Opinion
C082402
02-24-2017
In re M.D. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. SACRAMENTO COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. MA. D. et al., Defendants and Appellants.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. Nos. JD234629, JD234630, JD2364631)
Ma. D. (father) and Mary E. (mother) appeal from the juvenile court's orders terminating parental rights. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26.) Both parents contend the court erred by finding the beneficial parental relationship exception to adoption did not apply. We affirm.
Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On April 24, 2014, Sacramento County Department of Health and Human Services (the department) filed non-detaining petitions under section 300, subdivision (b), as to minors Ki. D. (born in December 2010), Kh. D. (born in October 2012), and M. D. (born in December 2013). The petitions alleged that the parents' domestic violence and father's substance abuse endangered the minors, and that father was currently detained for violating Penal Code section 273.5.
On May 27, 2014, the juvenile court sustained the petitions, ordered the minors to remain in mother's care under dependent supervision, granted services to both parents, and ordered mother, who had admitted recent marijuana use, into dependency drug court.
On June 20, 2014, the department filed supplemental petitions (§ 387) recommending out-of-home placement because mother was still using marijuana and maintaining a filthy home, had allowed father to return to the home after his release from custody, and had left the minors in his care.
The minors were placed together in a foster home and doing well, with a foster mother who was very attentive to them. Mother was doing little in the way of services, claiming her part-time work and "stress" made it impossible; she was not earning enough to pay the rent and was about to become homeless. Father was currently homeless and unemployed, but anxious to begin services. Both parents denied substance abuse.
On September 9, 2014, the juvenile court sustained the section 387 petitions, ordered out-of-home placement for the minors and services for the parents, again ordered mother into dependency drug court, and ordered father to undergo alcohol and other drug assessment and drug testing and to attend domestic violence classes.
The parents' services were repeatedly extended. However, the 18-month review report, filed October 9, 2015, and an addendum report filed January 28, 2016, recommended terminating services.
After almost completing his services, father had lost touch with the department and had failed to engage in visitation since June 2015, but had apparently made unauthorized contacts with the minors facilitated by mother. He had tested positive for alcohol in June 2015, had missed testing repeatedly since then, and had been photographed in a bar, apparently drinking, in December 2015.
Father reappeared in January 2016, claiming that he had been working out of town six days a week since June 2015 and could not visit the minors in person, but had spoken with them on Skype during their visits with mother.
Mother had relapsed twice with alcohol, had been discharged from a residential treatment facility in January 2016, and was near to being terminated from dependency drug court. She had failed to complete her services or to show any sense of urgency about doing so. Although she completed general group counseling, the director of that program thought she had not learned much from it. She appeared to be maintaining a relationship with father which could endanger the minors. Her visitation had been consistent since September 2015 (when she first relapsed and visits became supervised again), and the minors appeared bonded to her; however, during a visit at the residential treatment facility in January 2016 she lost all control of them.
In the meantime, the minors had remained in their foster home, where they had bonded with the foster mother. Ki. was at first assessed as developmentally delayed and in need of an individualized education plan (IEP), but had improved significantly and was no longer deemed a candidate for an IEP or special education; however, he remained in counseling, originally prescribed due to aggressive behavior and lack of focus. The minors were a sibling set, and the foster mother was willing to adopt all of them if necessary.
At a contested 18-month review hearing on February 3, 2016, the juvenile court terminated the parents' services and set a section 366.26 hearing.
The section 366.26 report, filed May 25, 2016, recommended termination of parental rights. Now on a weekly supervised visitation schedule, the parents visited the minors "sporadically," with frequent last-minute cancellations or failures to appear; the minors were visibly upset when visits were cancelled. The minors were participating in play therapy to deal with anger and behavioral issues. They were generally adoptable and had bonded with the foster mother after almost two years in her home. She remained committed to meeting their needs and providing them with permanency.
An addendum report filed June 15, 2016, stated that during recent visits, the minors seemed happy to see the parents and showed affection toward them, but the parents often had trouble controlling the minors' behavior.
On June 22 and 23, 2016, the juvenile court held a contested section 366.26 hearing. The parents testified, as did social worker Sarah Craven and visitation supervisor Shelley Goldsby.
