We neither weigh the evidence nor assess witness credibility, but merely determine whether the trial court was authorized to find Cash guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.Peters v. State , 281 Ga.App. 385(1), 636 S.E.2d 97 (2006). Id. ; Duren v. State , 252 Ga.App. 257, 258, 555 S.E.2d 913 (2001).

“On appeal, we must view the evidence ‘in the light most favorable to the verdict and the appellant no longer enjoys the presumption of innocence; moreover, on appeal this court determines evidence sufficiency and does not weigh the evidence or determine witness credibility.’ ” Peters v. State, 281 Ga.App. 385(1), 636 S.E.2d 97 (2006). So viewed, the evidence shows that on February 8, 2002, an Atlanta city police plainclothes detective was on patrol when he noticed a man standing in bushes near an apartment complex.

Hazley does not otherwise challenge the validity of his consent to such blood-alcohol test or the result thereof as establishing DUI per se, i.e., that his blood-alcohol concentration exceeded the legal limit (0.08 grams) within three hours of the last time he had physical control of his vehicle. See OCGA § 40-6-391 (a) (5); compare Peters v. State, 281 Ga.App. 385, 386-387 (1) ( 636 SE2d 97) (2006) (DUI per se conviction reversed where there was insufficient evidence that the defendant had an unlawful alcohol concentration level); Abelson v. State, 269 Ga. App. 596, 598 (1) ( 604 SE2d 647) (2004) (conviction for DUI per se reversed where State failed to prove an unlawful alcohol concentration within three hours of driving). Given the foregoing, the trial court's denial of Hazley's motion to suppress was not error. Vansant, supra, 264 Ga. at 320 (1).

See Burks v. United States, 437 U. S. 1, 9-10 (98 SC 2141, 57 LE2d 1) (1978); Jenkins v. State, 259 Ga. App. 47, 49 (2) ( 576 SE2d 300) (2002). See OCGA § 40-6-391 (a) (5) (a person shall not operate a moving vehicle if he has an alcohol concentration of "0.08 grams or more at any time within three hours after such driving or being in actual physical control from alcohol consumed before such driving or being in actual physical control ended"); Peters v. State, 281 Ga. App. 385, 386-387 (1) ( 636 SE2d 97) (2006) (per se DUI conviction reversed where there was insufficient evidence that the defendant had an unlawful alcohol concentration level); Abelson v. State, 269 Ga. App. 596, 598 (1) ( 604 SE2d 647) (2004) (conviction for per se DUI reversed where State failed to prove an essential element of OCGA § 40-6-391 (a) (5)). It is axiomatic that "[t]he Double Jeopardy Clause protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal.