Summary
enjoining pro se litigant from filing additional "senseless and vexatious filings," including any "involuntary bankruptcy proceeding, liens, UCC Financing Statements, and other encumbrances naming BMW, its officers, employees, attorneys, related entities and agents as purported debtors, without first seeking and obtaining leave [of court]"
Summary of this case from Bank of N.Y. Mellon v. PerryOpinion
Civil Action No. DKC 2004-3451.
September 15, 2005
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Carlos Peters filed this action against BMW of North America ("BMW"), on October 26, 2004. Plaintiff's amended complaint and declarations, along with the other documents Plaintiff has submitted in this case, are incomprehensible and fail to allege any facts to establish that BMW owes Plaintiff any amount of money or has any other obligations to Plaintiff. Paper nos. 5, 18, 20-27. The court will grant Defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and will enjoin Plaintiff from pursuing any additional legal action against Defendant in this or a related matter without leave of court.
I. Background
Plaintiff obtained a loan and purchased a car from Defendant in early 2004. Paper no. 1, attachment to complaint. Although Plaintiff's allegations lack coherency, Plaintiff appears to assert that around March 1, 2004 he mailed a "negotiable instrument" to Defendant in an attempt to satisfy the car loan, and Defendant failed to return the instrument or discharge the loan. Id. Plaintiff then sent a "Notice of Acceptance to Contract" to Defendant, to which it never responded. Id. On August 25, 2004, Defendant sent a letter to Plaintiff indicating that he was in default on the loan, and stating that failure to pay the amount due could result in acceleration of the loan and repossession of the property held as collateral for the loan ( i.e., the car). Id. Plaintiff sent a "Voucher" to Defendant to "discharge and settle account" on September 24, 2004. Id. On or around that same date, Defendant repossessed Plaintiff's car. In a third and final attempt to settle the account, Plaintiff sent a "Foreign Bill of Exchange" to Defendant, to which it did not respond. Id. Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant on October 26, 2004, and filed an amended complaint on November 17, 2004. Plaintiff seeks relief from Defendant in the amount of $2,191,640.87, and asserts diversity jurisdiction. It is unclear from Plaintiff's complaint what specific claims Plaintiff is asserting.
Although Plaintiff amended his complaint, see paper no. 5, pursuant to Local Rule 103(b)(6), the court may consider attachments to the original complaint.
A comparison between the original and amended complaints revealed only minor wording differences.
This is the amount sought in the amended complaint. Paper no. 5. It appears that Plaintiff also seeks the return of the repossessed car, with "upgrades," as well as "new vehicles to be settled at which time such will be decided upon." Paper no. 1, attachments to complaint. In later declarations, Plaintiff seeks relief in the amount of $14,430,000.00. Paper no. 27.
Defendant filed a motion to dismiss, paper no. 11, and a motion for issuance of a permanent injunction, paper no. 12. Defendant asserts that Plaintiff's complaint is incomprehensible, relies on a "legally meaningless series of documents," and is premised on the irrational and wholly unsupported notion that Plaintiff's submissions to Defendant somehow discharged Plaintiff's debt obligations and that Plaintiff is a secured creditor to whom BMW owes money. Defendant asks this court, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 11(c)(1)(B), to order Plaintiff to show cause why he should not be sanctioned. Paper no. 11. Defendant also seeks an injunction to prevent Plaintiff from pursuing threatened involuntary bankruptcy proceedings and filing other fraudulent documents against BMW and its employees. Paper no. 12.
II. Motion to Dismiss
A. Standard of Review
A court reviewing a complaint in light of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion accepts all well-pled allegations of the complaint as true and construes the facts and reasonable inferences derived therefrom in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Ibarra v. United States, 120 F.3d 472, 473 (4th Cir. 1997). Such a motion ought not to be granted unless "it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). The court, however, need not accept unsupported legal conclusions or pleaded facts, Revene v. Charles County Comm'rs, 882 F.2d 870, 873 (4th Cir. 1989), or conclusory factual allegations devoid of any reference to particular acts or practices. United Black Firefighters v. Hirst, 604 F.2d 844, 847 (4th Cir. 1979). Except in certain specified cases, a plaintiff's complaint need only satisfy the "simplified pleading standard" of Rule 8(a), Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 513 (2002), which requires a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). In construing the complaint of a pro se plaintiff, the court must read the document liberally and in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972).
