Petipren v. Jaskowski

58 Citing cases

  1. Trendell v. Hackel

    No. 345520 (Mich. Ct. App. Sep. 12, 2019)   Cited 1 times

    Under this statutory subsection, the grant of governmental immunity is "absolute[,]" when the elective executive official acts within the scope of his executive authority. Petipren v Jaskowski, 494 Mich 190, 203; 833 NW2d 247 (2013); Ross v Consumers Power Co (On Rehearing), 420 Mich 567, 633; 363 NW2d 641 (1984). To qualify for absolute immunity from tort liability an individual governmental employee must prove his or her entitlement to immunity by establishing, consistently with the statute's plain language, (1) that he or she is a judge, legislator, or the elective or highest appointive executive official of a level of government and (2) that he or she acted within the scope of his or her judicial, legislative, or executive authority.

  2. Hartzler Excavating, LLC v. Quattrin

    No. 351425 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 21, 2021)   Cited 1 times

    In reviewing a motion under MCR 2.116(C)(7), we accept the factual contents of the complaint as true unless contradicted by the movant's documentation. When the material facts are not in dispute, this Court may decide whether a plaintiff's claim is barred by immunity as a matter of law. [Petipren v Jaskowski, 494 Mich 190, 204; 833 NW2d 247 (2013).] III.

  3. Corey v. Wayne Cnty.

    No. 325465 (Mich. Ct. App. Mar. 15, 2016)

    "When a claim is barred by governmental immunity, summary disposition is appropriate under MCR 2.116(C)(7)." Petipren v Jaskowski, 494 Mich 190, 201; 833 NW2d 247 (2013). Under MCR 2.116(C)(7), the moving party may support its motion with affidavits, depositions, admissions, or other documentary evidence.

  4. Sottile v. Cnty. of Monroe

    No. 337260 (Mich. Ct. App. Mar. 22, 2018)

    In reviewing a motion under MCR 2.116(C)(7), we accept the factual contents of the complaint as true unless contradicted by the movant's documentation. When the material facts are not in dispute, this Court may decide whether a plaintiff's claim is barred by immunity as a matter of law. [Petipren v Jaskowski, 494 Mich 190, 201; 833 NW2d 247 (2013) (citations omitted).] MCL 691.1407(5) provides: "A judge, a legislator, and the elective or highest appointive executive official of all levels of governmental are immune from tort liability for injuries to persons or damages to property if he or she is acting within the scope of his or her judicial, legislative, or executive authority."

  5. Krawczyk v. Hagar Twp.

    Case No. 1:14-cv-914 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 3, 2016)

    COMP. LAWS §] 691.1407(5), and whether he or she acted within the scope of his or her executive authority requires consideration of [] "the nature of the specific acts alleged, the position held by the official alleged to have performed the acts, the charter, ordinances, or other local law defining the official's authority, and the structure and allocation of powers in the particular level of government." Petipren[ v. Jaskowski, 833 N.W.2d 247, 255 (Mich. 2013)] (citation omitted). Although it seems plain that Yopp, Ford and Veal are, according to the Highland Park Charter,

  6. Adams v. Skardoutos

    No. 369392 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 13, 2025)

    Finally, with regard to MCL 691.1407(5), "a chief of police, as head of the police department, qualifies as the highest appointive executive official of a level of government." Petipren v Jaskowski, 494 Mich. 190, 204 n 32; 833 N.W.2d 247 (2013).

  7. Harnden v. Brown

    No. 361549 (Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 13, 2023)

    MCL 691.1407(5) "provides certain high-ranking officials with absolute immunity from tort liability[.]" Petipren v Jaskowski, 494 Mich. 190, 204; 833 N.W.2d 247 (2013). It provides:

  8. Pattison v. City of Detroit

    No. 350474 (Mich. Ct. App. Oct. 22, 2020)

    For immunity purposes, "executive authority" does not depend on an actor's intent, motive, or state of mind; but rather "whether the official exercised authority vested in the official by virtue of his or her role in the executive branch." Pretipen v Jaskowski, 494 Mich 190, 205-209; 833 NW2d 247 (2013). Thus, where the scope of authority conferred upon a particular official included the authority to conduct a press interview, the person who held that official office could not be liable for defamation committed during such a press interview.

  9. A Felon's Crusade for Equality, Honesty, & Truth v. Detroit Pub. Sch. Cmty. Dist. Bd. of Educ.

    No. 343881 (Mich. Ct. App. Nov. 14, 2019)

    In considering issues involving statutory interpretation, the primary goal of the reviewing court is to determine the legislative intent, as discerned from the plain language of the statute. Petipren v Jaskowski, 494 Mich 190, 201; 833 NW2d 247 (2013). "If the language is clear and unambiguous, the statute must be enforced as written without judicial construction."

  10. Malcom v. Wayne Circuit Court Judge

    No. 333397 (Mich. Ct. App. Oct. 17, 2017)

    MCL 691.1407(5) "provides certain high-ranking officials with absolute immunity from tort liability[.]" Petipren v Jaskowski, 494 Mich 190, 204; 833 NW2d 247 (2013). To establish absolute immunity under MCL 691.1407(5), "an individual governmental employee must prove . . . (1) that he or she is a judge, legislator, or the elective or highest appointive executive official of a level of government and (2) that he or she acted within the scope of his or her judicial, legislative, or executive authority."