Opinion
No. 53513.
03-31-2011
In the Matter of PETER N., A Minor. Peter N., Appellant, v. The State of Nevada, Respondent.
Cristalli & Saggese, Ltd. Attorney General/Carson City Clark County District Attorney/Juvenile Division
Cristalli & Saggese, Ltd.
Attorney General/Carson City
Clark County District Attorney/Juvenile Division
ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE
This is an appeal from a district court order certifying appellant for criminal proceedings as an adult. Eighth Judicial District Court, Family Court Division, Clark County; William O. Voy, Judge.
BACKGROUND
Seventeen-year-old Peter N. and three other juveniles allegedly engaged in various criminal activities, including burglary, robbery, battery, kidnapping, false imprisonment, and grand larceny. Police arrested Peter and subsequently questioned him. Once he was in custody, a detective read Peter his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Peter initially asked for a lawyer but continued to answer the detective's questions. During the questioning, Peter admitted to his role in the crimes. The State filed two delinquency petitions against Peter, alleging seventeen and fifteen counts of criminal activity, respectively. The State sought to certify Peter as an adult under NRS 62B.390(1). Peter requested that the juvenile court hold a suppression hearing regarding the statements he made after his arrest. After hearing argument, the juvenile court denied Peter's request, decided that the State established prosecutive merit, and certified Peter to be tried as an adult.
Peter now appeals, arguing that the juvenile court erred by (1) refusing to conduct a hearing to determine whether Peter's statements warranted suppression, and (2) granting the State's certification motion based solely on the seriousness of the charged offenses. We conclude that Peter's arguments lack merit, and we affirm the district court's certification of Peter as an adult. The parties are familiar with the facts and procedural history of the case, and we do not discuss them further except as necessary to our disposition.
DISCUSSION
The juvenile court did not err by refusing to grant an evidentiary hearing regarding Peter's motion to suppress
Peter argues that the juvenile court erred when it denied his request for a full evidentiary hearing regarding whether his statements to police comported with the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. We disagree.
Standard of review
This court reviews issues concerning “the admissibility of evidence that implicate constitutional rights as mixed questions of law and fact subject to de novo review.” Hernandez v. State, 124 Nev. 639, 646, 188 P.3d 1126, 1131 (2008).
William M. does not require that the juvenile court address Peter's Fifth Amendment concerns in an evidentiary hearing during a certification proceeding
Peter argues that In re William M., 124 Nev. 1150, 196 P.3d 456, controls his Fifth Amendment claim. We disagree.
In William M., we considered NRS 62B.390 and the process known as presumptive certification. Id. at 1151–53, 196 P.3d at 457–58. Presumptive certification permitted the juvenile court to presume adult certification so long as the set of circumstances set forth in 62B.390(2) were met, unless the juvenile rebutted the presumption under NRS 62B.390(3). Rebutting the presumption required the juvenile court to find by clear and convincing evidence that substance abuse or emotional problems influenced the juvenile's criminal actions. William M., 124 Nev. at 1153, 196 P.3d at 457–58. Critically, this required the juvenile to admit to engaging in the criminal acts. Id. at 1163, 196 P.3d at 464. William M. argued that requiring juveniles to rebut the presumption by admitting to charged but unproven criminal acts implicated the Fifth Amendment's protections against self-incrimination and rendered that section of the statute unconstitutional. Id. at 1152, 196 P.3d at 457.
Based upon our decision in William M., the Nevada Legislature amended NRS 62B.390(3)(b). The amendment eliminated the language requiring the actions of the child to be substantially the result of substance abuse or emotional behavior problems. 2009 Nev. Stat., ch. 69 § 1, at 239.
We agreed and concluded that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination applied to “inculpatory statements made in juvenile proceedings.” Id. at 1158, 196 P.3d at 461. However, we also concluded that the availability of the Fifth Amendment privilege depended “on the nature of the statements and the exposure that the statements invite.” Id. at 1161, 196 P.3d at 463. We concluded that the statements that juveniles would be required to make to rebut presumptive certification would invite exposure to possible commitment or imprisonment. Id.