The function of pleadings under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is to provide fair notice to defendants of the claims being asserted against them. A complaint that is prolix and/or confusing makes it difficult for a defendant to file a responsive pleading and makes it difficult for the court to conduct orderly litigation. Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a) requires a complaint to contain (1) a short and plain statement of the grounds upon which the court has jurisdiction, (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that plaintiff is entitled to relief, and (3) a demand for judgment for the relief plaintiff seeks.
In order to state a claim for any type of fraud, Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b) requires the complaint to state the circumstances constituting fraud "with particularity." The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit discussed the requirements in Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 176 F.3d 776, 784 (4th Cir. 1999):
According to two noted scholars, the "circumstances" required to be pled with particularity under Rule 9(b) are "the time, place, and contents of the false representations, as well as the identity of the person making the misrepresentation and what he obtained thereby." 5 Charles Alan Wright and Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 1297, at 590 (2nd ed. 1990). See also Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 980 (4th Cir. 1990); In re Cryomedical Sciences, Inc. Sec. Litig., 884 F.Supp. 1001, 1012-13 (D.Md. 1995); In re Medimmune, Inc. Sec. Litig., 873 F.Supp. 953, 964-69 (D.Md. 1995). Mere allegations of "fraud by hindsight" will not satisfy the requirements of Rule 9(b). Hillson Partners Ltd. P'ship v. Adage, Inc., 42 F.3d 204, 209 (4th Cir. 1994).
As stated by the court, Rule 9(b) has four purposes:
First, the rule ensures that the defendant has sufficient information to formulate a defense by putting it on notice of the conduct complained of. . . . Second, Rule 9(b) exists to protect defendants from frivolous suits. A third reason for the rule is to eliminate fraud actions in which all the facts are learned after discovery. Finally, Rule 9(b) protects defendants from harm to their goodwill and reputation.Harrison, 176 F.3d at 784.
B. Analysis
The court has read all of Plaintiff's submissions in this case. All of Plaintiff's filings are incomprehensible, and fail to allege any facts to support a claim against Defendant. In an attachment to the original complaint, Plaintiff states that at the time he purchased the car, "full disclosure was not given." In addition, in one of Plaintiff's declarations, paper no. 18, Plaintiff states: "All contracts and agreements and presentments by [Defendant] are expressly induced by Fraud, Coercion, Extortion and non-disclosure contracts upon [Plaintiff]." If Plaintiff is asserting fraud with regard to the original car purchase, Plaintiff certainly fails to allege sufficient facts in support. Plaintiff may be arguing that Defendant was in breach of a contract, but other than filing a document titled "Notice of Acceptance to Contract" that Plaintiff himself created and that Defendant never signed, Plaintiff fails to provide evidence that a contract ever existed, outside of the original car financing agreement. To the extent that Plaintiff is asserting other claims, again, there are not sufficient facts to prove Defendant's liability. Defendant need not respond to a complaint that is so lacking in detail and fails to assert any coherent facts to support a claim. Moreover, Plaintiff has had ample opportunity in this case to indicate good faith and rationality in bringing this action and he has not done so. It is abundantly clear, as more fully discussed in the next section, that an opportunity to amend would not yield a viable complaint. Accordingly, the motion to dismiss will be granted, without leave to amend. See Conley, 355 U.S. at 41.
Because Plaintiff's complaint and other submissions are incoherent, Plaintiff's exact claims cannot be determined.
III. Motion for Issuance of Permanent Injunction
A. Standard of Review
"The All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (2000), grants federal courts the authority to limit access to the courts by vexatious and repetitive litigants." Cromer v. Kraft Foods North Am., Inc., 390 F.3d 812, 817 (4th Cir. 2004). The remedy should not deny access to courts, and should be used only when "exigent circumstances" arise, especially when dealing with a pro se plaintiff. Id. at 817-18. One circumstance that may justify a prefiling injunction is where a litigant files meritless and repetitive actions. Id. at 818.
