Opinion
4:21-725-DCC-TER
03-23-2021
Steven Desmond Peterson, #15086-056, Petitioner, v. Nanette Barnes, Warden, Respondent.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Thomas E. Rogers, III United States Magistrate Judge
Petitioner, proceeding pro se, brings this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 for habeas relief. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 73.02(B)(2)(c), D.S.C., the undersigned is authorized to review such petitions for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the District Court. Petitioner has been released from federal prison.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of the pro se pleadings pursuant to the procedural provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. The review has been conducted in light of the following precedents: Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25 (1992); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1989); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972); Nasim v. Warden, Maryland House of Correction, 64 F.3d 951 (4th Cir. 1995)(en banc); Todd v. Baskerville, 712 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1983); Loe v. Armistead, 582 F.2d 1291 (4th Cir. 1978); and Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). The Petitioner is a pro se litigant, and thus his pleadings are accorded liberal construction. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)(per curiam); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972). Even under this less stringent standard, the petition is subject to summary dismissal. The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim currently cognizable in a federal district court. Weller v. Department of Social Services, 901 F.2d 387, 390-91 (4th Cir. 1990).
Furthermore, this court is charged with screening Petitioner's lawsuit to determine if “it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court.” Rule 4 of Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts. Following the required initial review, it is recommended that the Petition should be summarily dismissed due to Petitioner not having fully exhausted his administrative remedies.
The Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases are also applicable to Section 2241 cases. See Rule 1(b) of Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases.
BACKGROUND
Petitioner has filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, contesting the loss of good time credit of 79 days as a result of prison disciplinary proceedings. (ECF No. 1). Petitioner informed the court he was released. (ECF No. 9). Petitioner was recently granted a sentence reduction in the Eastern District of North Carolina. U.S. v. Peterson, 3:94-cr-46-3H (ECF No. 726). Such reduction included a supervised release term of five years. Id.
Generally, the release of a prisoner renders moot any claims for injunctive or declaratory relief. Rendelman v. Rouse, 569 F.3d 182, 186 (4th Cir. 2009); Incumaa v. Ozmint, 507 F.3d 281, 286-87 (4th Cir. 2007). As such, when a federal prisoner files a habeas corpus petition seeking an earlier release from incarceration, his release may render the petition moot.
However, there are two exceptions to the mootness doctrine. Leonard v. Hammond, 804 F.2d 838, 842 (4th Cir. 1986). First, under the “collateral consequences” exception, a habeas petition is not rendered moot after a petitioner is released from custody where the petition challenges collateral consequences that continue after expiration of the sentence. Id. Second, the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception prevents a petition from becoming moot when two elements are present: (a) the challenged action is too short in duration to be fully litigated before it ceases or expires, and (b) there is a reasonable expectation that the same petitioner will be subjected to the same wrongful action again. Leonard, 804 F.2d at 842.
The Fourth Circuit further explained that “[a]lthough the underlying prison sentence has been served, a case is not moot when an associated term of supervised release is ongoing, because on remand, a district court could grant relief to the prevailing party in the form of a shorter period of supervised release.” United States v. Ketter, 908 F.3d 61, 66 (4th Cir. 2018).
Nonetheless, in this case, a term of supervised release is insufficient to sustain this habeas petition, given the nature of the claim raised and the inability of this court to award Petitioner any relief even if he were to succeed. “The question is not whether the petition, which challenges only the calculation of the prison sentence, asserts a collateral consequence, but whether it asserts a redressable collateral consequence.” Owens v. Young, No. 5:19-CV-00579, 2020 WL 5414595, at *5 (S.D. W.Va. July 20, 2020), report and recommendation adopted, 2020 WL 5415229 (S.D. W.Va. Sept. 9, 2020)(internal citation and quotation omitted).
Petitioner here does not challenge the validity of his conviction or sentence as imposed; he brings this petition to dispute the outcome of a disciplinary hearing that resulted in a loss of 79 days of GTC. Ordering the BOP to reverse the disciplinary sanction and reinstate the lost time-which is the only relief this court could grant-would be of no benefit to Petitioner.
