Petitions for Allowance of Appeal

14 Citing cases

  1. Palmer v. Bartosh

    959 A.2d 508 (Pa. Cmmw. Ct. 2008)   Cited 30 times
    In Palmer, a public school teacher brought an action against two school district administrators, in both their official and individual capacities, asserting various state law tort and constitutional claims, alleging the two administrators worked together to terminate him from his school district employment.

    The policy or custom need not be formally adopted; rather, it may come into existence after a single incident if that incident involves a policymaker. Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 89 L.Ed.2d 452 (1986); MacMillen v. Lock Haven Hospital, 120 Pa. Cmwlth. 444, 548 A.2d 706 (1988), appeal denied, 522 Pa. 580, 559 A.2d 41 (1989). Here, because the Palmers failed to plead the existence of a District policy or custom establishing a causal nexus between the District and the Defendants' conduct or that the Defendants are policymakers for the District, the Palmers failed to state a cause of action against the Defendants in their official capacities under Section 1983.

  2. Margaitis v. Deacon

    2005 Ct. Sup. 3051 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2005)

    (Citations omitted.) Lara, Inc. v. Dorney Park Coaster Co., 116 Pa.Commw.Ct 548, 554, 542 A.2d 220 (1988), cert. denied, 522 Pa. 580, 559 A.2d 40 (1989). Oregon has also treated a license as irrevocable. "Oregon is one of a minority of jurisdictions which recognize the possibility of an irrevocable license . . . [O]ne who induces another to make significant expenditures for permanent improvements in reasonable reliance upon one's promise to allow a permanent use of land is subsequently estopped from revoking the license."

  3. THE PMA GROUP v. W.C.A.B

    768 A.2d 917 (Pa. Cmmw. Ct. 2001)   Cited 3 times

    The Barna, Beissel, and Cedar Farms cases involved a challenge concerning the work-relatedness of the claimant's injuries and, therefore, the issue in dispute was the viability of the claim. Where, as here, the issue concerns the shifting of liability from one carrier to another for an admittedly compensable claim, the rationale of these cases (knowledge of the facts and opportunity to investigate) is not controlling. Birmingham Fire Ins. Co. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board (Kennedy), 657 A.2d 96 (Pa.Cmwlth. 1995); Sunset Golf Course v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board (Department of Public Welfare), 595 A.2d 213 (Pa.Cmwlth. 1991), appeal denied, 529 Pa. 654, 602 A.2d 863 (1992); Swartz v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board (Dutch Pantry), 543 A.2d 201 (Pa.Cmwlth. 1988), appeals denied, 522 Pa. 580, 559 A.2d 40 (1989) and 522 Pa. 581, 559 A.2d 41 (1989). In Swartz, Aetna Insurance Company (Aetna) paid benefits to a claimant pursuant to an NCP and concluded payments with the signing of a final receipt.

  4. Schrader Bellows v. W.C.A.B

    711 A.2d 578 (Pa. Cmmw. Ct. 1998)   Cited 5 times
    In Schrader Bellows, the claimant suffered, over numerous years, multiple incidents of contact dermatitis due to the coolants used by the employer, and the claimant's physician testified that, due to the airborne nature of the coolants, "regardless of where in the plant or which type of position [the e]mployer would provide, [the c]laimant will continue to experience the dermatitis as long as he is working at [the e]mployer's facility."

    Rather, Employer asserts that, because the Claimant's symptoms resolved, he is presently no longer disabled and is not entitled to benefits. Employer cites Mancini's Bakery v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board (Leone), 625 A.2d 1308 (Pa. Commw. 1993); Schwartz v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal (Dutch Pantry Restaurant), 543 A.2d 201 (Pa.Commw. 1988), petition for allowance of appeal denied, 522 Pa. 580, 559 A.2d 40 (1989), for the proposition that the risk of future dermatitis is not a compensable injury. However, in Bethlehem Steel Corporation v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board (Boles), 677 A.2d 857 (Pa. Commw. 1996), we specifically distinguished Swartz and Mancini's Bakery from Farquhar because, in the former cases, the claimants did not establish that they were unfit or unable to perform their duties when they returned to work.

  5. Chester v. Chester Redevelopment Auth

    686 A.2d 30 (Pa. Cmmw. Ct. 1996)   Cited 13 times
    Discussing the "separate and distinct" standards for preliminary and permanent injunctions

    It is well established that separate and distinct standards govern a request for preliminary injunction and a request for permanent injunction: a preliminary injunction turns on the presence of imminent, irreparable harm, while a permanent injunction is warranted if no adequate remedy at law exists for a legal wrong. LARA, Inc. v. Dorney Park Coaster Co., 116 Pa. Commw. 548, 542 A.2d 220 (1988), appeal denied, 522 Pa. 580, 559 A.2d 40 (1989). Consequently, it is inappropriate for a court to treat a preliminary injunction hearing as a final injunction proceeding without providing a full hearing.