The factors to be considered in evaluating a prefiling injunction are: (1) the litigant's history of vexatious litigation; (2) whether the litigant has an objective good faith belief in the merit of the action; (3) whether the litigant is represented by counsel; (4) whether the litigant has caused needless expense or unnecessary burdens on the opposing party and/or the court; and (5) the adequacy of other sanctions.Whitehead v. Viacom, 233 F.Supp.2d 715, 726 (D.Md. 2002) (citing Safir v. United States Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 19, 24 (2nd Cir. 1986). See also Cromer, 390 F.3d at 818. After weighing these factors, if a judge determines that a prefiling injunction is an appropriate remedy, "the judge must ensure that the injunction is narrowly tailored to fit the specific circumstances at issue." Id. Finally, before imposing a prefiling injunction a judge must provide the litigant with notice and an opportunity to be heard on the matter. Id. at 819.
B. Analysis
A prefiling injunction that requires Plaintiff to obtain court approval prior to pursuing any legal action against Defendant in this or a related matter is an appropriate remedy and will be granted. An application of the Safir factors establishes that the prefiling injunction is proper. Plaintiff has filed more than a dozen incoherent and nonsensical documents; in none of the filings does Plaintiff make coherent arguments or respond in any comprehensible manner to Defendant's motions. To the extent that the content of Plaintiff's complaint and other filings can be deciphered, there is absolutely no indication that Plaintiff could have an objective good faith belief in the merit of the action. Moreover, in one document Plaintiff threatens to file involuntary bankruptcy proceedings against BMW's President and CEO, in both their public and private capacities, as well as against John W. Snow, the Secretary of the Treasury, if "each Respondent does not deliver $1,000,000 plus daily fines to [Plaintiff] as agreed to in the contract." Paper no. 1, attachment to complaint titled "Notice and Acceptance of Contract." There is no evidence that any of the "respondents" Plaintiff named assented to any "contract." In another document, Plaintiff may be claiming that in addition to this case he has filed or will file some sort of related claim against Defendant in Maryland state court: "I Carlos Peters . . . [am] filing a NOTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CLAIM ADMIRALTY ADMINISTRATIVE RELIEF to the Circuit Court of Prince George's County." Paper no. 18. Plaintiff's blatant threats and general disregard for this court and for the judicial system as a whole suggests that Plaintiff will continue with senseless and vexacious filings, and that the imposition of other sanctions would not deter Plaintiff from doing so. Given the weight of the other Safir factors in favor of granting the prefiling injunction, the fact that Plaintiff proceeds pro se is not sufficient to preclude this remedy.
These documents include: an indecipherable complaint, two motions for default judgment, a motion to vacate correspondence from the Deputy Clerk of the Court, four "declarations," a response to Defendant's request seeking the Court's assistance, three notices of "Demand and Settlement for the Closing of the Escrow," and a "Notorial Protest and Notice of Administrative Judgment/Certificate of Dishonor."
Plaintiff's complaint does not name Mr. Snow as a defendant and his connection to the matter is unknown.
The court's injunction is narrowly tailored to address this specific situation because it will not deny Plaintiff access to courts — he can pursue legal action with leave of court, and it relates only to filings in this and related actions against Defendant. See Cromer, 390 F.3d at 819 (finding an injunction would be narrowly tailored if it addressed only filings in the particular case or related actions). Finally, Plaintiff has been given notice and the opportunity to be heard concerning the injunction and has not provided any reason not to grant it. Instead, Plaintiff has continued to submit incomprehensible documents which do not in any way address Defendant's motion. For these reasons, the court enjoins Plaintiff from pursuing any legal action against Defendant in this or a related matter without leave of court; Plaintiff will be subject to sanctions if he violates the injunction. The court denies Defendant's request that it exercise its powers under Fed.R.Civ.P. 11(c)(1)(B) and order Plaintiff to show cause why he should not be sanctioned at this time.
A separate order will be entered.