Peterson v. Ford Motor Company

Full title: Vickie Peterson, Plaintiff, v. Ford Motor Company, Defendant

Court: United States District Court, D. Minnesota

Date published: Feb 17, 2005

Civil No. 03-5027 (DWF/JSM) (D. Minn. Feb. 17, 2005)

Opinion

Civil No. 03-5027 (DWF/JSM).

February 17, 2005

Stephen W. Cooper, Esq., Cooper Law Office, Minneapolis, MN, and Stephanie A. Haedt, Esq., Cooper Law Firm, Rochester, MN, counsel for Plaintiff.

Kathryn Hipp Carlson, Esq., Miller Hipp, Minneapolis, MN, Charlie J. Harris, Jr., Esq., and Stephen M. Bledsoe, Esq., Berkowitz Stanton Brandt Williams Shaw, Kansas City, MO, counsel for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

DONOVAN FRANK, District Judge

Introduction

This matter is before the undersigned United States District Judge pursuant to Defendant Ford Motor Company's ("Ford") Motion for Summary Judgment. Specifically, Ford asks the Court to dismiss claims brought against it by Plaintiff Vickie Peterson for breach of contract, negligence, and violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") and the Minnesota Human Rights Act ("MHRA"). Peterson opposes the motion with regard to all of her claims. For the reasons set forth below, the Court denies Ford's Motion for Summary Judgment as to Peterson's ADA, MHRA, and breach of contract claims, but grants the motion as to Peterson's negligence claim.

Background

Ford owns and operates the Twin Cities Assembly Plant in St. Paul, Minnesota ("the Plant"). The Plant employs approximately 1,900 hourly employees who perform a variety of jobs. Ford also hires employees on a part-time basis to work on or around the assembly lines. Generally, the temporary part-time employees ("TPTs") work two days per week. The TPTs are hired to fill in for full-time employees who have gone on vacation, are absent from work, or have bid for other positions. As a result, the TPTs must be able to handle a wide variety of tasks as they can be moved from task to task by management in order to meet the Plant's needs at any given time.

In 1989, Peterson was in an automobile accident in which she injured her foot and shoulder. As a result of the accident, Peterson broke all of the metatarsal bones in her right foot. Doctors operated on Peterson's foot on the day of the accident. Peterson has had an additional eight surgeries on her foot over the years because of the severity of the injury. Doctors also operated on Peterson's shoulder on the day of the collision. Peterson currently has surgical "clips" in her shoulder.

On May 19, 2000, Peterson completed an application for employment with Ford at the Plant. As part of the application process, applicants complete a medical history form. The medical history form asks a series of questions about the applicant's medical history, including whether the applicant has ever had surgery, whether the applicant has been restricted in his or her work because of the applicant's health, and whether the applicant has any physical disabilities at the present time. Peterson answered each of these questions in the negative. However, Peterson did indicate that she had previously injured her foot and shoulder.

Peterson was examined by Dr. Horazaniecki, a physician hired by Ford to perform pre-employment physicals. Dr. Horazaniecki requested information from Peterson about her medical history and Peterson advised Dr. Horazaniecki that she had been in an automobile accident and had sustained foot and shoulder injuries. Shortly after Dr. Horazaniecki completed his medical evaluation, Ford hired Peterson as a TPT.

Peterson began working for Ford on Monday, June 19, 2000. Peterson described the duties she performed while working as a TPT as peeling stickers off of equipment and plugging in and putting on caps. Peterson worked for Ford until August 2000. Ford asserts that it terminated Peterson's employment at that time for failure to report for work. Peterson, on the other hand, contends that she resigned her position to begin work for the Minneapolis public school district.

On July 24, 2002, Peterson again completed an employment application for a TPT position at the Plant. One week later, Peterson completed a medical history form. Peterson again answered the questions regarding the presence of a past or present medical disability in the negative. However, Peterson again stated that she had previously undergone surgery on her foot and shoulder.

While reviewing Peterson's answers to the medical history form's questions, Dr. Hirt, a physician hired by Ford to perform pre-employment physicals, asked Peterson about her foot and shoulder injuries. Dr. Hirt performed a range-of-motion test on Peterson's shoulders and examined her foot. Based on his evaluation of the foot and shoulder injuries, Dr. Hirt arranged for Peterson to have x-rays taken of her foot and shoulder.

