Opinion
Case No. 3:18 CV 1959
2020-03-10
Sierra PETERSON, Plaintiff, v. Rick RUPPRIGHT, Defendant.
Edwin M. Bibler, Jeffrey J. Ratliff, Rocky J. Ratliff, J. C. Ratliff, Law Office of J.C. Ratliff, Marion, OH, for Plaintiff. David M. Smith, Todd M. Raskin, Mazanec, Raskin & Ryder, Cleveland, OH, Amily A. Imbrogno, Mazanec, Raskin & Ryder, Solon, OH, for Defendant.
Edwin M. Bibler, Jeffrey J. Ratliff, Rocky J. Ratliff, J. C. Ratliff, Law Office of J.C. Ratliff, Marion, OH, for Plaintiff.
David M. Smith, Todd M. Raskin, Mazanec, Raskin & Ryder, Cleveland, OH, Amily A. Imbrogno, Mazanec, Raskin & Ryder, Solon, OH, for Defendant.
ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT
JACK ZOUHARY, U. S. DISTRICT JUDGE INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Sierra Peterson and Defendant Rick Ruppright engaged in a consensual, romantic relationship for several months in late 2015. In 2018, Plaintiff sued Ruppright and the Hancock County Sherriff's Department, alleging several violations of Ohio's childhood sexual abuse statute, along with a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress ("IIED"). Defendants moved for Summary Judgment (Docs. 46, 55). After hearing argument (Doc. 63), this Court granted the County's Motion (see Doc. 60), leaving Ruppright as the sole Defendant. This Court examines whether there is sufficient evidence from which a jury could reasonably find for Plaintiff. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, then a high school student, lived with her father in Mount Cory, Ohio (Doc. 48 at 7). Defendant, who worked as a dispatcher for the County Sherriff's Office and volunteered for the Mount Cory Fire Department, lived nearby with his wife (Docs. 13 at 1; 49 at 52–54).
Plaintiff and Defendant were known to each other for several years, as Plaintiff's father was also a Mount Cory firefighter (Doc. 49 at 31). In November 2014, Plaintiff was working on homework at the Mount Cory Fire Department when Defendant put his hands on her thigh and kissed her on the neck (Doc. 48 at 13). He then "pulled her in for an intense kiss and used his other hand to trail down her inner thigh" (Docs. 48 at 72, 208; 46-2 at 11).
In August 2015, Plaintiff and Defendant spent time together at a tractor pull, where they flirted and held hands (Doc. 49 at 32–33). Afterwards, they began texting each other multiple times per day (Doc. 46-2 at 36). In October 2015, the relationship became sexual in nature (Docs. 48 at 34; 49 at 35). At the time, Plaintiff was sixteen years old (Doc. 48 at 9); Defendant was forty-five (Doc. 13 at 2). Their relationship continued for several weeks, during which the two exchanged thousands of text and Facebook messages (Doc. 46-2 at 37). The two secretly spent time together at each other's home (Doc. 48 at 29, 50) and at the Sherriff's Office dispatch center (Doc. 46-2 at 42, 46–47). During the course of this relationship, they never had sexual intercourse (Doc. 48 at 37).
In December 2015, Defendant invited Plaintiff to be his guest at the County holiday party (Doc. 48 at 340). Several attendees took notice (Doc. 50 at 20–23). Plaintiff's father was notified, as was the County Sheriff (id. at 25–26). An investigation ensued, and Defendant was charged with contributing to the delinquency of a minor -- providing Plaintiff, a high-school junior, with alcohol and helping her skip school (Docs. 3 at 4; 13 at 2; 48 at 74). He pled guilty to this misdemeanor in August 2016 and served three months in prison (Doc. 13 at 2).
DISCUSSION
Ohio Revised Code Section 2305.111 creates a civil cause of action for "childhood sexual abuse" where (1) the victim is a minor, and (2) the conduct fits one of the defined relationships, e.g. , teacher-student, or is proscribed by one of the listed criminal statutes. Plaintiff cites three of those statutes. This Court addresses each, before turning to the IIED claim.
