Opinion
F074358
03-14-2017
In re R.S., et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. STANISLAUS COUNTY COMMUNITY SERVICES AGENCY, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. R.S., Defendant and Appellant.
Mary Elizabeth Handy, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. John P. Doering, County Counsel, and Carrie M. Stephens, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. Nos. 517190, 517191, 517192)
OPINION
THE COURT APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Stanislaus County. Ann Q. Ameral, Judge. Mary Elizabeth Handy, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. John P. Doering, County Counsel, and Carrie M. Stephens, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Before Poochigian, Acting P.J., Detjen, J., and Franson, J.
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Appellant Randy S. (father) appeals from the juvenile court's order terminating his parental rights to his four and five-year-old sons, Robert and Randy, and two-year-old daughter Megan. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26.) Father contends the juvenile court erred in not applying the exception to adoption set forth in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) (the "beneficial relationship exception"). We affirm.
Statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code. --------
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS
In February 2015, the juvenile court exercised its dependency jurisdiction over then three-year-old Randy, two-year-old Robert and one-month-old Megan after sustaining allegations that father and the children's mother, Jennifer, endangered them by their use of methamphetamine and marijuana. Father and Jennifer were then residents of Nirvana Drug and Alcohol Treatment Institute (Nirvana) and the children were placed together in foster care. The court ordered reunification services and weekly supervised visitation for both parents.
The juvenile court provided father reunification services until the 12-month review hearing. During that time, father visited the children regularly but struggled to manage their behavior. In addition, he was discharged from Nirvana multiple times for dishonesty and noncompliance. In December 2015, the staff at Nirvana decided he needed to seek treatment elsewhere because he resisted his treatment team. In January 2016, he entered the Salvation Army Adult Rehabilitation Center, a six-month treatment program. Mother, meanwhile, was discharged from Nirvana in June 2015 and did not reenter treatment. By the six-month review hearing in October 2015, her whereabouts were unknown and the juvenile court terminated her services.
Meanwhile, the children were doing well in their foster placement. They had been living with the foster family since January 2015. The children were bonded to their foster parents and the foster parents wanted to adopt them.
In March 2016, the juvenile court terminated father's reunification services following a contested 12-month review hearing. The court found that father made minimal progress in his services plan because he was resistant to treatment and that he had not demonstrated the capacity and ability to complete the objectives of his treatment plan and provide for the children's safety, protection and well-being. The court set a section 366.26 hearing to implement a permanent plan and reduced father's visits to twice a month.
The agency recommended the juvenile court terminate father and Jennifer's parental rights at the section 366.26 hearing and initiate adoption proceedings to allow the foster parents to adopt the children. The foster parents had cared for the children since January 2015, and had grown to love them. They wanted to adopt the children and make them part of their family. The children meanwhile had developed strong bonds with their foster family.
In July 2016, the juvenile court conducted a contested section 366.26 hearing. Father testified he had been clean and sober since January 30, 2016, and lived with his parents. He visited the children twice a month. They called him "dad" and greeted him with a hug and kiss. He read to them or played with them, using building blocks or making a clubhouse with a blanket and chairs. He made a game out of cleaning up the toys at the end of their visits. Whoever cleaned up first got a prize and they always got a dollar each.
The juvenile court found by clear and convincing evidence that it was likely the children would be adopted. Applying the beneficial relationship exception, the court also found that father regularly visited the children but failed to show that terminating his parental rights would be detrimental to them. Consequently, the court terminated father and Jennifer's parental rights and ordered adoption as the permanent plan.
DISCUSSION
Father contends he established the existence of the beneficial relationship exception and therefore the juvenile court erred by terminating his parental rights. He argues the juvenile court should have ordered legal guardianship. We disagree.
Section 366.26 governs the proceedings at which the juvenile court must select a permanent placement for a dependent child. The express purpose of a section 366.26 hearing is "to provide stable, permanent homes" for dependent children. (§ 366.26, subd. (b).) If the court determines it is likely the child will be adopted, the statute mandates termination of parental rights unless the parent opposing termination can demonstrate that one of the statutory exceptions applies. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(A) & (B).)
Father contends the exception found in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i), i.e., the beneficial relationship exception, applied in his case. The beneficial relationship exception pertains where the evidence supports "a compelling reason for determining that termination would be detrimental to the child [because the parent maintained] ... [¶] ... regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship." (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) " 'To trigger the application of the parental relationship exception, the parent must show the parent-child relationship is sufficiently strong that the child would suffer detriment from its termination.' [Citation.] A beneficial relationship 'is one that "promotes the well-being of the child to such a degree as to outweigh the well-being the child would gain in a permanent home with new, adoptive parents." ' " (In re Marcelo B. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 635, 643.)
The nature of the relationship between the parent and child is key in determining the existence of a beneficial relationship; it is not sufficient to show that the child derives some benefit from the relationship or shares some " 'emotional bond' " with the parent. (In re K.P. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 614, 621 (K.P.).) "To overcome the preference for adoption and avoid termination of the natural parent's rights, the parent must show that severing the natural parent-child relationship would deprive the child of a substantial, positive emotional attachment such that the child would be greatly harmed." (In re Angel B. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 454, 466.) In other words, the parent must show he or she occupies a " ' "parental role" in the child's life.' " (K.P., supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 621.) The parent has the burden of proving the statutory exception applies. (In re Megan S. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 247, 252.)
The juvenile court's decision that a parent has not satisfied this burden may be based on either or both of two component determinations—whether a beneficial parental relationship exists and whether the existence of that relationship constitutes "a compelling reason for determining that termination would be detrimental to the child." (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B).) When the juvenile court finds the parent has not established the existence of the requisite beneficial relationship, our review is limited to determining whether the evidence compels a finding in favor of the parent on this issue as a matter of law. (In re I.W. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1517, 1528.) When the juvenile court concludes the benefit to the child derived from preserving parental rights is not sufficiently compelling to outweigh the benefit achieved by the permanency of adoption, we review that determination for abuse of discretion. (K.P., supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at pp. 621-622.)
Here, the juvenile court found that father regularly visited the children but failed to show that terminating his parental rights would harm them so profoundly that the resulting detriment outweighed the benefit they would receive by being adopted into a loving home. In ruling, the court noted that Megan had lived with her foster parents all of her life and that Robert and Randy had lived with them nearly 18 months, "a significant period of time."
Father contends he was Robert and Randy's primary parent during their first few years of life and developed a meaningful, loving relationship with Megan during visitation. He argues the evidence established the children had a lifelong attachment to him and that their emotional security depended on maintaining that relationship. He points to evidence that he cared for them as a parent would during visitation, played with them and was affectionate with them. He also points out that the children reciprocated his affection and called him "dad" and "daddy."
We conclude father failed to show the existence of a beneficial relationship exception as a matter of law. Although father was loving and playful with the children, there is no evidence that he occupied a parental role with them. Further, he did not present any evidence that severing his parental rights would be detrimental to the children. Given the lack of evidence of detriment and compelling evidence in favor of adoption, we find no error and affirm the juvenile court's order terminating father's parental rights.
DISPOSITION
The July 14, 2016 order terminating father's parental rights is affirmed.