The Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division ("Appellate Division") affirmed the convictions and sentence on October 20, 1999. Petitioner's petition for certification to the New Jersey Supreme Court was denied on February 3, 2000. See State v. Bryant, 163 N.J. 74 (2000). Petitioner's name is documented throughout the state court proceedings as "Alton Bryant."
denied and appeal dismissed, 170 N.J. 206, 785 A. 2d 435 (2001), cert. denied., 535 U.S. 1012, 122 S.Ct. 1594, 152 L.Ed. 2d 510 (2002) ; State v. Walker, 325 N.J.Super. 35, 41, 737 A. 2d 701 (App.Div.1999) (observing trial judge “relied on his observations of [the child] at the voir dire during pretrial motions and upon the report prepared by [the child]'s treating psychiatrist” to make competency determination), certif. denied, 163 N.J. 74, 747 A. 2d 283 (2000) ; Zamorsky, supra, 159 N.J.Super. at 280, 387 A. 2d 1227 (acknowledging trial court conducted questioning of child in one of two proceedings). Direct questioning by the trial judge, with immediate follow-up on an evasive or inconclusive response, may be the most effective method to probe the child's understanding of the importance of telling the truth in the formal setting of a courtroom.
It is black letter law that where a material factual matter is contested, it cannot be relied on without a resolution of the disputed evidence. See, e.g., Brill v. Guardian Life Ins.Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540, 666 A.2d 146 (1995) (setting forth standard for determining whether material factual dispute precludes grant of summary judgment); Central Paper Distrib. Servs. v. Int'l Records Storage Retrieval Serv., Inc., 325 N.J.Super. 225, 232, 738 A.2d 962 (App.Div. 1999) (holding legal issue not amenable to summary judgment when dependent on disputed operative facts that require plenary hearing opportunity), certif. denied, 163 N.J. 74, 747 A.2d 283 (2000); State v. Green, 62 N.J. 547, 564, 303 A.2d 312 (1973) (discussing rule requiring disclosure of presentence reports so as to provide defendants "`with fair opportunity to be heard on any adverse matters relevant to the sentencing'" (citing State v. Kunz, 55 N.J. 128, 144, 259 A.2d 895 (1969))). Thus, as a general proposition, we agree that the State may produce evidence outside an allocution to establish whether a defendant's offense involved or touched on his office.
The Appellate Division also addressed other contentions of defendants not pertinent to this appeal. We granted defendants' petition for certification, 163 N.J. 74 (2000), solely to address the security question. II.
A plaintiff's self-serving assertion alone will not create a question of material fact sufficient to defeat a summary judgment motion. Martin v. Rutgers Cas. Ins. Co., 346 N.J.Super. 225, 232 (App. Div. 1999), certif. den. 163 N.J. 74 (2000) (questions of law dependent upon the operative facts cannot be decided by summary judgment when those facts are in dispute). A motion for summary judgment can be defeated only if the opposition addresses "specific facts" and "concrete evidence" to support a favorable jury verdict. Housel for Housel v. Theadoris, 314 N.J.Super. 597, 604 (App. Div. 1998). Nevertheless, the Court must examine the evidence presented in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. Brill, 142 N.J. at 540.
State v. Bryant, No. A-5662-97 (App. Div. Oct. 20, 1999), certif. denied, State v. Bryant, 163 N.J. 74 (2000). In March 2000, defendant filed his first PCR petition in that case.
State v. Bryant, No. A-5662-97 (App. Div. Oct. 20, 1999) (slip op. at 15), certif. denied, 163 N.J. 74 (2000). Defendant filed a first petition for PCR on April 13, 2000.
"The determination of whether a person is competent to be a witness lies within the sound discretion of the trial judge," State v. Savage, 120 N.J. 594, 632 (1990), that "will not be disturbed unless it plainly lacks support on the record," State v. Walker, 325 N.J. Super. 35, 41 (App. Div. 1999), certif. denied, 163 N.J. 74 (2000). Here, Hall testified at a pre-trial competency hearing.
Srvcs. v. Int'l. Records Storage & Retrieval Serv., Inc., 325 N.J. Super. 225, 227 (App. Div. 1999), certif. denied, 163 N.J. 74 (2000), failed to do so. Nevertheless, defendants moved - two years later - to amend their appeal to include the final judgment entered in January 2012, which rendered the matter no longer interlocutory. I.
Div.), certif. denied, 196 N.J. 85 (2008); Central Paper Distrib. Servs. v. Int'l Records Storage & Retrieval Serv., Inc., 325 N.J. Super. 225, 231 (App. Div. 1999), certif. denied, 163 N.J. 74 (2000). On this appeal, Meridian argues in the alternative that the contract is unambiguous and supports its position, or that the trial court should have adopted Meridian's interpretation of ambiguous language in the contract. Meridian also contends that the trial court should have reformed the contract under the doctrines of mutual mistake or unilateral mistake, or to enforce what the parties intended and avoid unjust enrichment.