Opinion
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION. (See Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure Rule 32.1)
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California. D.C. No. 1:10-cv-01132-BAM. Barbara McAuliffe, Magistrate Judge, Presiding.
The parties consented to proceed before a magistrate judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).
SPENCER PETERSON, III, Plaintiff - Appellant, Pro se, Vacaville, CA.
For STATE OF CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION, Defendant - Appellee: Connie Alison Broussard, Deputy Attorney General, ATTORNEY'S GENERAL OFFICE, Fresno, CA; Michelle K. Littlewood, Deputy Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, Fresno, CA.
Before: RAWLINSON, N.R. SMITH, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
Spencer Peterson, III, appeals pro se from the district court's summary judgment in his employment action alleging race discrimination and retaliation in violation of federal and state law. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Vasquez v. County of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 639 (9th Cir. 2004), and we affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Peterson's racial discrimination claims under Title VII and California's Fair Employment and Housing Act (" FEHA" ) because Peterson failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendants' legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for failing to promote him were pretextual. See id. at 640-42 & n.5 (discussing elements of a discrimination claim under Title VII and explaining that circumstantial evidence of pretext must be specific and substantial); see also Metoyer v. Chassman, 504 F.3d 919, 941 (9th Cir. 2007) (" California courts apply the Title VII framework to claims brought under FEHA." ).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Peterson's retaliation claims because Peterson failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether there was a causal link between his protected activity and the alleged adverse employment action. See Vasquez, 349 F.3d at 646 (elements of a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII); Raad v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough Sch. Dist., 323 F.3d 1185, 1197 (9th Cir. 2003) (employer's knowledge of protected activity necessary for causation).
Peterson's contention concerning whether a promotion delay or denial constitutes an adverse employment action is unavailing.
AFFIRMED.