Opinion
E068306
11-01-2017
In re P.R. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. RIVERSIDE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SOCIAL SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. S.A., Defendant and Appellant.
Pamela Rae Tripp, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Gregory P. Priamos, County Counsel, James E. Brown, Guy B. Pittman and Julie Koons Jarvi, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super.Ct.No. SWJ1500219) OPINION APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Judith C. Clark, Judge. Affirmed. Pamela Rae Tripp, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Gregory P. Priamos, County Counsel, James E. Brown, Guy B. Pittman and Julie Koons Jarvi, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Appellant Steven A., Jr., (father) appeals the order terminating his parental rights as to his daughters, P.R. and C.R. (the children). On appeal, he argues that the order must be reversed because: (1) the Riverside County Department of Social Services (DPSS) failed to make reasonable efforts to locate him and he did not receive notice of the jurisdiction/disposition hearing; and (2) his due process rights were violated when the juvenile court terminated his parental rights without making a finding of parental unfitness. We affirm.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
DPSS filed an initial Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 petition on April 17, 2015, on behalf of P.R. The petition alleged that P.R., who was two years old at the time, came within the provisions of section 300, subdivisions (b) (failure to protect) and (g) (no provision for support). The petition specifically alleged that the child's mother (mother) was abusing controlled substances and had a history with the Los Angeles County Child Protective Services (CPS), with regard to a prior dependency case alleging general neglect of P.R. and substance abuse. The petition also alleged that the identity and whereabouts of P.R.'s father were unknown.
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise noted.
Mother is not a party to this appeal.
On April 20, 2015, DPSS filed a section 300 petition on behalf of C.R., who was about one week old. This petition alleged that C.R. came within the provisions of section 300, subdivisions (b) (failure to protect) and (g) (no provision for support). It contained the same allegations as P.R.'s petition, plus the allegation that mother had placed C.R. at risk of abuse and neglect since she lacked the appropriate provisions to care for the child.
The social worker filed a detention report stating that mother gave birth to C.R., who weighed four pounds, seven ounces. Mother tested positive for opiates, but the child tested negative. Mother was not bonding with the child in the hospital and refused to feed her. The social worker interviewed mother at the hospital. Mother said she resided with her mother and said P.R. lived with her there. Mother reported that P.R.'s father was Brian B. She said they did not talk anymore, and she did not know his whereabouts. Her current boyfriend was Steve J. She said she was dating a man named Jonathan (last name unknown) when she became pregnant with C.R., but the short relationship ended before she could notify him of the pregnancy. The nurses informed the social worker of their concerns about mother's lack of feeding C.R., her mental health, and her desire to spend time with her boyfriend, rather than care for her newborn.
The social worker further reported that, in 2013, Los Angeles County CPS had received a referral alleging general neglect of P.R. According to the referral, mother and father, who was listed as the alleged father, had neglected the health and safety of P.R.
The court held a detention hearing regarding C.R.'s petition on April 21, 2015, and detained C.R. in foster care.
That same day, the social worker filed a first amended petition with regard to P.R. This petition listed Brian B. as the father, but stated his whereabouts were unknown. The petition alleged that P.R. came within the provisions of section 300, subdivisions (b) (failure to protect), (g) (no provision for support), and (j) (abuse of sibling). Under section 300, subdivision (g), the petition alleged that "the whereabouts of the child's father, Brian [B.] [are] unknown." It also alleged: "The [father's] whereabouts are currently unknown."
The social worker filed a detention report, which provided that, on April 16, 2015, mother stated that Brian B. was the biological father of P.R. The social worker also stated that the April 10, 2013 detention report from the Los Angeles County CPS case listed father as the alleged father of P.R. Mother did not provide any information as to his whereabouts.
On April 22, 2015, the social worker filed a second amended section 300 petition on behalf of both children. This petition named both Brian B. and father as P.R. fathers, and Jonathan (last name unknown) as C.R.'s father. The petition alleged that the whereabouts of the fathers were unknown.
In the record, Jonathan's name is spelled both as "Johnathan" and "Jonathan." For consistency's sake, we will simply spell his name as "Jonathan."
