¶41 This Court has held that when ineffective assistance of counsel claims can be decided upon the record, such claims are appropriate for consideration on direct appeal. In re Petition of Evans (1991), 250 Mont. 172, 819 P.2d 156. But, when ineffective assistance of counsel claims require consideration of factual matters outside the record, the claims are inappropriate in the context of a direct appeal.

Section 46-21-105(2), MCA (1995), provides that grounds for relief which reasonably could have been raised on direct appeal may not be raised thereafter in a petition for postconviction relief. In that regard, where ineffective assistance of counsel claims are based on facts of record in the underlying case, they must be raised in the direct appeal; conversely, where the allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel cannot be documented from the record in the underlying case, those claims must be raised by petition for postconviction relief. See, e.g., State v. Bromgard (1995), 273 Mont. 20, 23, 901 P.2d 611, 613 (citation omitted); Petition of Evans (1991), 250 Mont. 172, 173, 819 P.2d 156, 157 (citation omitted). ¶ 13.

IAC claims are reviewable on direct appeal only if record-based (i.e., the record fully manifests the rationale for the disputed action or inaction), or on the rare occasion that no plausible reasonable justification exists for the subject action or inaction. See, e.g, State v. Olson, 2014 MT 8, ¶ 20, 373 Mont. 262, 317 P.3d 159; State v. Briscoe, 2012 MT 152, ¶ 10, 365 Mont. 383, 282 P.3d 657; State v. Fender, 2007 MT 268, ¶ 9, 339 Mont. 395, 170 P.3d 971; State v. White, 2001 MT 149, ¶ 20, 306 Mont. 58, 30 P.3d 340; Hagen v. State, 1999 MT 8, ¶ 12, 293 Mont. 60, 973 P.2d 233; In re Evans, 250 Mont. 172, 173, 819 P.2d 156, 157 (1991).

; Upshaw, ¶ 34; State v. Fender, 2007 MT 268, ¶ 9, 339 Mont. 395, 170 P.3d 971; State v. Kougl, 2004 MT 243, ¶¶ 14-21, 323 Mont. 6, 97 P.3d 1095; Hagen v. State, 1999 MT 8, ¶¶ 12-15, 293 Mont. 60, 973 P.2d 233; In re Evans, 250 Mont. 172, 173, 819 P.2d 156, 157 (1991). Accord State v. Denny, 2021 MT 104, ¶ 37, 404 Mont. 116, 485 P.3d 1227 (non-record-based IAC claims not amenable to review on direct appeal except where there can be "no legitimate reason for counsel's actions or inactions" - citing Kougl, ¶ 15). See also State v. White, 2001 MT 149, ¶ 20, 306 Mont. 58, 30 P.3d 340 (IAC claims are record-based only if the record fully manifests the rationale for the subject action or inaction).

¶39 Moreover, we generally do not address non-record-based IAC claims on direct appeal. State v. Fender , 2007 MT 268, ¶ 9, 339 Mont. 395, 170 P.3d 971 ; Hagen v. State , 1999 MT 8, ¶ 13, 293 Mont. 60, 973 P.2d 233 ; In re Evans , 250 Mont. 172, 173, 819 P.2d 156, 157 (1991). IAC claims are record-based only if the record fully manifests counsel's rationale for the disputed action or inaction.

We do so — and must continue to do so — to prevent the abuse of postconviction proceedings by those who would substitute those proceedings for direct appeal and in order to preserve the integrity of the trial level proceedings and direct appeal. See, e.g., Hanson, ¶ 16; Mothka v. State (1997), 281 Mont. 175, 177, 931 P.2d 1331, 1333; Kills on Top v. State (1995), 273 Mont. 32, 60, 901 P.2d 1368, 1386; Petition of Manula (1993), 263 Mont. 166, 169, 866 P.2d 1127, 1129; Petition of Evans (1991), 250 Mont. 172, 819 P.2d 156; Tecca v. McCormick (1990), 246 Mont. 317, 806 P.2d 11. We also must continue to do so because the statutes controlling postconviction relief proceedings were duly enacted by the Legislature and we must apply them by their terms (absent a successful constitutional challenge, which is not at issue in the present case).

ed thereafter in a petition for postconviction relief. When ineffective assistance of counsel claims are based on facts of record in the underlying case, they must be raised in the direct appeal; conversely, where the allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel cannot be documented from the record in the underlying case, those claims must be raised by petition for postconviction relief. See Hagen, ¶ 12 (holding that where ineffective assistance of counsel claims are based on facts of record in the underlying case, they must be raised in the direct appeal; and where the allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel cannot be documented from the record in the underlying case, those claims must be raised by petition for postconviction relief); State v. Bromgard (1995), 273 Mont. 20, 23, 901 P.2d 611, 613 (holding that allegations based on facts that cannot be documented from the record in the underlying case must be raised by petition for postconviction relief); Petition of Evans (1991), 250 Mont. 172, 173, 819 P.2d 156, 157 (holding that ineffective assistance of counsel claims are inappropriate in direct review if the claim requires consideration of factual matter outside of the record). A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is based on the record and must be raised on direct appeal if the allegations can be established or disproved on facts that can be documented solely from the record presented on appeal. See Bromgard, 273 Mont. at 23, 901 P.2d at 613; State v. Courchen (1992), 256 Mont. 381, 389, 847 P.2d 271, 275-76.

See, e.g., In re Evans (1991), 250 Mont. 172, 173, 819 P.2d 156, 157-58. ¶ 15 Affirmed.

Here, Baker could reasonably have preserved his issues 1, 7, 9-14, 17 and 19, on their merits by first raising them in District Court. Having failed to do so the sole issue which he may now raise is one of ineffective assistance of counsel, by reason of the failure of counsel to preserve those issues. Unless a post-conviction petitioner can demonstrate a fundamental miscarriage of justice (which Baker has failed to do here), we will consistently apply the procedural bar. See, Eiler; Petition of Evans (1991), 250 Mont. 172, 819 P.2d 156; McColley; Duncan v. State (1990), 243 Mont. 232, 794 P.2d 331; Tecca v. McCormick (1990), 246 Mont. 317, 806 P.2d 11; Petition of Martin (1989), 240 Mont. 419, 787 P.2d 746. Accordingly, we conclude that Baker's issues 1, 7, 9-14, 17 and 19, are procedurally barred under § 46-21-105(2), MCA, as having not been raised on direct appeal.

We have applied that statutory bar [in § 46-21-105(2), MCA] consistently in order to prevent the abuse of postconviction relief by criminal defendants who would substitute those proceedings for direct appeal and in order to preserve the integrity of the trial and direct appeal. See, for example, In re the Petition of Evans (1991), 250 Mont. 172, 819 P.2d 156; Tecca v. McCormick (1990), 246 Mont. 317, 806 P.2d 11; State v. Gorder (1990), 243 Mont. 333, 792 P.2d 370; Duncan v. State (1990), 243 Mont. 232, 794 P.2d 331; In re Petition of Martin (1989), 240 Mont. 419, 787 P.2d 746. In re the Petition of Manula (1993), 263 Mont. 166, 169, 866 P.2d 1127, 1129.