Mother testified that she wanted the minors returned to her. At her weekly visits, the minors were excited, jumping on her and screaming "Mama." She played with all of them, but tried to give Ki. a little extra time because he had some "issues." When visits ended, they did not want to go with the foster mother; they begged to go home with her.
According to mother, during the visit at the residential treatment facility on January 20, 2016, the minors were running around and playing, "just being babies." When this disturbed the facility director, mother took them outside, but it was too cold. Back inside, it was hard to find things for them to do because the house did not have toys or television. They were not out of mother's control, just "hyperactive" as always.
Mother corrected the minors when they did something wrong, but it was hard to focus on discipline when she saw them for only two or three hours a week. When the visitation supervisor advised her that she needed to discipline more consistently, she started to work on that.
Although mother had not remained compliant with dependency drug court, she felt that she had grown and changed a great deal despite the difficulties of her life. Domestic violence was no longer an issue because she and father were no longer together. She had learned from her mistakes and was "in a better place as a mom now." She had recently heard that the foster mother did not want to adopt the minors, and it would be extremely detrimental to them if they could neither come home with her nor stay with the foster mother.
Social worker Craven, who was in the adoptions unit, testified that she had had the case since April 2016. The visitation supervisor told her that mother still required redirection during visits and failed to establish boundaries for the minors; visits were moved out of the agency's office because mother let the minors jump on and off furniture and endanger themselves. When they missed visits, it was very difficult for them, and they would do some "acting out." Craven had not personally observed visits.
Craven thought the minors were not more active than other children in their age group. They could sit quietly and knew how to say "please" and "thank you." When Ki. was unruly, the foster mother would redirect him and ask him to sit down; she never showed exasperation or lost control.
The current placement was the intended adoptive placement. The foster mother was excited about adopting all the minors and was working energetically toward that goal. Craven had spoken to the minors, but they were too young to understand what was going on. Craven had not spoken to the visitation supervisor or the minors' therapist regarding her recommendation for placement.
Craven thought it would be harmful to the minors if they never saw their parents again, but things were seldom as clean cut as that. The decision whether to terminate parental rights always involved a "balancing act." Although Craven did not know whether the foster mother would allow postadoption contact with the parents, she expected that to happen; the foster mother had invited mother to Ki.'s preschool graduation and given the parents portraits of the minors made by their school, and Craven did not believe that sort of behavior would change after adoption.
Goldsby testified that she had been the director of Fred Jefferson Foster Family Agency (FFA) in Sacramento for 15 years, and the primary visitation supervisor in this case from June 2014 to the present. She had a master's degree in social work and a Ph.D. in clinical psychology. She had been a juvenile court investigator and a dependency social worker. She was an adoption specialist for Northern California, working to find placements for hard-to-place children.
Based on this experience, the juvenile court found Goldsby qualified to testify as an expert on "the successes and failures of adoptions."
In Goldsby's opinion, the minors were "really active" and "high energy," more so than most children their ages; they needed close supervision. They were also aggressive toward each other.
When the foster mother brought the minors for visits, she could "sometimes" handle their energy, but they could escape her when getting out of the car. Goldsby relocated visits away from the FFA office because it had staircases and elevators.
Over the past six months, the parents were allowed four hours a week of visitation. When they visited, Ki. would run to father, shouting "Papa," wanting to be picked up and held; Kh. was always clinging to him. When he was not present, both minors would cling to mother, and Kh. would say strongly that she did not want to go back. On the other hand, M., the youngest minor, was "very independent" and sometimes went off by herself.
When visits ended, Ki. and Kh. would say they did not want to leave. Father or mother would have to "coach" them to get back in the car by reassuring them that the parents would see them again soon, and the process sometimes took 15 or 20 minutes.
Father sometimes had to be redirected to keep closer watch on the minors, but Goldsby did not think they were in danger with him. He accepted her advice to keep a closer rein on them "for the most part." She was still anxious about Ki. during visits, however, because he sometimes ran away and did not follow father's instructions.