Sexual Battery -- R.C. 2907.03
Consensual sexual conduct between two persons over sixteen years old is generally legal under Ohio law. See R.C. 2807.04. "The intent of [the sexual-battery statute] is to forbid sexual conduct in a variety of situations where the offender takes unconscionable advantage of the victim." State v. Noggle , 67 Ohio St. 3d 31, 32, 615 N.E.2d 1040 (1993). However, violations of the sexual-battery statute can occur only where one of the specifically enumerated relationships is present. See Id. at 33, 615 N.E.2d 1040 ("The General Assembly envisioned a variety of specific situations where an offender might take unconscionable advantage of a victim."). For instance, a teacher cannot stand in as a parent or "person in loco parentis" as a matter of law. State v. Mole , 149 Ohio St. 3d 215, 227, 74 N.E.3d 368 (2016).
Plaintiff originally alleged four sections of R.C. 2907.03 apply here. At the hearing, Plaintiff conceded Defendant was never Plaintiff's "custodian or person in loco parentis" (Doc. 63 at 15–16). Section (A)(5) therefore cannot apply. Under Section (A)(6), the victim must be "in custody of law or a patient in a hospital or other institution, and the offender [must have] supervisory or disciplinary authority." This part of the statute "is directed at those situations where the offender, through power conferred by the state, is able to coerce or force sexual activity by the misuse of that authority." State v. Walker , 140 Ohio App. 3d 445, 454, 748 N.E.2d 79 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000) (citation omitted). Not the case here either (see Doc. 63 at 16–19). Merely bringing Plaintiff to the dispatch office is not enough. " ‘Custody of law’ ... require[s] some showing that the victim's liberty was restrained by some power conferred by the state." Walker , 140 Ohio App. 3d at 455, 748 N.E.2d 79. Similarly, Section (A)(9) requires the offender to be a "coach" or "instructor" or to have "temporary or occasional disciplinary control" over the victim. Defendant, however, was never Plaintiff's coach or instructor, and never had any sort of disciplinary control over Plaintiff (see Doc. 63 at 16–17). These provisions do not apply here.
Section (A)(1), the final provision cited by Plaintiff, requires that "[t]he offender knowingly coerces the other person to submit by any means that would prevent resistance by a person of ordinary resolution." Here, Plaintiff alleges she was "groomed" by Defendant beginning at age ten, and that grooming is equivalent to coercion (Doc. 57 at 18–19). Essentially, she argues that because Defendant groomed her from a young age, she was unable to consent at age sixteen (Doc. 63 at 21). Defendant counters that Plaintiff consented at all relevant times and that grooming cannot negate consent, nor can it constitute coercion (id. at 11). "Grooming refers to deliberate actions taken by a defendant to expose a child to sexual material; the ultimate goal of grooming is the formation of an emotional connection with the child and a reduction of the child's inhibitions in order to prepare the child for sexual activity." State v. Hernandez , 2019-Ohio-5242, at ¶ 31, 2019 WL 6977132 (Ohio Ct. App. 2019) (quoting United States v. Chambers , 642 F.3d 588, 593 (7th Cir. 2011) ). There is simply no evidence that grooming took place here. Plaintiff testified that she did not have a close relationship with Defendant until 2014, after she turned sixteen (Doc. 48 at 11–12). The grooming theory falls short as well.
The relationship between Plaintiff and Defendant is also insufficient to show coercion. "[S]exual conduct by coercion is broader than sexual conduct by force." Pordash v. Hudson , 2006 WL 4691239, at *19 (N.D. Ohio 2006) (citing State v. Bajaj , 2005-Ohio-2931, at ¶ 22, 2005 WL 1385709 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005) ). However, "a defendant has not committed sexual battery if the only evidence of coercion is the relationship between the defendant and the victim unless the statute specifically provides otherwise." Bajaj , 2005-Ohio-2931, at ¶ 24. Plaintiff alleges Defendant was her "uncle, friend, mentor" and even a "father-like figure" (Docs. 57 at 18; 63 at 30). Such a non-enumerated relationship, by itself, does not constitute coercion.
Additionally, Plaintiff testified that Defendant did not coerce her (Doc. 48 at 36, 70–71):
Q. You said you started touching him as well, correct?
A. Correct.
Q. At no time during this time was he forcing you to do any of this --
A. No, sir.
* * *
Q. And during that time you did say that you consented to the relationship?
A. Yes. I was very adamant because that was what I had been told to say.
Q. And as of today, though, you can still testify this was a consensual relationship that you had with Mr. Ruppright, correct?
A. Physically, yes.
Q. Okay. But he did not coerce you into the relationship, you took part in the relationship willingly, correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. And he never forced you to do anything, correct?
