Were it necessary to do so there is abundant authority to support the view that the courts do have such power. Petition of Florida State Bar Ass'n, 1938, 134 Fla. 851, 186 So. 280; Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Kellogg, 1949, 338 Ill. App. 618, 88 N.E.2d 519; In re Baker, 1951, 8 N.J. 321, 85 A.2d 505; West Virginia State Bar v. Earley, 109 S.E.2d 420, supra. The next question then is whether this Court may enforce its authority in such matters by either or both contempt proceedings and injunction.
December 2, 1948, the Committee on Bar Integration, Florida State Bar Association, exhibited its petition, praying for a rule integrating the Florida Bar. A similar petition was filed in 1937, praying for the adoption of rules to regulate procedure and integrate the bar. Our opinion in response to the latter petition is reported in 134 Fla. 851, 186 So. 280, but the question of integration as treated here was not considered. The petition in this case alleges that in September 1947, the Florida State Bar Association made a complete roster of the Florida Bar, which was found to contain the names of 2,700 lawyers.
The charges were clearly proven as to some of them; as to others they were admitted or not controverted, or there was no showing why the order made was improper. In this case the Circuit Court held in effect that as an individual appellant may seek shelter under the Fifth Amendment, but if he does and refuses to answer whether or not he is now or has ever been a member of the Communist Party, or other subversive organizations, the privilege to practice law may be withdrawn from him and his name stricken from the roll of attorneys. The Code of Ethics, 145 Fla. 763, 31 F.S.A. 420, Section 1, Oath of Admission; Petition of Florida State Bar Ass'n, 134 Fla. 851, 186 So. 280; Petition of Florida State Bar Ass'n, Fla. 1949, 40 So.2d 902; Lambdin v. State, supra, and Joopanenko v. Gavagan, Fla. 1953, 67 So.2d 434, are relied on to support this holding. We agree that no lawyer trained and educated in the democratic tradition can become a member of the Communist Party or other subversive organization without forfeiting his privilege to practice law.
There can be no doubt that this court has inherent power to regulate the practice in the courts of this state, including the right to prescribe the qualifications for admission to the Bar of this state. And we have repeatedly so held. See Petition of Florida State Bar Association, 134 Fla. 851, 186 So. 280. But the concurrent jurisdiction of the Legislature and this court in the field of admissions to the Bar was expressly recognized in that case, as it was again in a later Petition of Florida State Bar Association for Promulgation of New Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, 145 Fla. 223, 199 So. 57, 58. In the case last cited, Mr. Justice Terrell, in speaking of the constitutional powers of the Legislature under Sections 20 and 21 of Article III of the Constitution, F.S.A., said: "I do not construe these provisions to be exclusive but supplemental to the power of the courts to prescribe rules regulating contempts, admission to the bar, and for the conduct of judicial business.
This Court has approved the doctrine but it has never attempted to limit or define the scope of its power in that field. Petition of the Florida State Bar Association, 134 Fla. 851, 186 So. 280. If not limited in the Constitution, the great weight of authority in this country supports the view that courts have inherent power to make rules governing contempt, admissions to the bar, and for the conduct of the business brought before them.
Konrad v. Jefferson Parish Council, 520 So.2d 393 (La. 1988). This inherent power, which has been used to regulate the admission of attorneys to the practice of law, see In re Florida State Bar Ass'n, 134 Fla. 851, 186 So. 280 (1938), is a necessary concomitant to the judicial power, but pertains to the administration of the business of the courts.Konrad, supra at 397.
Many years ago, when this Court was first asked to require that all applicants seeking admission to the practice of law have a college degree and have graduated from an approved law school, we rejected that requirement, finding that other means of obtaining experience for admission to the practice of law should be permitted. See Petition of Florida State Bar Association, 134 Fla. 851, 186 So. 280 (1938). Nevertheless, we still required all applicants to have the equivalent of a high school education and to have completed approved courses in the study of law; we did not allow admission based on experience alone.
La.C.J.P. art. 19 recognizes that a juvenile court "possesses inherently all powers necessary for the exercise of its jurisdiction". The doctrine of inherent powers has been utilized to provide the power to punish for contempt, United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812); to adopt rules of practice, State ex rel Ross v. Call, 39 Fla. 504, 22 So. 748 (1897); to regulate lawyer admission to practice and lawyer discipline, In re Florida State Bar Association, 134 Fla. 851, 186 So.2d 280 (1938); and to require the appropriation or expenditure of funds reasonably necessary for the court's functioning as a court, Lancaster County v. Brinthall, 29 Pa. 38 (1857); Note, Judicial Financial Autonomy and Inherent Power, 57 Cornell L.Rev. 975 (1972). The doctrine exists because it is essential to the survival of the judiciary as an independent branch of government.
A long line of case law in other jurisdictions affirms the inherent power of the judiciary to regulate the unauthorized practice of law. See, e.g., Petition of Florida State Bar Ass'n, 134 Fla. 851, 186 So. 280 (1938); State v. Sperry, 140 So.2d 587 (Fla. 1962); Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Kellogg, 338 Ill. App. 618, 88 N.E.2d 519 (1949); In re Baker, 8 N.J. 321, 85 A.2d 505 (1951); R.J. Edwards, Inc. v. Hert, 504 P.2d 407 (Okla. 1972); West Virginia State Bar v. Earley, 144 W. Va. 504, 109 S.E.2d 420 (1959). See also American Bar Association, Unauthorized Practice Handbook (1972); Comment, Control of the Unauthorized Practice of Law: Scope of Inherent Judicial Power, 28 U. Chi. L. Rev. 162 (1960); Comment, Remedies Available to Control the Unauthorized Practice of Law, 62 Colum. L. Rev. 501 (1962).
authority. Code of Alabama 1940, as Recompiled 1958, Title 46, Sections 26, 27(1), 29, 30(2), 34, 39 and 42; Ex Parte Thompson, 228 Ala. 113, 152 So. 279 (1933); In Re Fite, 228 Ala. 4, 152 So. 246 (1933); In Re Dozier, 262 Ala. 197, 77 So.2d 903 (1955); Land Title Company v. State Ex Rel. Porter, 292 Ala. 691, 229 So.2d 289 (1974); Ex ParteBanks, 254 Ala. 117, 48 So.2d 35 (1950); Yielding v. State, 232 Ala. 292, 167 So. 580 (1936); State Ex Rel. Wilkinson v. Lane, 181 Ala. 646, 62 So. 31 (1913); In Re Opinion of The Justices, 232 Ala. 56, 166 So. 706 (1936); City of Dothan v. Lucus, 47 Ala. App. 336, 254 So.2d 341 (1971); State Ex Rel. Highsmith v. Brown Service Funeral Home, 236 Ala. 249, 182 So. 18 (1938); Ables v. Southern Railway Company, 164 Ala. 356, 51 So. 327 (1909); 73 Am.Jur.2d, Section 378; Ex Parte Banks, 254 Ala. 117, 48 So.2d 35 (1950); Code of Alabama 1940, as Recompiled 1958, Title 46, Section 34 (Annotation thereunder); In Petition of Florida State Bar Association, 134 Fla. 851, 186 So. 280 (1938); Barr v. Watts, 70 So.2d 347 (Fla. 1956). The Alabama legislature has, for more than 50 years, regulated the admissions to practice law in this state.