According to Goldsby, the foster mother had expressed ambivalence about Ki.'s behavior (which included calling her names and refusing to follow directions) and the work needed to deal with him; she had also told Goldsby that Ki.'s therapist had "some concerns" about the foster mother adopting him (or about "her handling [of] [Ki.]'s behavior"). Believing that Ki. would "overwhelm" the foster mother and it would end up disrupting his life, Goldsby advised her three months ago not to adopt the minors.
Goldsby had not spoken to the therapist.
In Goldsby's opinion, the foster mother's ambivalence about Ki., if not resolved, would be a bar to adoption. Because she could not handle his challenges to her authority, he would "get really stuck" in his disruptive behavior.
At this point the trial court observed that this hearing was not about whether the foster mother was the appropriate parent, but whether the minors were adoptable and whether any exception to adoption existed.
Goldsby opined that Ki. was "a special needs kid" who needed a home with the skills to deal with his "attachment disorder." Asked to define "special needs child," Goldsby stated: "Has to do with age. It has to do with ethnicity. It has to do with learning disabilities." Goldsby did not know if Ki. was specifically adoptable.
Goldsby later retracted the term "attachment disorder" because she had not "done an assessment" on that issue.
Goldsby admitted that the foster mother had never said she did not want to adopt Ki. and that persons planning to adopt often felt anxious. Goldsby had not told the social worker of her concerns about the foster mother and Ki.
Father testified that on unsupervised visits, he would pick the minors up in the morning and have them all day, and they would always go somewhere to have fun. When the visits were supervised, the minors played video games a lot at his home.
When father arrived for visits, the minors would all run to his car, trying to get in; when he left, trying to put them in the foster mother's car was "even worse" because "my son knows." Kh., who was "daddy's little girl," would not let go of him and would say she did not want to leave when visits ended. M. was "the least affected by this" because she was three months old when removed from the parental home.
During the summer of 2015, father was helping to fight wildfires for up to four weeks at a time, and had the pay stubs to prove it. The social worker then on the case knew about this and approved it. Out of town, he could not regularly drug test. The juvenile court told him he had done all he needed to do by way of services; he just needed to work and find housing. At some point he had to take a second job and work up to 22 hours a day. He did not disappear.
While out of town, he would call the minors at least once a week at the foster mother's home, or would speak to them that often on Skype during mother's unsupervised visits. In February 2016, he resumed regular in-person visitation.
Father believed Ki. was already "messed up" by the impending loss of contact with him. Ki. used to smile all the time, but now he always looked sad, and he talked only about coming home.
Father could not believe that parental rights might be terminated. According to him, the parents were not on drugs; he had had "a hundred pee tests, clean, twice a week for months." The minors were never neglected. The parents had ended their "toxic relationship."
Recalled as a rebuttal witness, Craven testified that when she visited the minors in placement, they were excited to see her, running up to her and calling her name. Kh. was "clingy" with her, the foster mother, and the foster mother's teen daughter.
In Craven's experience, Ki. had never been defiant, at most he had shown typical five-year-old stubbornness. His school reports and placement reports did not indicate defiance. He was generally adoptable due to his age, lack of significant behavioral issues, and good health.
Craven did not recall why Ki. had a therapist. She had contacted the therapist, but had not received a response. She did not think it important to discuss with the therapist whether the termination of parental rights would cause any possible detriment to Ki., because at this point "the weight of permanency" mattered most.
Asked whether the foster mother was ambivalent toward adoption, Craven answered with a "[r]esounding no." The foster mother had had the minors in her home for two years and considered them a part of her family. When Craven mentioned guardianship, the foster mother said: "Oh, I've already decided I'm adopting. This is happening." Since then, she had made great progress toward completing the home study. She had never expressed any ambivalence about "this process, adopting any of the children or all of the children."
Based on her experience supervising hundreds of parental visits, Craven opined that it was common for children not to want to leave at visits' end. Father's testimony about the fun he and the minors would have together on visits was typical, and children normally looked forward to such experiences; besides, "kids love their parents. It's just part of it.
The parents' attorneys argued that both parents had met the requirements of the beneficial parental relationship exception to adoption. Father's counsel also argued that the department had not shown Ki. was adoptable.