Dr. James Jacobs, a physician at St. Joseph's Hospital, reviewed the x-ray results and authored radiology reports based on those results. In his report, Dr. Jacobs stated with regard to Peterson's foot:

Post operative and post traumatic changes in the right mid foot with solid arthrodesis between the bases of the first and second metatarsals and the adjacent cuneiforms with 2 screws across the first tarsal metatarsal joint. There is also solid fusion of the third metatarsal and lateral cuneiform. The joint spaces between the fourth and fifth metatarsals and the cuboid is narrowed with subchondral sclerosis consistent with advanced degenerative change. There is moderate arthritic [n]arrowing [sic] at the joint space between the navicular and the cuneiforms accessory ossicle medial to the talus which is a normal variant. No acute osseous findings [sic].

(Peterson's Exhibit Index, Exhibit L ("Radiology Care Diagnostic Imaging Reports"), Bates VP0045.)

Dr. Jacobs also authored a radiology report regarding Peterson's shoulder. The report states in part:

Moderate old healed fracture deformity of the left proximal humeral neck. There is thick peristeal reaction cortical remottling and a wide transverse band of sclerosis at the healing fracture. Disc[r]ete [sic] fracture line is not visible. Normal alignment at the glenohumeral joint. No other fractures are seen. Surgical clips in the left axilla. No other abnormality.

(Peterson's Exhibit Index, Radiology Care Diagnostic Imaging Reports, Bates VP0046.)

After reviewing Dr. Jacobs' reports, Dr. Hirt determined that Peterson had the following medical restrictions on her ability to work: (1) inability to do work at or above her left shoulder; (2) inability to push or pull objects forcefully with her left hand; (3) inability to work while standing on her tiptoes; (4) inability to stand for a prolonged period of time; and (5) inability to climb stairs on a repeated basis. (Peterson's Exhibit Index, Exhibit E ("Dr. Hirt's Dep."), at 89:8-97:15.)

Dr. Hirt submitted his report and recommendations regarding Peterson to Daria Dozier, the human resources associate at the Plant. Dozier asserts that she reviewed Peterson's prescribed medical restrictions and compared them to the essential functions of the jobs within the TPT classification before determining that Peterson would be unable to perform these functions. As a result, Dozier withdrew the offer of employment.

On July 30, 2003, Peterson filed a complaint in Ramsey County District Court alleging, among other things, that Ford violated the ADA and MHRA. On August 20, 2003, Ford removed this case to federal court.

Discussion

I. Standard of Review

Summary judgment is proper if there are no disputed issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The Court must view the evidence and the inferences which may be reasonably drawn from the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Enterprise Bank v. Magna Bank of Missouri, 92 F.3d 743, 747 (8^th Cir. 1996). However, as the Supreme Court has stated, "[s]ummary judgment procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed 'to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.'" Fed.R.Civ.P. 1; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986).

The moving party bears the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Enterprise Bank, 92 F.3d at 747. The nonmoving part must demonstrate the existence of specific facts in the record which create a genuine issue for trial. See Krenik v. County of Le Sueur, 47 F.3d 953, 957 (8^th Cir. 1995). A party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment may not rest on mere allegations or denials, but must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986); Krenik, 47 F.3d at 957.

II. Peterson's ADA Claim ¹

1 The MHRA parallels the ADA and thus Peterson's MHRA claim can be treated as co-extensive with her ADA claim. See Fenney v. Dakota, Minn. Eastern R.R. Co., 327 F.3d 707, 711 n. 5. (8^th Cir. 2003); Roberts v. KinderCare Learning Ctrs., Inc., 86 F.3d 844, 846 n. 2 (8^th Cir. 1996).

The ADA protects any "qualified individual with a disability." Philip v. Ford Motor Co., 328 F.3d 1020, 1023 (8^th Cir. 2003), quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). In order to establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA, Peterson must show that: (1) she has a disability within the meaning of the ADA; (2) she is qualified to perform the essential functions of the job, with or without reasonable accommodation; and (3) she suffered an adverse employment action because of the disability. See Philip, 328 F.3d at 1023; Kiel v. Select Artificials, Inc., 169 F.3d 1131, 1135 (8^th Cir. 1999). The employer must then rebut the presumption of discrimination "by articulating a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action." Kiel, 169 F.3d at 1135. If the employer does this, then "the burden of production shifts back to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the employer's non-discriminatory reason is pretextual." Id. The proof necessary for discrimination cases is flexible and varies with the specific facts of each case. See Philip, 328 F.3d at 1023.

To be considered disabled under the ADA, a person must: (1) have a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities; (2) have a record of such impairment; or (3) be regarded as having such an impairment. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). A person is "substantially limited" by his or her impairment if the impairment "prevents or severely restricts" the individual's ability to perform a major life activity. Toyota Motor Mfg., Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 198 (2002); see also Fenney, 327 F.3d at 714-715. Major life activities include speaking, hearing, learning, caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, breathing and working. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i). The factors considered in determining whether a person is substantially limited in a major life activity include: (1) the nature and severity of the impairment; (2) its duration or anticipated duration; and (3) its long-term impact. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2)(i)-(iii).