At the detention hearing that same day, the court dismissed the first amended petition. The court designated both Brian B. and father as alleged fathers. It then detained the children in foster care.
That same day, mother filed a paternity inquiry form and named "Steven Adam Bryan" as P.R.'s father. On the paternity inquiry form regarding C.R., mother only listed "Jonathan" as a possible father.
Jurisdiction/Disposition
The social worker filed a jurisdiction/disposition report on May 8, 2015, recommending that the court declare the children as dependents and provide mother with reunification services. The social worker recommended that the court deny services as to all three alleged fathers, since they were merely alleged and their whereabouts were unknown. The social worker reported that, on May 4, 2015, mother said the whereabouts of the alleged fathers were still unknown. The social worker stated: "Due to the lack of identifying information, I was unable to verify the identity of the alleged father. A[n] . . . inmate locator [search] produced no matches for the alleged father, [(father)]." The social worker further reported that mother was unable to provide the last name or any additional information needed to determine the identity of the alleged father of C.R. The social worker reported that, on May 4, 2015, a CLETS search was submitted regarding mother, Brian B., and father, and the results were pending. Furthermore, a search of the Superior Court of Riverside County website did not produce any matches for father.
CLETS stands for the California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System, which is a confidential law enforcement database that allows access to an individual's criminal history, driver's license and vehicle registration information. (Richardson v. City and County of San Francisco Police Com. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 671, 674, fn. 1.)
The court held a contested jurisdiction/disposition hearing on July 17, 2015. County counsel stated that DPSS was recommending that the court sustain the petition, provide reunification services to mother, and deny services to the three alleged fathers. Mother contested the petition and testified on her own behalf. After hearing testimony and argument of counsel, the court sustained the petition and adjudged the children dependents of the court. The children were removed from the custody of mother and the alleged fathers, pursuant to section 361, subdivision (c). The court ordered services to be provided for mother, but denied services to the alleged fathers under section 361.5, subdivisions (a) and (b)(1).
Six-month Status Review
The social worker filed a six-month status review report on January 5, 2016, recommending that services for mother be continued. The social worker reported that the children were currently placed with the maternal grandmother in Cypress, California, and that the family had relocated in November 2015, without prior notice. The home was in the process of being assessed by the relative assessment unit. Mother was currently residing with her cousin in Hemet, California. She had not had contact with DPSS since October 23, 2015.
The court held a contested six-month review hearing on February 16, 2016, at which it followed DPSS's recommendations and set a 12-month review hearing.
In an addendum report filed on February 16, 2016, the social worker reported that she asked mother on February 4, 2016, about the children's alleged fathers. Mother indicated she still did not have any contact information. She continued to report that P.R.'s father was "Steven or Brian," but then said C.R.'s father was also "Steven or Brian." The social worker reported that, due to the limited amount of information, a parent locator referral could not be submitted for either alleged father.
Twelve-month Status Review Hearing
The social worker filed a 12-month status review report on May 27, 2016, and recommended that mother's services be terminated and a section 366.26 hearing be set, with the permanent plan of adoption.
The social worker filed an addendum report on July 21, 2016, and reported that, on June 15, 2016, she had received a voice message from a "Mr. Steve [A]." Mr. A. identified himself as the paternal grandfather of the children and said he was concerned about their care. The social worker called him back, and Mr. A. reported that he and his wife were living in Las Vegas, but were in California the past week. He said he "had not seen his son, the father of the children, until about December of 2015." He said that, since December, he had seen his grandchildren multiple times with his son and mother. He reported that mother had been living with, or was in a relationship with, his son for the last three years. He said they stayed in hotels and lived a "gypsy lifestyle." Mr. A. reported that his son, mother, and the maternal grandmother had all been lying to DPSS. He forwarded a photo of mother and one of the children, which had been taken at his apartment, as proof. When asked about the paternity of the children, Mr. A. said his son, father, was the father of the children. He gave father's date of birth to the social worker. The social worker gave Mr. A. information regarding the next juvenile court hearing, since he said he was willing to testify regarding the information he had shared.
On June 17, 2016, the social worker attempted to contact mother by telephone. She left a message requesting a return call as soon as possible. On July 20, 2016, the social worker attempted to call mother again, but the phone rang several times and then disconnected. Thus, she was unable to leave a message.
