One cannot complain of a ruling that his own trial procedure and conduct procured or aided in causing. Peters v. Davis, 214 Ga. App. 885, 887 ( 449 S.E.2d 624) (1994); West v. Nodvin, 196 Ga. App. 825, 829 ( 397 S.E.2d 567) (1990). We also note that the case of Sutherland v. Woodring, 216 Ga. 621 ( 118 S.E.2d 482) (1961), cited by the dissent, could be read together with OCGA § 9-10-186 to create an anomaly in the law.
In this case, although DOT objected to any reiteration of Limb's testimony going out with the jury, its objection did not reach the specific issue of the method chosen by the trial court to submit the testimony to the jury. See Peters v. Davis, 214 Ga. App. 885, 889 ( 449 S.E.2d 624) (1994) ("to preserve an objection upon a specific point, the objection must be entered timely on the record upon that specific ground"). DOT objected to any information being provided in response to the jury's question (other than that the jurors must rely upon their collective memories) but did not object to the fact that the response itself was written.
A party cannot complain of a ruling that his own conduct procured or aided in causing. Peters v. Davis, 214 Ga. App. 885, 888 (2) ( 449 S.E.2d 624) (1994); West v. Nodvin, 196 Ga. App. 825, 829 (3) (e) ( 397 S.E.2d 567) (1990). Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part.
" (Punctuation and citations omitted; emphasis supplied.)) Peters v. Davis, 214 Ga. App. 885, 886 (1) ( 449 S.E.2d 624) (1994). Division 1 disposed of the issue of negligence per se. And, the jury found against the plaintiffs on the issue of whether the omissions by DOT constituted ordinary negligence.
Dade v. Dade, 213 Ga. 533 (1) ( 100 S.E.2d 181)." Peters v. Davis, 214 Ga. App. 885 (1) ( 449 S.E.2d 624). In the case sub judice, there is no indication that Dr. Cowart's efforts to maintain his examination lamp were unreasonable, as a matter of law.
See Citadel Corp. v. All-South Subcontractors, 217 Ga. App. 736, 737 ( 458 S.E.2d 711) (1995) ("An award of attorney fees is unauthorized if [the Sigaris] failed to prove the actual costs of their attorneys and the reasonableness of those costs.") (Punctuation omitted.) See also First Bank of Clayton County v. Dollar, 159 Ga. App. 815, 817 ( 285 S.E.2d 203) (1981) ("Generally, a party will proffer the opinion testimony of his present counsel as well as that of other attorneys in an effort to show what constitutes a reasonable attorney fee in light of the litigation history of the case.") Further, since Hayden asked the trial court to place the stipulation before the jury, he cannot now complain that the trial court did so. Peters v. Davis, 214 Ga. App. 885, 888 ( 449 S.E.2d 624) (1994). Accordingly, the trial court's grant of Hayden's motion for j.n.o.v. was improper, and the trial court improperly struck that portion of the judgment awarding the Sigaris attorney fees as a result.
So too, Peters v. Davis affirmed a trial court's refusal to grant a new trial after the jury found that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover damages for pain and suffering. 449 S.E.2d 624, 626 (Ga.Ct.App. 1994). And Cheeks v. Miller indeed held that “[t]he existence of an actual controversy is fundamental to a decision on the merits, ” but it did so to vacate a final judgment on the merits of a not-yet-ripe declaratory judgment claim-not to dismiss the case at the pleading stage.