A. No.
Q. And he never got you to a point of intoxication to force you to do anything, correct?
A. Not that I recall, no. I will, again, I will say there was a time that I didn't feel comfortable to drive.
Because the relationship between Plaintiff and Defendant is not specifically listed in the statute, and there is no independent evidence of coercion, all sections of R.C. 2907.03 -- including Section (A)(1) -- are inapplicable. Therefore, Plaintiff's sexual-battery claims fail.
Sexual Imposition -- R.C. 2907.06
Plaintiff next alleges Defendant violated the sexual-imposition statute. For a violation of R.C. 2907.06 to constitute "childhood sexual abuse," there is an added requirement -- the offender must fit into one of the categories enumerated in R.C. 2305.111(A)(1)(b). Relevant to this case, those categories include: (1) a "person in loco parentis;" (2) a person with "supervisory or disciplinary authority over [a] victim" who is "in custody of law;" (3) a "coach ... instructor ... [or] person with temporary or occasional disciplinary control over the victim;" and (4) an employee of a "detention facility" where the victim is confined. R.C. 2305.111(A)(1)(b)(i), (ii), (v), (vii).
As outlined above, Defendant fits none of these categories. He never exercised disciplinary authority over Plaintiff, nor did he ever function as a coach or instructor (Doc. 63 at 16–17). Importantly, Plaintiff was never "in custody" of the Sherriff's Department (id. ). Indeed, the alleged 2014 sexual encounter happened at the Mount Cory Fire Department -- not the Sheriff's Office (Doc. 48 at 13). And her visits to the Sheriff's Office occurred after the consensual relationship began (Doc. 46-2 at 45–47). Because Plaintiff cannot demonstrate an enumerated relationship, she cannot establish a sexual-imposition claim.
Setting that threshold issue aside, Plaintiff points to R.C. 2907.06(A)(1) and (A)(4). First, Section (A)(4) requires the victim to be under the age of sixteen. None of the conduct in this case took place before Plaintiff's sixteenth birthday (see Doc. 48 at 9). Second, Section (A)(1) applies where "the offender knows that the sexual contact is offensive to the other person ... or is reckless in that regard." Plaintiff testified that she was a "willing participant" in the relationship, beginning in August 2015, and never indicated to Defendant that she found any of his actions offensive (Doc. 48 at 51, 81).
The November 2014 incident, which occurred prior to the relationship, likely fits the definition of "offensive." See Love v. City of Port Clinton , 37 Ohio St. 3d 98, 99, 524 N.E.2d 166 (1988) ("Contact which is offensive to a reasonable sense of personal dignity is offensive contact."). Plaintiff "moved away" from Defendant following the encounter, and later expressed to him that it made her "really uncomfortable" (Doc. 81–2). This Court notes that this was unsolicited, inappropriate contact with a sixteen-year-old at Defendant's place of employment (Doc. 46-2 at 23–24). However, as noted above, because Defendant fits none of the R.C. 2305.111(A)(1)(b) categories, no viable sexual-imposition claim exists.
Gross Sexual Imposition -- R.C. 2907.05
Plaintiff next claims Defendant violated the gross-sexual-imposition statute (Doc. 57 at 18). The same additional requirement of demonstrating a relationship outlined in R.C. 2305.111(A)(1)(b) applies. And, again, Plaintiff cannot do so. Further, the cited provisions are inapplicable.
R.C. 2907.05(A)(2) requires an offender "substantially impair the [victim's] judgment or control" ... "for the purpose of preventing resistance." Plaintiff points to the instances of Defendant providing her with alcohol (Doc. 57 at 17–18). However, she testified (Doc. 48 at 36–37):
Q. At no time during this time was he forcing you to do any of this --
A. No, sir.
Q. -- correct? Okay. And at no time were you intoxicated or unable to leave, correct?
A. I had drank a few times in his house, I don't believe it was to the point of not being able to say "no" or making a conscious choice to leave, however, I had had enough that I didn't drive at least one occasion.
Q. All right.
A. I didn't feel comfortable getting behind the wheel with the amount of alcohol I had had.
Q. So during this period, though, he did not coerce you to do anything, correct?
A. Not correct. He had things that he was interested in and didn't push for it but slowly led me to what he wanted.
Q. Okay. But then you willingly did them.
A. Yes, sir.
In light of this testimony, Plaintiff's judgment or control was not "substantially impaired." Further, the record is clear -- Defendant never forced Plaintiff to drink alcohol, and whenever she asked Defendant to "stop" because she was uncomfortable, he stopped (id. at 38, 78–80).