The court held a contested 12-month status review hearing on July 28, 2016. Mr. A. did not appear. Mother testified on her own behalf. She admitted that she had been arrested the day before, while she was with father. She said he picked her up because he was coming to court with her, when the police stopped them. She said she did not know why she was arrested, but had spent one and a half days in jail before being bailed out by a family friend. Mother explained that she had called father and was trying to reconcile with him because the social worker told her to try to bring the children's father and anybody who would take the children to the hearing in case they needed to be adopted. Mother said she found father and told him that P.R. might be his child, so she asked him to come to court with her to do a paternity test. Mother admitted that once she had obtained father's phone number, she did not provide it to the social worker.
The court confirmed that father was in custody in Orange County, and that he was an alleged father. It then found that returning the children to mother would create a substantial risk of detriment to them. The court continued the children as dependents, found that the current placement was not appropriate since the maternal grandmother was unwilling to cooperate with DPSS, and removed the children from her care. The court terminated mother's reunification services and stated that it had no doubt she knew all along how to reach father, but had refused to provide his information to DPSS. The court appointed counsel for father and set a section 366.26 hearing.
On September 7, 2016, the social worker submitted a request for a parent locator referral on behalf of father. On September 12, 2016, DPSS executed an internet search on the jail information management system in six counties, and they all produced the results that father was "Not Incarcerated." DPSS also searched the websites for the California Department of Corrections, the Federal Department of Prisons, the California Statewide Automated Welfare System, Medical Eligibility Data System, as well as many others. All search results were negative.
On September 16, 2016, the social worker filed an ex parte application and order for paternity testing. The social worker reported that, on August 29, 2016, father had made contact with DPSS. He believed he was the children's father and requested a paternity test. He provided his residential address and contact number.
On September 23, 2016, the social worker filed requests for a finding of due diligence and authorization to serve father's counsel notice of the upcoming hearing. The court granted the requests. DPSS then sent notice of the section 366.26 hearing to father's counsel.
Sections 366.26 and 388
The social worker filed a section 366.26 report on November 10, 2016, recommending that the court continue the hearing for 120 days since a referral was generated on father regarding allegations of sexual abuse; the matter was being investigated. The social worker reported that father's paternity test was performed on October 18, 2016, and the results indicated a probability of paternity of over 99 percent as to both P.R. and C.R. Thus, the social worker requested the court find father to be the biological father of the children.
The court held a contested section 366.26 hearing on November 28, 2016. Father did not appear, but was represented by counsel. Father's counsel informed the court that he had not had contact with father for three months. He indicated that he planned to submit a section 388 petition to request visitation and services, when father did contact him. The court made a finding that father was the biological father of the children and continued the hearing. After a pause in the proceedings, the court went back on the record to state that father was now present in court. The court ordered him back on January 31, 2017.
The social worker filed an addendum report on January 26, 2017, recommending that father be provided with six months of reunification services and given supervised visitation. The social worker reported that a team decision making (TDM) meeting was held on January 23, 2017, at which father acknowledged he should have come forward earlier. He said that mother lied to him about the custody of the children and told him the children were in the maternal grandmother's custody. Thus, father believed there was "no CPS case open." He said he had many visits with the children at the maternal grandmother's house and elsewhere, and he was involved in their lives. Father said that as soon as he found out the children had been removed from the maternal grandmother on July 28, 2016, he contacted DPSS and got the social worker's phone number. He called her on August 29, 2016. The TDM recommendation was that father be provided with reunification services and the section 366.26 hearing be vacated.
The court held a hearing on January 31, 2017. Father was present with counsel. Father's counsel informed the court that he had submitted section 388 petitions for each child and asked the court to accept them. The petitions requested that the court order services for father, since the court had previously denied services when father's whereabouts were unknown. The court ordered the petitions received and filed, and it found that a prima facie showing had been made. Thus, it set a hearing on the petitions for March 3, 2017.
On February 3, 2017, the prospective adoptive parents filed requests for de facto parent status as to each of the children. The court granted the requests on February 7, 2017.
