May 28, 2015) (omission in original) (quoting State v. Gottlieb, No. A-3391-97 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Feb. 15, 2000) (ECF No. 15-5), certification denied 165 N.J. 486 (2000)). The Honorable Leonard N. Arnold, J.S.C., sentenced Gottlieb to life imprisonment with twenty-five years of parole ineligibility, as well as one five-year term to run concurrently, and one five-year term to run consecutively.

This may be accomplished, in appropriate circumstances, through defendant's physical presence at sidebar when safety is not a concern, through minimal use of standby counsel as a conduit, by sending the jury to the jury room and having the discussion in open court (as was done on several occasions here), or even through advances in courtroom technology. See, e.g., State v. Cook, 330 N.J. Super 395, 415 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 165 N.J. 486 (2000) (explaining that defendant who was not permitted to be physically present at sidebars "was given use of a wireless listening device whereby he could sit at counsel table" and listen to what was being discussed at sidebar). In circumstances in which trial courts determine that defendants should not be allowed at sidebar, we expect that the legitimate security concerns that necessitate such a finding will be detailed clearly on the record.

State v. Rolex, 329 N.J. Super. 220, 226 (App.Div.), certif.denied, 165 N.J. 486 (2000). As a result, the Appellate Division remanded the case for supplementation of the record regarding the actual operation of a no appearance/no waiver agreement.

On February 15, 2000, the Appellate Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey affirmed the conviction and sentence, and on July 7, 2000, the New Jersey Supreme Court denied certification. See State v. Gottlieb, 165 N.J. 486 (2000) (table). Gottlieb does not indicate in his § 2241 Petition whether or not he pursued post-conviction relief.

The New Jersey Supreme Court denied certification on July 7, 2000. State v. Flores, 165 N.J. 486 (2000) (table). Petitioner states that he filed his first state petition for post-conviction relief in the Law Division on October 30, 2001. (Dkt. 1 at 3.)

Consider N.J.S.A. 46:16-1.1 (allowing for recordation of judgments, among other writings), and Sonderman v. Remington Const. Co., Inc., 127 N.J. 96 (1992) (regarding nonmonetary judgments affecting real property), and Gibau v. Klein, 329 N.J. Super. 227 (App. Div. 2000), cert, denied, 165 N.J. 486 (2000). See discussion in Part III (B)(4), infra.

) as against deeds recorded by BFPs,Consider N.J.S.A. 46:16–1.1 (allowing for recordation of judgments, among other writings), and Sonderman v. Remington Const. Co., Inc., 127 N.J. 96, 603 A.2d 1 (1992) (regarding nonmonetary judgments affecting real property), and Gibau v. Klein, 329 N.J.Super. 227, 747 A.2d 316 (App.Div.2000), cert. denied, 165 N.J. 486, 758 A.2d 646 (2000). See discussion in Part III(B)(4), infra.

State v. Cook , 330 N.J.Super. 395, 412, 750 A .2d 91 (App. Div.), certif. denied , 165 N.J. 486, 758 A .2d 646 (2000). The purpose of the IAD is "to encourage the expeditious and orderly disposition of [outstanding] charges and determination of the proper status of any and all detainers based on untried indictments, informations or complaints."

[ N.J.R.E. 611(a).] That inherent power extends to a criminal defendant's location and movement within the courtroom, State v. Davenport, 177 N.J. 288, 827 A.2d 1063 (2003); State v. Cook, 330 N.J.Super. 395, 750 A.2d 91 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 165 N.J. 486, 758 A.2d 646 (2000), as well as permitting a "support person" to sit near a child sexual abuse victim while the child testifies. State v. T.E., 342 N.J.Super. 14,775 A.2d 686 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 170 N.J. 86,784 A.2d 719 (2001).

This may be accomplished in appropriate circumstances through defendant's physical presence at sidebar when safety is not a concern, through minimal use of standby counsel as a conduit, by sending the jury to the jury room and having the discussion in open court (as was done on several occasions here), or even through advances in courtroom technology. See e.g.,State v. Cook, 330 N.J.Super. 395, 415, 750 A.2d 91 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 165 N.J. 486, 758 A.2d 646 (2000) (explaining that defendant who was not permitted to be physically present at sidebars "was given use of a wireless listening device whereby he could sit at counsel table" and listen to what was being discussed at sidebar). In circumstances in which trial courts determine that defendants should not be allowed at sidebar, we expect that the legitimate security concerns that necessitate such a finding will be detailed clearly on the record.