In connection with this motion, Peterson's counsel asserts that Ford discriminated against Peterson either because she has a disability, has a record of such impairment, or was "regarded as" disabled by Ford. Peterson's counsel failed to refute Ford's argument that Peterson is not actually disabled in its papers. Accordingly, Ford contends that Peterson has abandoned this claim. Ford also claims that Peterson's record of disability claim should be stricken from the record as it was not put forth in either Peterson's Complaint or in her answers to discovery. The Court finds some merit to these arguments. Nonetheless, the Court will consider each of the claims raised by Peterson.

A. Physical Impairment Substantially Limiting One Or More Major Life Activities ²

2 Minnesota requires a less stringent showing that an impairment constitutes a disability than does the ADA. See Hoover v. Norwest Private Mortgage Banking, 632 N.W.2d 534, 543 (Minn. 2001) (noting that the 1989 Amendment of the MHRA requires a "material" limitation rather than a "substantial" limitation.)

Peterson concedes that she has physical limitations as a result of her injuries. During her deposition, Peterson indicated that she could not: (1) walk or run for long periods of time; (2) climb stairs while carrying a certain amount of weight; (3) jump; (4) ski; or (5) rollerskate. Ford disputes that any of these limitations rise to the level of being "substantial" or "material" in nature and has provided the Court with a bevy of cases from courts throughout the United States holding the same with regard to each of these limitations. After reviewing Peterson's deposition testimony and the cases cited by Ford, the Court finds that Peterson's impairments do not sufficiently limit one or more of her major life activities.

B. Record of Disability

Peterson also claims that she was discriminated against based on her previous injuries as set out in her medical records. In order to have a record of disability under the ADA, a plaintiff's medical documentation must show that he or she has a history of, or has been misclassified as having, a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k). Peterson contends that Dr. Hirt relied on her medical records and documentation dating back to 1989 when determining what medical restrictions to place on Peterson's ability to work.

The Court finds that Peterson's record of disability claim is without merit. In his deposition, Dr. Hirt stated that the only medical record he relied on when evaluating Peterson's ability to work was Dr. Jacobs' radiology reports. The Court questions whether these contemporaneous medical records would be sufficient evidence upon which Peterson could base a record of disability claim. Nonetheless, Dr. Jacobs' radiology reports do not indicate that Peterson is disabled. Thus, Dr. Hirt's recommendations, and Ford's subsequent decision regarding Peterson's employment, were not based on a record of disability.

C. Regarded As Disabled

Peterson also asserts that she was discriminated against by Ford because she was regarded as disabled. In order to be regarded as disabled under the ADA, a plaintiff must show that an employer believed that he or she had a physical or mental impairment that substantially limited one or more major life activities, or that an employer believed that he or she had an actual, nonlimiting impairment that substantially limited one or more major life activities. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 489 (1999). The provision addressing perceived disabilities exists "to combat the effects of 'archaic attitudes,' erroneous perceptions, and myths that work to the disadvantage of persons with or regarded as having disabilities." Wooten v. Farmland Foods, 58 F.3d 382, 385 (8th Cir. 1995) (quoting School Bd. of Nassau County, Fla. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 279 (1987)).

Peterson asserts that the medical restrictions prescribed by Dr. Hirt were extremely broad and would effectively keep her from working any of the jobs available at the Plant as well as any physical labor, delivery, or warehouse jobs. Therefore, Peterson claims that the medical restrictions are evidence that Dr. Hirt and Ford regarded her as disabled. Peterson also claims that Dr. Hirt considered the likelihood that Peterson would be injured on the job in the future, the costs associated with future worker's compensation claims as a result of such injuries, and Peterson's lost productivity in determining what, if any, medical restrictions to place on Peterson. Peterson claims that such considerations violate the ADA.

Ford contends that neither Dr. Hirt nor Dozier regarded Peterson as disabled. Ford points out that Dr. Hirt relied only on the medical forms completed by Peterson, his own observations drawn from a pre-employment physical, and the radiology reports prepared by Dr. Jacobs in determining what medical restrictions should be placed on Peterson. Ford asserts that Dr. Hirt did not have any information regarding Peterson's daily life and that he did not put forth any opinion as to whether Peterson could perform the duties of a TPT assembler. Likewise, Ford contends that Dozier merely compared the medical restrictions prescribed by Dr. Hirt to the essential functions of the TPT assembler position in determining that Peterson would be unable to perform the TPT's tasks.

