N.J. 607 (2000). II