Section (A)(5), the second provision cited by Plaintiff, is violated where the victim's ability "to resist or consent is substantially impaired because of a mental or physical condition ... and the offender knows or has reasonable cause to believe that the [victim's] ability to resist or consent ... is substantially impaired." At her deposition, Plaintiff was asked: "So the times that you did have sexual contact with him nothing was causing you physically or mentally to be unable to resist him?" (Doc. 48 at 80). "Correct," she responded (id. ). This Court inquired further at the hearing: "Was there any mental or physical condition which substantially impaired Plaintiff's ability to consent?" (Doc. 63 at 28). Plaintiff responded by pointing to Defendant's knowledge of "her mental condition regarding her mother's suicide" and "attachment issues that she had with her father" (id. ). The purpose of the Sections (A)(2) and (A)(5) is to protect a specific category of victims "whose ability to resist" is substantially impaired. See State v. Wine , 2012-Ohio-2837, at ¶ 50, 2012 WL 2371396 (Ohio Ct. App. 2012). This is not one of those cases.
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
Finally, we turn to Plaintiff's IIED claim (Doc. 3 at 6–7). Under Ohio law, such a claim requires:
1) The actor either intended to cause emotional distress or knew or should have known that actions taken would result in serious emotional distress to the plaintiff;
2) The actor's conduct was so extreme and outrageous as to go "beyond all possible bounds of decency" and was such that it can be considered as "utterly intolerable in a civilized community;"
3) The actor's actions were the proximate cause of plaintiff's psychic injury; and
4) The mental anguish suffered by plaintiff is serious and of a nature that "no reasonable man could be expected to endure it."
Pyle v. Pyle , 11 Ohio App. 3d 31, 34, 463 N.E.2d 98 (Ohio Ct. App. 1983) (citations omitted).
Plaintiff's first hurdle is to demonstrate mental distress so severe that "a reasonable person, normally constituted, would be unable to cope adequately with the mental distress engendered by the circumstances of the case." Hardmon v. CCC Van Wert Credit Union , 2009-Ohio-6721, at ¶ 23, 2009 WL 4895538 (Ohio Ct. App. 2009) (quoting Paugh v. Hanks , 6 Ohio St. 3d 72, 78, 451 N.E.2d 759 (1983) ). Plaintiff asserts she has been diagnosed with PTSD, anxiety, and depression (Doc. 57 at 7–8). She points to her medical records, which document ongoing mental trauma stemming from the relationship, as proof that her mental distress is "severe" (see Docs. 57-4 through 57-8). Specifically, Plaintiff has issues trusting others and feels "exiled and disapproved of by her town" (Doc. 57-7 at 32, 50). Although the record lacks evidence of PTSD (see Doc 63 at 43–44), this Court will assume her mental distress is severe. See White v. Bhatt , 2017-Ohio-9277, at ¶ 26, 102 N.E.3d 607 (2017) ("It is for the court to determine whether on the evidence severe emotional distress can be found; it is for the jury to determine whether, on the evidence, it has in fact existed.") (citation omitted).
Next is causation. Plaintiff again cites her medical records to establish that the romantic relationship was the proximate cause of her conditions (Doc. 57 at 8). When asked if she could separate her childhood-related mental-health issues from those caused by Defendant, Plaintiff answered (Doc. 48 at 89):
Yes, you can [separate the two]. Before, before this incident with the [D]efendant,
I could walk in a room full of men and not have an issue. Sitting in here right now is the worst thing that has probably ever happened in a long time because I'm surrounded by men. I don't feel comfortable.... I don't feel safe. I don't trust it. I watch over my shoulder all the time now. I never did that before. I didn't have random anxiety attacks that were debilitating to the point that I had to pull over, stop my car so I didn't wreck. I didn't have extreme flashbacks.
At the hearing, this Court inquired as to whether Plaintiff's testimony could satisfy causation in the absence of expert testimony. Both parties filed supplemental authority (see Docs. 61–62).