Based on a review of the record, the Court finds that summary judgment is not appropriate with regard to Peterson's "regarded as" disability claim. Peterson's primary claim is that Dr. Hirt placed medical restrictions on her, not because of any present physical limitations, but, instead, because of some speculative risk of future harm. The Court has reviewed Dr. Hirt's deposition testimony and one view of the evidence that could be drawn from the testimony is that the medical restrictions were placed on Peterson based on these impermissible grounds. While the Court does not believe that a jury would accept this view of Dr. Hirt's testimony based on his deposition testimony in its entirety, the Court is bound to accept this view of the evidence for the purposes of this motion. Accordingly, Ford's Motion for Summary Judgment is denied as to this claim.

III. Breach of Contract

Peterson contends that Ford extended its offer of work conditioned only on her ability to complete satisfactorily a routine physical examination. In support of her claim, Peterson points out that she received a letter from Ford on July 31, 2002, that stated, in part, that Ford extended an offer of employment to Peterson "contingent upon satisfactory completion of a routine pre-employment physical examination. . . ." (Peterson's Exhibit Index, Exhibit I, Bates VP0017.) Peterson contends that Ford also sets out the conditions under which the physical examination is to be conducted. Specifically, Ford's Guide for Compliance with the ADA states that the company will not hire or retain those individuals that are a "direct threat" of substantial harm to the health and safety of themselves and others. (Peterson's Exhibit Index, Exhibit N, Bates 43.) A "direct threat" is defined as one who is a significant risk of substantial harm to the health and safety of others. ( Id.) A "significant risk" exists where there is a "high probability of substantial harm." ( Id.) A "direct threat" is "[n]either speculative risk nor remote risk, nor a slightly increased risk." ( Id.) The determination as to whether an individual is or is not a "direct threat" is to focus on the individual's "present ability to safely perform the functions of the job." ( Id.) Peterson alleges that Dr. Hirt failed to follow these guidelines when prescribing her medical restrictions and, as such, Ford failed to follow its own guidelines when it revoked her conditional offer of work.

Ford claims that it never extended a conditional offer of employment to Peterson. Instead, Ford contends that the language of the letter does not establish an intent to contract on Ford's behalf. Ford also asserts that any offer of employment that was extended to Peterson via the July 31 letter was conditioned on third-party approval of its terms. Therefore, Ford contends any contractual obligations contained in the letter were unenforceable.

The Court has reviewed the contents of the July 31, 2002, letter and finds that a conditional offer of employment was extended to Peterson. Accordingly, Ford should have followed its own internal guidelines in determining Peterson's abilities and what, if any, medical restrictions should have been prescribed for her. As previously discussed, one view of the evidence is that Dr. Hirt placed medical restrictions on Peterson based not on her present abilities, but based on speculation regarding Peterson's risk of future injury. Accordingly, the Court denies summary judgment as to this claim.

IV. Negligence

Ford has argued that Peterson's common law negligence claim is preempted by the exclusivity provision of the Minnesota Human Rights Act. Minnesota Statutes § 363.11 clearly states that "as to acts declared unfair by section 363.03, the procedure herein provided shall, while pending, be exclusive." This exclusivity provision has been held to preempt common law claims based upon the same facts and alleging the same damages as MHRA. claims while those MHRA claims are pending. See Williams v. St. Paul Ramsey Medical Center, Inc., 551 N.W.2d 483, 485 (Minn. 1996); Sullivan v. Spot Weld, Inc., 560 N.W.2d 712, 717 (Minn.Ct.App. 1997). Peterson has alleged no separate factual predicate for her common law negligence claim; accordingly, summary judgment as to that claim is appropriate.

Conclusion

Peterson's disability and breach of contract claims survive Ford's Motion for Summary Judgment only because the Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to Peterson. However, the Court believes that Peterson will have a very difficult time convincing a jury to accept the evidence in the same manner. Therefore, the Court believes that it is in the best interests of the parties to negotiate a resolution of this issue among themselves. As the parties may already be aware, Magistrate Judge Janie S. Mayeron is available to assist in the negotiation of a settlement should the parties find such services to be helpful. If the Court may be of assistance in this matter, the parties should contact Lowell Lindquist, Calendar Clerk for Judge Donovan W. Frank, at 651-848-1296, or Katie Haagenson, Calendar Clerk for Magistrate Judge Mayeron, at 651-848-1190.

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Defendant Ford Motor Company's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 14) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART, as follows:

a. Defendant Ford Motor Company's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED as to Plaintiff Vickie Peterson's negligence claim.

b. Defendant Ford Motor Company's Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED as to Plaintiff Vickie Peterson's ADA, MHRA, and breach of contract claims.