The social worker filed an addendum report on February 28, 2017, and reported that father was residing with his mother in Arizona, but stated he would move to his grandparents' residence in Los Angeles. The social worker further reported that father had a sixth grade education and was unemployed, but was looking for a job.
The court held a hearing on March 3, 2017, but the hearing was continued. A hearing was then held on March 24, 2017. At the outset, father's counsel raised the issue of lack of notice of the jurisdiction/disposition hearing. Father's counsel informed the court that he had filed another section 388 petition that day, requesting reunification services or, in the alternative, requesting the court set aside the jurisdiction findings made on July 17, 2015, due to a lack of notice to father. The hearings regarding the section 388 petitions and the section 366.26 termination of parental rights were continued to May 11, 2017.
At the outset of the hearing on May 11, 2017, the court deemed the section 388 petitions filed on March 23, 2017, as amendments to the previous section 388 petitions to add the issue of notice. Father's counsel informed the court that he had received discovery from counsel and, in his review, did not see any declaration of due diligence filed for father. County counsel responded by stating that, from the beginning of the case, the only identifying information DPSS had was father's name. The social worker continued to ask mother, but she never gave any other information.
The jurisdiction/disposition report showed that a California inmate locator search was performed, but there were no positive results. County counsel stated that, due to the lack of identifying information, no declaration of due diligence was filed, and that if a search on someone who had father's name was performed, there would be "a gajillion hits." Counsel said nothing further could be done since they had no identifying information. Counsel for the children agreed.
Father's counsel responded that the problem was that he could not go back and look to see what efforts DPSS had made because there was no record of any of their efforts. The court asked father's counsel what evidence he had that DPSS had any other information upon which to act. He responded that DPSS had his name, but there was no evidence DPSS used his name except to do a criminal search. Father's counsel just did not believe that DPSS had no information upon which to act. Thus, the basis of the motion was that DPSS did not act on the information it had and did not meet the requirements to show it made a due diligence effort. He added that there was nothing in the reports to show DPSS acted on the information of the prior dependency in Los Angeles County, which named father as the father of P.R. County counsel responded that the Los Angeles County documents were not before the court, so he would not comment on them. Moreover, under section 388, it was father's burden to find information showing DPSS failed to do something with the information it had.
The court took the matter under submission and returned after a recess. The court indicated that it had reviewed the entire case file and specifically noted that mother never identified father as possibly being the father of C.R. Rather, she always referred to an individual named "Jonathan." Mother identified the person at the hospital as Steve J. As to P.R., mother identified Brian B. as the father. The court did note that a likely place DPSS could have looked to find information was in the Los Angeles County dependency case, which it did.
The court found that, in fact, it was DPSS that identified father as the possible father, since he was the alleged father in the Los Angeles County case. However, the Los Angeles agency was never able to locate him. Thus, the court found that DPSS did pursue all reasonable avenues available. The court noted that DPSS basically was required to conduct an inquiry in good faith, and that DPSS had no other identifying information, such as a date of birth, a physical description, a location, a phone number, or any contact information. Moreover, in light of the fact that a court in a previous proceeding was unable to locate that person, it could not find that DPSS's efforts were unreasonable in this case. Therefore, the court found that DPSS had exercised reasonable diligence in seeking to notice father, and that there was no notice error.
With regard to father's request for reunification services, father's counsel first argued that the court should find father a presumed father. He asserted that mother lied to father and said the children were in the custody of the maternal grandmother, so he believed there was "no CPS case open." He further contended that father had many visits with the children at the maternal grandmother's residence, and he provided photographs of father and the children. County counsel argued that father admitted he knew the children were with the maternal grandmother, and it was only when he was at risk of having his parental rights terminated that he bothered to come forward. Moreover, there was no evidence that father was stopped from filing any custody orders earlier.
The court noted that presumed father status would be based on father taking the children into his home and holding them out as his own children. However, there was no evidence to support that he had ever done either. Thus, it denied father's request for presumed father status.