The juvenile court found all the minors were adoptable and likely to be adopted, whether by the present caretaker or some other. Contrary to Goldsby's opinion, Ki. was not a special needs child and did not have an attachment disorder; furthermore, the claim that the foster mother was ambivalent or uncommitted toward him contradicted the information given in every report since the jurisdictional hearing.
The court found further that Goldsby had failed to show that she understood the term "special needs" or how it might apply to Ki., and that if anything, his behavior showed excessive attachment, not inability to form attachments. The court did not "have a great deal of confidence in Dr. Goldsby's testimony and, in fact, question[ed] her credibility."
It was a close question whether either parent had regularly visited and contacted the minors. Mother's visits had been consistent only since February 2016, and her earlier inconsistency had been harmful to the minors. Although father maintained that he could not visit the minors between June 2015 and February 2016 because he was working out of town, the fact remained that whatever contact he had during that time frame was unauthorized.
However, assuming for the sake of argument the parents had engaged in regular visitation and contact, they had not shown that severing the parental relationship would be so detrimental to the minors as to cause them great harm. Although the minors were attached to the parents and had a loving relationship with them, the minors had been out of the parents' care for almost two years. The minors did not look to the parents to act in a parental capacity toward them. The parents had not demonstrated an ability to provide the minors with a stable and secure home, which the minors had found instead with the foster mother. They had now reached a point of emotional health and stability that they did not have with the parents. Though it would provide some benefit to maintain a relationship with the parents, "and maybe more strongly with [Ki.]," such benefit did not outweigh the benefit of being in a stable, permanent home. Permanency was in the minors' best interests.
For all the above reasons, the juvenile court terminated parental rights as to both parents and ordered adoption as the permanent plan.
DISCUSSION
I
Father contends he satisfied the test for establishing the beneficial relationship exception to adoption. He also adopts mother's arguments by reference to the extent they do not conflict with his own. Finally, he contends that if the juvenile court's ruling is reversed as to mother, it must also be reversed as to him. We are not persuaded.
" 'At the selection and implementation hearing held pursuant to section 366.26, a juvenile court must make one of four possible alternative permanent plans for a minor child. . . . The permanent plan preferred by the Legislature is adoption. [Citation.]' [Citations.] If the court finds the child is adoptable, it must terminate parental rights absent circumstances under which it would be detrimental to the child." (In re Ronell A. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1352, 1368, italics omitted.)
There are only limited circumstances permitting the juvenile court to find a "compelling reason for determining that termination [of parental rights] would be detrimental to the child . . . ." (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B).) One of those circumstances exists where the parent had maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship, often referred to as the beneficial parental relationship exception. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) The benefit to the child must promote "the well-being of the child to such a degree as to outweigh the well-being the child would gain in a permanent home with new, adoptive parents. In other words, the court balances the strength and quality of the natural parent/child relationship in a tenuous placement against the security and the sense of belonging a new family would confer. If severing the natural parent/child relationship would deprive the child of a substantial, positive emotional attachment such that the child would be greatly harmed, the preference for adoption is overcome and the natural parent's rights are not terminated." (In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 575 (Autumn H.); accord, In re C.F. (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 549, 555 (C.F.).)
"Because a section 366.26 hearing occurs only after the court has repeatedly found the parent unable to meet the child's needs, it is only in an extraordinary case that preservation of the parent's rights will prevail over the Legislature's preference for adoptive placement." (In re Jasmine D. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1350 (Jasmine D.).)
The party claiming the beneficial parental relationship exception to adoption has the burden of establishing the circumstances supporting the exception. (C.F., supra, 193 Cal.App.4th at p. 553.) The factual predicate of the exception must be supported by substantial evidence, but the juvenile court exercises its discretion in weighing that evidence and determining detriment. (In re K.P. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 614, 622; In re Bailey J. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1314-1315.)
"On review of the sufficiency of the evidence, we presume in favor of the order, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, giving the prevailing party the benefit of every reasonable inference and resolving all conflicts in support of the order." (Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 576.) " '[E]valuating the factual basis for an exercise of discretion is similar to analyzing the sufficiency of the evidence for the ruling. . . . Broad deference must be shown to the trial judge.' " (Jasmine D., supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 1351.)