  6. Berger v. West Jefferson Hill School

    669 A.2d 1084 (Pa. Cmmw. Ct. 1995)   Cited 11 times
    In Berger v. West Jefferson Hill School District, 669 A.2d 1084, 1086 (Pa.Cmwlth. 1995), this Court noted the well-established principle that "a court may not treat a hearing for a preliminary injunction as a final hearing and as a basis for a permanent injunction, unless the parties stipulate to the contrary."

    Second, it is well established that a court may not treat a hearing for a preliminary injunction as a final hearing and as a basis for a permanent injunction, unless the parties stipulate to the contrary. LARA, Inc. v. Dorney Park Coaster Co., Inc, 116 Pa. Commw. 548, 542 A.2d 220 (1988), petition for allowance of appeal denied, 522 Pa. 580, 559 A.2d 40 (1989); Soja, Crestwood School District v. Topito, 76 Pa. Commw. 321, 463 A.2d 1247 (1983). The rationale against integration of these two proceedings is that separate and distinct standards control a request for a preliminary injunction, on the one hand, and a request for a permanent injunction, on the other.

  7. Reliable Foods v. W.C.A.B

    660 A.2d 162 (Pa. Cmmw. Ct. 1995)   Cited 14 times
    Holding that where a claimant is receiving partial disability benefits following a return to work and, then, is totally disabled as a result of a new injury, the claimant is entitled to receive compensation for both injuries concurrently, so long as the maximum compensation payable is not exceeded

    The present case is not the first wherein the evidence accepted by the fact finder could support a finding of either a recurrence or an aggravation, depending on the reasoning applied. For example, in Swartz v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board (Dutch Pantry Restaurant), 117 Pa. Commw. 47, 543 A.2d 201 (1988), petitions for allowance of appeal denied, 522 Pa. 580, 559 A.2d 40 and 522 Pa. 581, 559 A.2d 41 (1989), the claimant was initially injured in May of 1984 by a chemical burn to her hands, incurring a skin infection and dermatitis. After signing a final receipt, the claimant returned to work with restrictions not to use chemical solutions.

  8. NAT. UNDERGROUND STG. v. WCAB

    658 A.2d 1389 (Pa. Cmmw. Ct. 1995)   Cited 3 times
    Noting claimant's injury was not underlying allergy but allergic reaction

    There is simply no evidence to support a finding of a recurrence of a prior injury. Insurers rely on Swartz v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board (Dutch Pantry Restaurant), 117 Pa. Commw. 47, 543 A.2d 201 (1988), petitions for allowance of appeal denied, 522 Pa. 580, 559 A.2d 40, and 522 Pa. 581, 559 A.2d 41 (1989). Swartz, however, is clearly distinguishable from the instant case.

  9. Williams v. W.C.A.B

    166 Pa. Commw. 276 (Pa. Cmmw. Ct. 1994)   Cited 8 times

    In a worker's compensation case, the application of equitable estoppel must be restricted in light of statutory constraints. Swartz v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board (Dutch Pantry Restaurant), 117 Pa. Commw. 47, 543 A.2d 201 (1988), appeals denied, 522 Pa. 580, 581, 559 A.2d 40, 41 (1989). Under Section 406.1 of the Act, an employer must promptly investigate the claim and commence payment of compensation within twenty-one days after its notice or knowledge of an employee's disability (1) pursuant to the parties' agreement establishing the compensation payment or (2) if no such agreement has been entered into, pursuant to a notice of compensation payable unilaterally acknowledging its liability. If the employer controverts its liability for the injury, the employer must issue a notice of compensation denial within twenty-one days of its notice or knowledge of the employee's disability.

  10. J.B. Steven, Inc. v. Board of Com'rs

    164 Pa. Commw. 315 (Pa. Cmmw. Ct. 1994)   Cited 9 times

    The remedy requested here by JBS falls within an exception set out in subsection (c). See Kallmann v. Carlisle Zoning Hearing Board, 117 Pa. Commw. 499, 543 A.2d 1273 (1988), petition for allowance of appeal denied, 522 Pa. 580, 559 A.2d 40 (1989) (objectors' declaratory judgment complaint was a disguised appeal attempting to challenge the zoning hearing board's grant of a variance). As the objectors did in Kallmann, JBS here seeks to overturn a decision by a tribunal through declaratory judgment, an action not available under the DJA.