Plaintiff argues no medical expert is necessary but, in any event, Katie Carpenter -- Plaintiff's therapist -- will be able to testify (Doc. 61 at 2). While Plaintiff is correct -- Carpenter's credentials likely qualify her as an expert -- Plaintiff failed to comply with the disclosure requirements of Federal Civil Rule 26(a)(2)(B) and the expert disclosure deadline set by this Court (Doc. 29 at 2). As Defendant points out, the time for disclosing expert witnesses has long passed (Doc. 62 at 1–2). Therefore, Carpenter may only serve as a "fact witness" and "may not testify ‘based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702.’ " Krutko v. Franklin Cty. , Ohio, 2016 WL 455397, at *4 (S.D. Ohio 2016).
Nonetheless, Plaintiff herself can establish causation. See Hollingsworth v. Time Warner Cable , 168 Ohio App.3d 658, 2006-Ohio-4903, at ¶ 75, 861 N.E.2d 580 (2006) ("A plaintiff's own testimony, in combination with the facts and circumstances of a particular case, can suffice to sustain the plaintiff's burden on [causation]."). However, "[w]hile Ohio does not require expert medical testimony to support an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, a plaintiff must at least provide some evidence beyond his or her own testimony." Talley v. Family Dollar Stores of Ohio, Inc. , 542 F.3d 1099, 1111 (6th Cir. 2008). Plaintiff provides documentation from sessions with multiple therapists dating back to 2016 (Doc. 57-5 through 57-8). Nearly every one of these sessions related to the emotional distress stemming from her relationship with Defendant. Thus, Plaintiff relies on more than her own deposition testimony. See, e.g. , Buckman-Peirson v. Brannon , 159 Ohio App.3d 12, 2004-Ohio-6074, at ¶ 58, 822 N.E.2d 830 (2004) (holding that plaintiffs may establish causation without presenting expert medical testimony, as long as they present some evidence outside of their own deposition testimony). See also Doe v. Roman , 2002-Ohio-6671, at ¶¶ 39–43 (Ohio Ct. App. 2002) (evidence that plaintiff had difficulty "trusting anyone," felt like the situation was "her fault," and received counseling until she entered college was sufficient to survive summary judgment).
Finally, we look to Defendant's intent and the nature of his conduct. Plaintiff must show that Defendant's intentional or reckless actions were "extreme and outrageous." Pyle , 11 Ohio App. 3d at 34, 463 N.E.2d 98. A reasonable jury could find Defendant knew or should have known his actions would result in emotional distress. Defendant was well aware of Plaintiff's difficult home life -- a situation that might render the high-school junior vulnerable to his advances and displays of affection (Doc. 49 at 55–57).
However, the bar is high for what constitutes "outrageous conduct." The alleged conduct must be "so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community." Beckloff v. Amcor Rigid Plastics USA, LLC , 2017-Ohio-4467, at ¶ 44, 93 N.E.3d 329 (Ohio Ct. App. 2017) (citations omitted). "Only the most extreme wrongs, which do gross violence to the norms of a civilized society, will rise to the level of outrageous conduct." Brown v. Denny , 72 Ohio App. 3d 417, 423, 594 N.E.2d 1008 (1991).
In conclusory fashion, Plaintiff asserts: "It is easy for a jury to find that a man of forty-six years of age to engage in a sexual relationship with Plaintiff at her age was extreme, outrageous, and intolerable, and that such conduct would cause Plaintiff emotional distress" (Doc. 57 at 18–19). Plaintiff fails to point to any Ohio case finding that a lawful, consensual relationship may serve as the basis for such a claim. Instead, Plaintiff again returns to the "grooming" theory -- "once groomed, the fact that a victim does not resist, consents, or engages in the activity has no bearing on whether there was consent for the sexual conduct" (id. at 19). As noted above, grooming does not apply here.
Indeed, such a consensual relationship between two persons above the age of sixteen is legal under Ohio law. The question here is whether Defendant's actions went "beyond all possible bounds of decency." Bailey v. Searles-Bailey , 140 Ohio App. 3d 174, 183, 746 N.E.2d 1159 (2000). "Ohio courts have consistently recognized that it is essential to view such conduct in context because many situations are fraught with antagonism and emotion that a person is expected to endure." Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In short, Defendant's conduct must "rise to the level of an atrocity" when viewed in light of all the circumstances. Voisard v. Noble , 1990 WL 16494, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990). The facts of this case do not satisfy that standard.
CONCLUSION
Defendant's actions were wrong on many levels. Even reprehensible. But the conduct does not run afoul of the childhood sexual abuse statute, and the facts do not meet the outrageousness requirement of IIED. The Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 46) is granted.
IT IS SO ORDERED.