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Perutsakos v. Tarmey

107 N.H. 51 (N.H. 1966)
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Perutsakos v. Tarmey

6 Citing cases

  1. Anderson v. Estate of Wood

    171 N.H. 524 (N.H. 2018)   Cited 2 times
    Explaining that we will not examine legislative history unless we find statutory language to be ambiguous

    Id. at 691-92, 506 A.2d 310. On that issue, we found our decision in Perutsakos v. Tarmey, 107 N.H. 51, 217 A.2d 177 (1966), controlling. Coffey, 127 N.H. at 692, 506 A.2d 310.

  2. Coffey v. Bresnahan

    127 N.H. 687 (N.H. 1986)   Cited 16 times
    Concluding that legislature would have enacted statute, permitting institution of a tort action after the death of a party, with a constitutional six-year limitation period rather than the unconstitutional two-year limitation contained in the statute

    See RSA 556:11; see also Lozier v. Brown Company, 121 N.H. 67, 70, 426 A.2d 29, 31 (1981). This issue was determined by the court in Perutsakos v. Tarmey, 107 N.H. 51, 217 A.2d 177 (1966), where we stated that "[w]e think that the words of [section] 11, `has not already become barred' mean an action which has not become barred at the time of the death of the deceased party . . . . In other words section 11 permits suits within a designated period after the decedent's death on all claims not already barred at the time of such death by the general statute of limitations.

  3. Porter v. Dartmouth College

    678 F. Supp. 2d 15 (D.N.H. 2010)   Cited 2 times
    Finding parents have standing to maintain their wrongful death suit when they filed within the statute of limitations but were not appointed administrators of their daughter's estate until after the limitations period

    But that provision "does not apply to actions for personal injuries or wrongful death." Perutsakos v. Tarmey, 107 N.H. 51, 52 (1966); see also N.H. Rev. Stat. ยง 556:9. The New Hampshire Supreme Court, though, has not always required strict compliance with the statute.

  4. Burke v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co.

    120 N.H. 365 (N.H. 1980)   Cited 9 times
    Holding that an injured party does not have a direct cause of action against the company insuring the person who injured him

    RSA 556:11 provides that actions not otherwise barred must be brought against the estate within two years of the death of the decedent. See Perutsakos v. Tarmey, 107 N.H. 51, 217 A.2d 177 (1966). Inasmuch as the parties concede that no action was brought against the estate of M. Roy London within the statutory limit, the plaintiffs' suit is now barred.

  5. Chodakowski v. Piper

    120 N.H. 330 (N.H. 1980)   Cited 4 times

    The legislature had already enacted a statute of limitations which also has the effect of extending the time for bringing actions in some cases. RSA 556:1, relating to survival of actions, sometimes has the incidental effect of extending the time for suit. Perutsakos v. Tarmey, 107 N.H. 51, 217 A.2d 177 (1966). Moreover, the language of RSA 507-C:10 (Supp.

  6. Torr v. Dover

    107 N.H. 501 (N.H. 1967)   Cited 5 times

    " The two sections must necessarily be construed together and the absolute limitation for filing an appeal set forth in RSA 234:24 controls the proceedings taken under RSA 199:18. Statutes of limitation are designed to expedite the orderly administration of justice and for the court to invoke its inherent power in the face of a clear statutory limitation would circumvent the intent and purpose of such statutes of limitation. Cf. Cloutier v. Kasheta, 105 N.H. 262; Perutsakos v. Tarmey, 107 N.H. 51; Alden v. Kimball, 104 N.H. 454, 456. The absence of any statutory provision for extension of the time for filing in cases of accident and mistake is a further indication that the Legislature intended the sixty-day limit to be absolute.