As to the section 388 petitions, the court found changed circumstances in that father's status was elevated from an alleged father to a biological father. As to best interests, the court pointed out that father admitted he knew the dependency case existed at the point when the children were removed from the maternal grandmother on July 26, 2016. However, he waited until August 29, 2016, to come forward. That delay was significant to the court, since it showed a failure on father's part to act in a manner that was in the children's best interests. The court noted that the matter was delayed after he came forward for additional investigation, but the sexual allegations against him were unfounded. The court stated that the children needed to have a stable, consistent, appropriate, law-abiding parent in their lives, and father had not established those qualities. Instead, he was unemployed, with no source of income, he had been uncooperative in providing DPSS with information, and he did not have stable housing. Father said he was attending a rehabilitation program as a result of a pending drug charge, but he refused to provide information to verify anything. The court added that, given father's behavior, his credibility was not great. Most significantly, the court noted father's failure to visit the children. He missed a scheduled visit on February 21, 2017, cancelled a visit on March 6, 2017, and did not visit at all throughout March and April. The court noted that father had an ongoing drug problem and pending drug charges. It concluded that father had failed to meet his burden of proof that it was in the children's best interests to grant him services; therefore, it denied the petitions.
The court then proceeded to the section 366.26 hearing. Father's counsel objected to the termination of parental rights because father had a bond with the children. The court noted that the children were currently placed with prospective adoptive parents and were bonded with them; thus, it found the children were likely to be adopted. The court found that none of the exceptions to the termination of parental rights applied, and it terminated father's and mother's parental rights.
ANALYSIS
I. The Court Did Not Violate Father's Due Process Rights
Father filed a section 388 petition requesting that the jurisdictional findings made on July 17, 2015, be set aside, due to a lack of notice to him. He now claims that the court violated his due process rights when it found that notice had been provided to him for the jurisdiction/disposition hearing. (See Ansley v. Superior Court (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 477, 487 (Ansley).) Father further argues that DPSS failed to make any reasonable effort to locate him and, as such, the court abused its discretion in denying his section 388 petition. Thus, he contends that this court should reverse the order denying his petition and also reverse the order terminating his parental rights. We disagree.
A. The Court Did Not Find That Notice Had Been Provided to Father Since His Whereabouts Were Unknown
Father first sets forth authority regarding the requirement of providing notice. However, contrary to his claim, the court did not find that notice had been provided to him for the jurisdiction/disposition hearing. The court did state its finding that "adequate notice has been given." However, it was apparently referring to notice to mother. We note that, at that point in the proceedings, there were three alleged fathers, and mother said their whereabouts were unknown. The first amended petition alleged that father was the father of P.R. and stated that his whereabouts were unknown. It appears that father was only alleged in the amended petition because the social worker had discovered mother's 2013 dependency case, which listed father as the alleged father of P.R. Furthermore, at the jurisdiction/disposition hearing, the court denied father services under section 361.5, subdivisions (a) and (b)(1), because his whereabouts were unknown. Thus, the record reflects that the court did not find that notice had been given to father for the hearing, but rather that his whereabouts were unknown.
B. The Court Properly Found That DPSS Exercised Reasonable Diligence in Seeking to Provide Father with Notice
Father next argues that DPSS's search for him was insufficient and "not calculated to lead to actual notice." DPSS contends that the court did not abuse its discretion in finding that they had exercised reasonable diligence in searching for father. We agree with DPSS.
At the outset, we note father's assertion that the juvenile court "began its ruling on [his] Ansley motion by acknowledging that a due diligent search had never been conducted for the father." This statement is simply false since the court concluded that DPSS exercised reasonable diligence in seeking to notice father. (See post.)
"Section 316.2 requires the juvenile court to inquire of the mother the identity of all alleged or presumed fathers at the detention hearing or as soon thereafter as practicable. [Citations.] Each alleged father is entitled to notice that the child is the subject of dependency proceedings. [Citation.] Section 316.2 is designed to protect the alleged father's limited due process rights. [Citation.] An alleged father is entitled to notice so that he can challenge his paternity status." (In re Eric E. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 252, 257.) "If the whereabouts of a parent are unknown, the issue becomes whether due diligence was used to locate the parent. [Citation.] The term 'reasonable or due diligence' ' "denotes a thorough, systematic investigation and inquiry conducted in good faith." ' [Citation.] Due process notice requirements are deemed satisfied where a parent cannot be located despite a reasonable search effort and the failure to give actual notice will not render the proceedings invalid." (In re Claudia S. (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 236, 247.)