Here, Peter's case is distinguishable from that of William M. id. at 1151–52, 196 P.3d at 457, in that Peter's inculpatory statements do not necessarily open him to exposure to commitment or imprisonment in the same way as a juvenile attempting to rebut presumptive certification. See id. at 1160–61, 196 P.3d at 463. Peter's statements were not statements “made in juvenile proceedings.” Id. at 1157–58, 196 P.3d at 461. Instead, Peter voluntarily made the statements he challenges after his arrest, and not during the certification proceeding, as the presumptive certification rebuttal disapproved of by this court required. Id. at 1161–62, 196 P.3d at 463. Additionally, the juvenile court used Peter's statements for the limited purpose of determining his status as a juvenile or adult. This difference is critical because Peter may still challenge the admissibility of his statements at trial pursuant to NRS 174.125. Accordingly, we reject Peter's contentions that William M. is instructive in the instant case.
The juvenile court is not required to consider a motion to suppress during certification proceedings
The juvenile division of the district court retains jurisdiction over children under the age of eighteen accused of committing delinquent acts. In re William M., 124 Nev. 1150, 1152, 196 P.3d 456, 457 (2008). The State may move to certify a juvenile for criminal proceedings as an adult pursuant to NRS 62B.390(1) if the juvenile is charged with an offense that would be a felony if committed by an adult, and is fourteen years old or older at the time of the offense. To determine whether the juvenile court should transfer the minor, the State must establish the charge's prosecutive merit. In the Matter of Seven Minors, 99 Nev. 427, 437, 664 P.2d 947, 953 (1983), disapproved of on other grounds by Matter of William S., 122 Nev. 432, 442 n. 23, 132 P.3d 1015, 1021 n. 23 (2006). If the juvenile court determines that the State has demonstrated prosecutive merit under the probable cause standard, it next determines whether the case should be transferred by reviewing a matrix of categories, including the nature and seriousness of the offense, past admitted criminal offenses, and the personal attributes of the juvenile. Seven Minors, 99 Nev. at 442, 664 P.2d at 957.
The process of finding prosecutive merit “is comparable to the finding that must be made in pre-adjudication detention matters.” In re Three Minors, 100 Nev. 414, 418, 684 P.2d 1121, 1124 (1984), disapproved of on other grounds by Matter of William S., 122 Nev. at 442 n. 23, 132 P.3d at 1021 n. 23. In juvenile certification proceedings, due process does not require an adversary hearing comparable to a preliminary examination. Three Minors, 100 Nev. at 418, 684 P.2d at 1124. This is because certification proceedings are generally dispositional and not adjudicatory in nature. Id. This is comparable to adult probable cause proceedings, wherein judges may determine probable cause without an adversary hearing because this stage of the proceedings is one of limited function and nonadversary character. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 120, 122, 95 S.Ct. 854, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975).
Here, the juvenile court found Peter's motion to suppress to be premature at the certification stage of the proceedings. The juvenile court stated that the certification proceeding represents a dispositional stage, where the purpose is to decide which court should exercise jurisdiction over the matter. The juvenile court further noted that Peter could move prior to trial to suppress the statements he made in custody. The juvenile court noted that its decision comported with the conclusions of other jurisdictions that recognize that juvenile certification proceedings are not adjudicatory in nature, and therefore, courts should not entertain motions to suppress at certification proceedings. We agree with the juvenile court's conclusion that the certification proceeding represents a dispositional stage, and that Peter can move to suppress his statements before trial. NRS 174.125 ; Three Minors, 100 Nev. at 418, 684 P.2d at 1124.
The juvenile court properly used Peter's statement as a basis for prosecutive merit
Peter argues that the juvenile court improperly used his statement as a basis for certification when he challenged the statements as a violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), and on voluntariness grounds. We disagree.
For certification proceedings to go forward, the State must demonstrate prosecutive merit, which exists when there is probable cause to believe that the juvenile committed the offense charged. In re Three Minors, 100 Nev. at 417, 684 P.2d at 1123. Requiring the State to establish prosecutive merit serves two goals: (1) it furthers judicial economy by creating a sound basis for prosecution, and (2) it provides safeguards for the juvenile who should not be subject to a transfer proceeding if probable cause does not support his or her prosecution. Three Minors, 100 Nev. at 417–18, 684 P.2d at 1123.