Giving father the benefit of the doubt as to regular visitation and contact, as the juvenile court did, substantial evidence supported the court's finding that he did not show his relationship with the minors would so far promote their well-being as to overcome the Legislature's preference for adoption. They had been in the prospective adoptive home for two years (practically M.'s entire life, and a significant portion of the others' lives), and looked to the foster mother to meet their needs. Where adoptable minors are placed with a prospective adoptive family to which they have bonded and which meets their needs, that almost ends the discussion. (In re Dakota H. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 212, 228-229, 231; Jasmine D., supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 1350.)
Furthermore, father did not show that he functioned or could function as a parent, rather than merely as someone who entertained the minors during visits. The evidence that they ran to greet him when he visited, clung to him during visits, and departed with difficulty was shown by social worker Craven's testimony to be unremarkable at this point in the case, and not grounds for finding detriment to the minors from severing their relationship with him. Craven's testimony also established that the minors were enthusiastic and "clingy" toward her and others.
Citing In re S.B. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 289, father asserts that he did not need to show the minors had a " 'primary attachment' " to him in order to prove that the beneficial parental relationship exception applied. But the juvenile court did not apply any such test. In any event, In re S.B. is inapposite. The minor there had parent-child relationships with both her father and the grandmother with whom she lived; the father had maintained constant contact and visitation with the minor, had fully complied with his case plan, and had made every effort to regain the physical and emotional health needed to be a proper parent. (Id. at pp. 298-300.) In our case, father has not functioned as a parent for the last two years, and he has not cured his substance abuse problem.
Father cites Goldsby's testimony that it would be harmful to the minors if they never saw the parents again. However, as Craven pointed out, the foster mother had encouraged the parents to stay in contact with the minors and had reached out to them to include them in the minors' lives, and no evidence suggested that adoption would suddenly end such contact. But even if continued contact could not be ensured, the importance of permanency and stability for the minors had to be the juvenile court's prime consideration at this stage of the proceeding.
The parents acknowledge that the juvenile court rejected Goldsby's opinions on some points and assert that they are relying only on what the court did not reject. Since the court stated broadly it lacked "confidence" in Goldsby's testimony and "question[ed] her credibility," we doubt if anything in her testimony which was not corroborated by other evidence may be deemed reliable. We need not decide that point, however.
Father asserts that legal guardianship would have ensured that the parents could remain in the minors' lives while still giving the minors stability. We question whether father may raise this argument now because he did not seek an order of legal guardianship below. (See In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293.) But assuming the argument is properly before us, it lacks merit. Since the parents' testimony revealed that they had not accepted the reality that they would not regain custody, a guardianship arrangement would have left the minors torn between the parents and the legal guardian, an inherently unstable situation.
Furthermore, the authority father cites on this point is inapposite. In re Jerome D. (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 1200 involved a minor with a serious physical disability whom the appellate court found not to be generally adoptable; a prospective adoptive parent whose suitability had not been adequately assessed; and a mother with whom the minor had lived for the first six and a half years of his life, with whom he had had regular unsupervised visits, and with whom he wished to live again. (Id. at pp. 1204-1207.) In re Fernando M. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 529 did not consider the beneficial parental relationship exception; instead, it addressed the "exceptional circumstances" exception (former § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(D)), under which adoption is not feasible because the relative or foster parent with whom the child is living is unable or unwilling to adopt. (In re Fernando M., at p. 535.) Since the facts of our case do not resemble those of the cited decisions, they do not assist father.
In short, despite the minors' loving relationship with father and their attachment to him, he did not show that the benefits of the relationship outweighed the benefit of permanency and stability for the minors.
II
Mother contends: (1) The juvenile court erred by finding that the beneficial parental relationship exception required proof that the minors would be "greatly harmed" if the parental relationship were severed. (2) But even under that standard, mother met her burden of proof. Mother also joins in father's arguments. We conclude mother has shown no grounds for reversal.