Moreover, the Supreme Court of the United States considered a similar claim in United States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53 (2000). In that case, a defendant had been serving a custodial sentence in federal prison when he was immediately released after two of his convictions were vacated. Id. at 54. At the time of his release, he had served more time in prison than he should have absent the invalid convictions. The defendant there argued that the “overserved” time should be credited against his still valid term of supervised release to reduce its length. Id. Looking at 18 U.S.C. § 3624(e), the Supreme Court ruled against the defendant, holding his term of supervised release should remain unaltered. Id. The Johnson Court found that § 3624(e) makes clear “that a supervised release term does not commence until an individual ‘is released from imprisonment.' ” Id. at 57. The Supreme Court noted that “[a]ll concede [the defendant's] term of imprisonment should have ended earlier than it did, ” but concluded, “[i]t does not follow, however, that the term of supervised release commenced, as a matter of law, once he completed serving his lawful sentences.” Id. at 58. Accordingly, “[t]he objectives of supervised release would be unfulfilled if excess prison time were to offset and reduce terms of supervised release.” Id. Finally, the Johnson Court noted that the inequities presented “when an individual is incarcerated beyond the proper expiration of his prison term” could potentially be ameliorated by the statutory structure, which allows the sentencing court to modify or reduce an individual's terms and conditions of supervised release “in the interest of justice.” Id. at 60.
As Johnson clarifies, an individual is not automatically entitled to less supervised release just because he has served a longer incarceration than he should have served. Likewise, recovered GTC cannot be credited to a term of supervised release, because the term of supervised release does not begin until the term of incarceration has expired.
Because the decision to alter or end a term of supervised release falls exclusively within the authority of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to grant relief to Petitioner. As a result, the claim raised in the petition is moot, and the “collateral consequences” exception to mootness does not apply. See Kokoski v. Small, No.. 5:07-0145, 2008 WL 3200811, at *3 (S.D. W.Va. Aug. 5, 2008) (“Neither of these issues has any collateral consequences on [the petitioner], as the amount of GCT credited towards [the petitioner's] prior sentences has no effect on the time he will serve on supervised release, or on any term of imprisonment he could receive in the future, should his supervised release be revoked.”); Southard v. Williams, No. 2:15-CV-69, 2016 WL 3349320, at *4 (N.D. W.Va. June 15, 2016) (“Indisputably, efforts to have good conduct time restored once one is released from incarceration would be futile.”); Johnson v. Adams, No. 2:04CV605, 2005 WL 2593525, at *1 (E.D. Va. Oct. 12, 2005) (“[The petitioner] was released from the Federal Bureau of Prisons on July 21, 2005. Therefore, his petition requesting a different calculation of his good conduct time is moot.”); Melendez v. Masselieno, No. ELH-13-1864, 2014 WL 460848, at *4 (D. Md. Feb. 4, 2014) (inmate's release from prison rendered moot his challenge to the result of a disciplinary hearing and request that GCT be restored).
Therefore, the undersigned recommends finding that the collateral consequences exception to the mootness doctrine does not apply to this case, as Petitioner does not substantively challenge his underlying sentence, but instead is merely challenging the results of a disciplinary hearing, which, even if pursued successfully, would have no effect on his term of supervised release.
As to the second exception to the mootness doctrine, because Petitioner has been released from custody, “there is no reasonable expectation that [he] will be incarcerated again and face the same set of circumstances in the future.” Maultsby v. Rickard, No. 1:17-CV-04612, 2018 WL 4289648, at *2 (S.D. W.Va. June 29, 2018), report and recommendation adopted, 2018 WL 4291740 (S.D. W.Va. Sept. 6, 2018). Further, it is implausible that Petitioner will again be incarcerated and again be subjected to the same purportedly unconstitutional disciplinary proceeding. See e.g. Incumaa, 507 F.3d at 289.
Thus, Petitioner raises a claim that is now moot, and neither exception to the general mootness doctrine applies to his challenge to the disciplinary proceeding at issue in this petition. He has already received the only relief that this court could grant. To the extent that Petitioner believes the allegedly improper sanction should serve as a reason to reduce his term of supervised release, the sentencing court would be the appropriate court to address such.
This § 2241 action is subject to summary dismissal as it is moot.
RECOMMENDATION
Accordingly, it is recommended that the Petition in this case be dismissed without prejudice and without requiring the respondent to file a return.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 2317
Florence, South Carolina 29503
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).