Here, the record reflects that mother did not provide father's name as an alleged father of either child. The first section 300 petitions filed on behalf of P.R. and C.R. alleged that the identity and whereabouts of the child's father were unknown. Mother told the social worker that Brian B. was P.R.'s father. However, the social worker discovered that father was the alleged father of P.R. in the prior dependency case in Los Angeles County. Thus, the second amended section 300 petition that was filed on behalf of both children named Brian B. and father as alleged fathers of P.R., and named "Jonathan" as C.R.'s alleged father. The whereabouts of all of them were still alleged as unknown. On April 22, 2015, mother filed a paternity inquiry form. Father claims that mother "identified [him] as the alleged father of at least one of the children." However, the record shows that mother actually gave a name that was very similar to father's on the paternity inquiry form for P.R., and she gave no other information about him. On the paternity inquiry form filed regarding C.R., mother named "Jonathan" as a possible father of C.R. and gave no other information about him.
Father additionally claims that his "due process rights were violated as no effort other than an inmate locator [search] was employed by [DPSS] as their best effort to locate [him]." However, prior to the jurisdiction/disposition hearing, the social worker conducted a California inmate locator search and searched the Superior Court of Riverside County website. Neither search produced any matches for father. The social worker also submitted a CLETS search, and the results were pending at the time of the writing of the jurisdiction/disposition report. As the court noted, DPSS had no other identifying information, such as father's date of birth, a physical description, a location, a phone number, or any contact information. We also note that father's name is not unusual.
Upon review of the record, we conclude that DPSS made a reasonable search effort in good faith, under all the circumstances.
II. The Court Was Not Required to Make a Finding of Parental Unfitness
Father argues that his due process rights were violated when the court terminated his parental rights without first making a finding that he was an unfit father. However, no such finding was needed.
"California dependency law distinguishes between a presumed father, a biological father and a biological father who came forward early in the dependency case and displayed a full commitment to the child . . . . [Citations.] This court has consistently held that a biological father's rights are limited to establishing his right to presumed father status, and the court does not err by terminating a biological father's parental rights when he has had the opportunity to show presumed father status and has not done so." (In re A.S. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 351, 362 (A.S.).) "A man is a presumed father if he meets the criteria of Family Code section 7611. Under that statute, 'a man who has neither legally married nor attempted to legally marry the mother of his child cannot become a presumed father unless he both "receives the child into his home and openly holds out the child as his natural child." ' " (In re Jason J. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 922, 932 (Jason J.).)
Here, father's only status was that of a biological father. " '[A] biological father's "desire to establish a personal relationship with a child, without more, is not a fundamental liberty interest protected by the due process clause." [Citation.]' " (Jason J., supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at p. 933.) Thus, the court was not required to make a finding of parental unfitness before terminating his parental rights. (Id. at p. 934.)
In his reply brief, father argues that he "was deprived of notice at the inception of the case and had no opportunity to gain presumed father status." However, father was not deprived of notice. (See ante, § I.) Moreover, he requested the juvenile court below to find that he was a presumed father, arguing that he had a relationship with the children, the children had spent time with his family, and he had held the children out to be his own. However, the court concluded there was no evidence that would warrant elevating him to presumed father status, and it denied his request.
On appeal, father has not contested the court's denial of his request for presumed father status. We further note that, according to father, he became aware of the dependency case on July 28, 2016, but then waited over one month before calling the social worker. In addition, he cancelled a visit on March 6, 2017, and had no reported visits with the children during March and April 2017. In other words, by the time of the section 366.26 hearing on May 11, 2017, father had not visited the children in over two months. Thus, the record demonstrates that father did not promptly come forward once he became aware of the dependency case and, as the court noted, he did not even put forth the minimum effort of visiting the children.
Because father was only a biological father, and he did not demonstrate a willingness to accept full parental responsibilities for the children, the court was not required to make a particularized finding of unfitness or detriment before terminating his parental rights. (A.S., supra, 180 Cal.App.4th at p. 362; see In re Sarah C. (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 964, 981.)
DISPOSITION
The order terminating parental rights is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
McKINSTER
Acting P. J. We concur: MILLER
J. CODRINGTON
J.