Mother's first argument attacks the well-settled rule that to overcome the Legislature's preference for adoption, a party asserting the beneficial parental relationship exception must show that "severing the natural parent/child relationship would deprive the child of a substantial, positive emotional attachment such that the child would be greatly harmed." (Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575; accord, In re C.F., supra, 193 Cal.App.4th at p. 555; In re B.D. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 1218, 1234-1235; In re Helen W. (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 71, 81; In re L.Y.L. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 942, 953.) According to mother, this test improperly adds conditions to the statutory language of the beneficial parental relationship exception, which requires only a showing on this point that "the child would benefit from continuing the relationship." (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) In other words, all a parent needs to do to establish the existence of this exception (aside from proving regular visitation and contact) is to show that continuing the relationship would benefit the minors to any extent. We disagree.
First, mother cites no case law on point that supports her position. Second, the bare terms of the statute, on which mother relies, are insufficient to guide a juvenile court in deciding whether the beneficial parental relationship applies. This is so because the court cannot assess "benefit" in a vacuum, but must do so in light of the Legislature's clear preference for adoption. In other words, the court cannot decide whether children would benefit from continuing a parental relationship sufficiently to avoid the preference for adoption except by assessing the strength of that benefit and weighing it against the benefit from adoption. Thus, applying the statute necessarily involves a balancing test which is not spelled out in the statute on its face.
Under another heading, mother quotes the holding of In re C.F., supra, 193 Cal.App.4th at pages 558-559, that "the proposition a parent may establish the parent-child beneficial relationship exception by merely showing the child derives some measure of benefit from maintaining parental contact" does not state the law. Mother fails to recognize that this holding undercuts her argument against the Autumn H. standard, which In re C.F. reaffirms.
We are satisfied that the definition of the required balancing test stated in Autumn H. and consistently followed by later courts is correct. We therefore apply that test to mother's claim that she proved the existence of the exception. In doing so, we bear in mind that our standard of review is whether, viewing the evidence most favorably to the juvenile court's findings, substantial evidence supports those findings. (Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 576.)
Like father, mother had not played a parental role toward the minors since they were removed from her custody. Moreover, even after completing parenting education, he had not learned basic parental skills, such as how to keep the minors under control during visits, and did not seem to recognize that this was a problem. As with father, the fact that the minors enjoyed her visits and did not want them to end was insufficient to establish a strong, positive connection which would greatly harm the minors to sever. The minors had bonded with their foster mother, who considered them members of her family, and to whom they looked to meet their needs. Under all the circumstances, the juvenile court's finding that mother had not met her burden to establish the applicability of the beneficial parental relationship exception was amply supported.
Mother asserts in her reply brief that her activity in a parental role was demonstrated by the period of unsupervised and overnight visits she was granted. But those visits were curtailed because she used them as occasions to grant father covert and unauthorized contact with the minors. --------
Like father, mother relies heavily on the factually inapposite cases In re Jerome D., supra, 84 Cal.App.4th 1200, and In re S.B., supra, 164 Cal.App.4th 289. Like father, mother cites In re S.B. to support the strawman argument that she did not need to prove the minors had a "primary attachment" to her -- a point which does not respond to anything the juvenile court actually found.
Mother also cites In re Scott B. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 452, in which the court found legal guardianship the best option where an emotionally unstable 11-year-old minor had lived nearly all his life with his mother, continued to express a preference for living with her after he was removed from her custody, gained stability through her continued presence in his life, and did not understand that adoption could mean the end of contact with her. (Id. at pp. 471-472.) By contrast, the minors here have lived for two years (almost half a lifetime for the oldest, more for the others) out of the parents' custody, have flourished in their foster home and bonded with the foster mother, and show no signs of emotional instability (despite Dr. Goldsby's groundless contrary opinion). Thus Scott B. is also inapposite. To the extent mother relies on it to support an argument for legal guardianship, we note that, like father, she did not request an order for legal guardianship below (see In re S.B., supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1293), and on the facts of this case an order for legal guardianship would have been detrimental to providing stability and permanence for the minors.
We need not respond to mother's remaining points in detail, as they amount to demands that we reweigh the evidence and view it in the light most favorable to herself. On substantial evidence review, we may not do so.
DISPOSITION
The orders terminating parental rights are affirmed.
/s/_________
Blease, Acting P. J. We concur: /s/_________
Nicholson, J. /s/_________
Hull, J.