"The determination of what is a religion or religious belief `is more often than not a difficult and delicate task.'" Peterson v. Wilmur Communications, 205 F.Supp.2d 1014, 1018 (E.D.Wis. 2002) (quoting Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981).) "Few tasks that confront a court require more circumspection than that of determining whether a particular set of ideas constitutes a religion."

Title VII has also been applied to members of non-traditional religious organizations. An example of the application of title VII to a more non-traditional organization was discussed in Peterson v. Wilmur Communications, Inc. (E.D.Wis. 2002) 205 F. Supp.2d 1014, 1018-1019. The United States District Court explained as follows: "[A] test has emerged to determine whether beliefs are a religion for purposes of Title VII.

To adopt Fallon's argument that he need only show a strongly held moral or ethical belief in lieu of a sincere religious belief would contravene Third Circuit and Supreme Court precedent and would potentially entitle anyone with "strongly held" beliefs on any topic to protection under Title VII's religious discrimination provision. Fallon cites to Peterson v. Wilmur Comm., Inc., 205 F.Supp.2d 1014, 1022 (E.D.Wis.2002) in support of his position. In Peterson, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin held that an employee's membership in the World Church of the Creator was a "religious" belief—even though the organization's central tenet was white supremacy—because "it function[ed] as religion in [plaintiff's] life."

"The determination of what is a religion or religious belief 'is more often than not a difficult and delicate task.'" Peterson v. Wilmur Communications, 205 F.Supp.2d 1014, 1018 (E.D.Wis. 2002), quoting Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981). "Few tasks that confront a court require more circumspection than that of determining whether a particular set of ideas constitutes a religion."

Indeed, there can be no religious discrimination without this proof because only beliefs that fall within the statutory definition of “religion” qualify for protection under Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (“The term ‘religion' includes all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief”); Peterson v. Wilmur Commc'ns, Inc., 205 F.Supp.2d 1014, 1018 (E.D. Wis. 2002) (“As a threshold matter, the plaintiff must show that his or her beliefs constitute a ‘religion' under the meaning of Title VII.”).

Indeed, there can be no religious discrimination without this proof because only beliefs that fall within the statutory definition of “religion” qualify for protection under Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (“The term ‘religion' includes all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief ....”); see Peterson v. Wilmur Commc'ns, Inc., 205 F.Supp.2d 1014, 1018 (E.D. Wis. 2002) (“As a threshold matter, the plaintiff must show that his or her beliefs constitute a ‘religion' under the meaning of Title VII.”).

vity as a religion); but see Deville v. Crowell, No. 08-3076-SAC, 2011 WL 4526772, at *5-6 (D. Kan. Sept. 28, 2011) (assuming, without deciding, that federal prisoner's First Amendment claims based on denial of his request for group services to practice Creativity were actionable; defendants did not challenge whether Creativity was a recognized religion within the meaning of the First Amendment); Fricks v. Upton, No. 5:10-CV-458(MTT), 2011 WL 3156680, at *6 (M.D. Ga. Apr. 14, 2011) report and recommendation adopted, 2011 WL 3107733 (M.D. Ga. July 26, 2011) (expressing reservations regarding plaintiff's First Amendment claims arising out of his contentions that the Church of Creativity is a religion, but permitting plaintiff's claims that he was denied free exercise of his religion, that the defendants retaliated against him for such exercise, and that his religious material was confiscated to go forward on screening). The only case to find that Creativity qualified as a religion was Peterson v. Wilmur Commc'n Inc., 205 F.Supp.2d 1014, 1024 (E.D. Wisc. 2002). In that case, a district court found Creativity qualified as a religion in the context of an employment discrimination claim brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.

The sole decision finding that Creativity could constitute a religion arose in the employment-discrimination context, where the inquiry focuses on how the beliefs affect the adherent, not on the religious character of the beliefs themselves. Peterson v. Wilmur Commc'ns Inc., 205 F. Supp. 2d 1014, 1018 (E.D. Wis. 2002). In this Circuit, to determine if a belief system is truly "religious", the Court considers whether it: (1) addresses ultimate ideas, (2) contains metaphysical beliefs, (3) prescribes a particular moral or ethical system, (4) involves comprehensive beliefs, and (5) is accompanied by accoutrements of religion.

Plaintiff has not directed this Court to any decisional law finding Creativity to be a religion in the First Amendment context. Instead, Plaintiff relies on Peterson v. Wilmur Commc'n Inc., 205 F.Supp.2d 1014, 1024 (E.D. Wisc. 2002), in which a district court found Creativity qualified as a religion in the context of an employment discrimination claim brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. However, a Title VII claim applies a much broader standard than that employed in the context of the First Amendment, and for that reason is distinguishable.

Therefore, plaintiff has established a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether he was in fact included in the RIF because of his age. See Peterson v. Wilmur Communications, Inc., 205 F. Supp.2d 1014, 1024 (E.D. Wis. 2002)("For example, direct evidence is found where a letter of demotion from the decision maker states that because plaintiff is a member of the World Church of the Creator, a White supremacist political organization ... employees cannot have confidence in the objectivity of [his] training, evaluation, or supervision when [he] must compare Whites to non-Whites.") Even if the court had not determined the statement to be direct evidence of discrimination, the court would find a genuine dispute of material fact exists as to whether there is indirect evidence of age discrimination.