Probable cause is the belief that the suspect has committed a crime. Id. at 418, 684 P.2d at 1124. A judge usually determines whether probable cause exists in a nonadversary proceeding on the basis of written testimony and hearsay. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 120, 95 S.Ct. 854, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975). The judge may find probable cause based on “informal but reliable evidence,” including “the petition, sworn investigative reports, witnesses' affidavits, [and] police affidavits.” Three Minors, 100 Nev. at 418, 684 P.2d at 1124. The State meets its burden of demonstrating prosecutive merit if it presents proof of probable cause consistent with the holding in Gerstein. Id.
Here, the juvenile court responded to Peter's Miranda concern by saying that a possible violation of Miranda did not automatically make Peter's statement unreliable, and the court could consider reliable evidence. Regarding Peter's involuntariness claim, the judge reviewed Peter's lengthy statement and said that it could not “find based upon a record that it's to be an inherently unreliable statement.” In determining voluntariness, courts consider “the effect of the totality of the circumstances on the will of the defendant.” Passama v. State, 103 Nev. 212, 214, 735 P.2d 321, 323 (1987). Here, the police recited Miranda warnings to Peter before the interview began, and asked if Peter wanted a parent present during the interview. The police also responded positively to Peter's requests to use the restroom and for a drink of water. Based on the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that the juvenile court could consider Peter's statement as a basis for prosecutive merit as reliable evidence.
The juvenile court properly certified Peter to adult status based upon the nature and seriousness of the offenses charged
Peter argues that the juvenile court erred in certifying him to adult status because it used the nature and seriousness of the offenses charged as the sole basis for certification, and refused to consider Peter's subjective factors. We disagree.
Standard of review
The juvenile court has broad discretion in making decisions to certify minors under NRS 62B.390(1). Matter of Eric L., 123 Nev. 26, 33, 153 P.3d 32, 36 (2007). This court reviews the juvenile court's decision to certify for an abuse of that discretion, which occurs if the decision is arbitrary or capricious or outside the bounds of law or reason. Id. at 33, 153 P.3d at 36–37.
The juvenile court properly used the decisional matrix to certify Peter to adult status
After the State establishes prosecutive merit by demonstrating probable cause, the juvenile court proceeds to a consideration of a decisional matrix and considers three categories in deciding whether to transfer a juvenile. Seven Minors, 99 Nev. at 442, 664 P.2d at 9573. Those categories for consideration are: (1) the nature and seriousness of the charged offenses; (2) the persistency and seriousness of past criminal offenses; and (3) subjective factors, such as age, maturity, character, and strength of family relationships. Id. at 442, 664 P.2d 947, 664 P.2d at 957 ; see Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 566–67, 86 S.Ct. 1045, 16 L.Ed.2d 84 (1966).
This court has established that the “primary and most weighty consideration will be given to the first two of these categories.” Seven Minors, 99 Nev. at 435, 664 P.2d at 952. We have further instructed that the subjective factors “must be considered with greater caution” and can be relied upon “in close cases in which neither of the other two categories clearly impels transfer to adult court.” Id. In William S. this court examined the interplay between the presumptive and discretionary certification measures of NRS 62B.390 and clarified the decisional matrix under NRS 62B.390(1). 122 Nev. at 440–41, 132 P.3d at 1020–21. We reiterated in William S. our former conclusion from Seven Minors: that public safety remains paramount, and the seriousness of the offense or the minor's delinquent past alone may provide justification for transfer. Id. at 441, 664 P.2d 947, 132 P.3d at 1021.
Here, the juvenile court properly used the decisional matrix from Seven Minors. 99 Nev. at 435, 664 P.2d at 952. Because the State charged Peter with many serious offenses, the juvenile court was not required to consider Peter's subjective factors. William S., 122 Nev. at 441, 132 P.3d at 1021. The juvenile court noted Peter's age, which was seventeen-and-a—half years, at the time of the alleged commission of the charged offenses. The juvenile court also refuted Peter's argument that he was “just basically tagging along” by noting that Peter drove the car that evening and the crimes could not have been accomplished without his participation. Accordingly, the record indicates that the juvenile court considered Peter's arguments, but determined that his age and role in the alleged offenses weighed in favor of Peter's transfer. We conclude that the juvenile court did not make an arbitrary or capricious decision when it exercised its broad discretion to certify Peter as an adult based on the seriousness of the charged offenses.
Accordingly, we ORDER the judgment of the juvenile division of the district court AFFIRMED.