Opinion
E066497
03-22-2017
In re O.R. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. RIVERSIDE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SOCIAL SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. N.R., Defendant and Appellant; T.H., Appellant.
Jack A. Love, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Appellant, T.H. Konrad S. Lee, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant, N.R. Gregory P. Priamos, County Counsel, James E. Brown, Guy B. Pittman and Julie Koons Jarvi, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super.Ct.No. SWJ006448) OPINION APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Timothy F. Freer, Judge. Affirmed. Jack A. Love, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Appellant, T.H. Konrad S. Lee, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant, N.R. Gregory P. Priamos, County Counsel, James E. Brown, Guy B. Pittman and Julie Koons Jarvi, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Appellant T.H. (the maternal grandmother or the MGM) appeals from an order denying her Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 petition, in which she requested placement of her grandchildren, O.R. and A.R. (the children), with her. Appellant N.R. (father) appeals the same order, as well as the order terminating his parental rights to the children. Both appellants argue that the juvenile court and the Riverside County Department of Public Social Services (DPSS) failed to apply the relative placement preference, pursuant to section 361.3. We affirm.
All further statutory references will be to the Welfare and Institutions Code, unless otherwise noted.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On May 12, 2014, DPSS filed a section 300 petition on behalf of the children. O.R. was two years old at the time, and A.R. was eight months old. The petition alleged that they came within the provisions of section 300, subdivisions (b) (failure to protect), and (g) (no provision for support). The petition included the allegations that the children's mother (mother) and father had histories of extensive substance abuse, that mother had a prior history with DPSS, and that father was unable to provide care and support for the children.
Mother is not a party to this appeal. As such, this opinion will focus on the facts relevant to father. --------
The social worker filed a detention report stating that she had received a referral alleging general neglect, and it was reported that mother was using heroin. Mother and the children were living in the MGM's home. She was married to father, but he did not live with them. She planned on filing for divorce. Mother admitted to taking a methadone pill the day before and recently using marijuana. She had an extensive history of drug abuse. Despite multiple preventative substance abuse treatment programs, she continued to use drugs.
The social worker spoke with father on the telephone, and he explained that he and mother separated approximately three and one-half months prior, and he was currently living with his own mother.
The court held a detention hearing on May 13, 2014, and found father to be the presumed father of the children. The court detained the children in foster care.
Jurisdiction/disposition
The social worker filed a jurisdiction/disposition report on May 30, 2014, and recommended that the court find the allegations in the petition true and declare the children dependents of the court. The social worker further recommended that the court deny reunification services to father pursuant to section 361.5, subdivision (b)(12), since he had a violent felony conviction. It also recommended that mother be denied services pursuant to section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10) and (b)(11). The social worker reported that mother had always lived with her mother, with the exception of about one year. Mother was homeschooled, starting around the age of 10, due to the MGM being hospitalized after having back surgery. She had minimal supervision and said she was "looking for an escape" because she was the primary caregiver for her mother. Thus, she began using methamphetamine and marijuana.
Mother requested that her sister (the maternal aunt) and a family friend be considered for possible placement. The social worker spoke with the maternal aunt, who declined to be assessed for placement. However, she did say that mother and the MGM argued and fought with each other, and she believed it was emotionally damaging to the children. She also stated that the MGM was addicted to pills and enabled mother.
The court held a contested jurisdiction/disposition hearing on June 26, 2014. It sustained the petition, adjudged the children dependents, and ordered reunification services for the parents, as that was in the children's best interest. The children were removed from the custody and care of the parents.
Six-month Status Review
The social worker filed a six-month status review report on December 11, 2014, recommending that the children remain dependents and the court offer the parents family maintenance services. The social worker reported that the children were returned to mother's care on November 24, 2014. Mother was in a residential treatment program from May 27, 2014, to September 22, 2014, and she moved into sober living housing at Martha's Village and Kitchen after she completed the program. The program housed singles and families with children for up to one year. The social worker subsequently changed its recommendation regarding father to offer reunification services.
At a contested six-month review hearing on February 3, 2015, the court ordered family maintenance services for mother and continued reunification services for father.
Twelve-month Status Review/Section 387
The social worker filed a 12-month status review report on May 14, 2015, and recommended that mother's services be continued, but services to father be terminated. The social worker reported that mother and the children were now residing at the MGM's home.
On June 9, 2015, the social worker filed a section 387 supplemental petition alleging that the previous disposition had not been effective in protecting the children; mother had failed to benefit from services and continued to abuse controlled substances. The social worker reported that a team decision meeting was held on May 18, 2015, which included mother, the MGM, and the social worker. They addressed the issues on mother's noncompliance with her services and her inability to protect the children. It was decided that the children would remain in her care under the condition that she adhere to a safety plan. Mother also agreed to have individual counseling, submit to random drug testing, and enroll in an outpatient substance abuse program. Mother tested positive for several drugs on May 18, 2015. On June 5, 2015, the social worker went to the MGM's home to talk to mother, and the MGM said mother and one of the children drove to the store. After mother arrived back home, she admitted that she relapsed sometime between May 18, 2015, and May 27, 2015. She said she had not told the MGM of her relapse, but suspected the MGM knew. The social worker asked her to submit to an on-demand drug test that day, and mother tested positive. Due to the positive tests results, her admitted relapse, and the fact that she was driving with a child while under the influence of a controlled substance, the social worker removed the children from her care. The children were placed together in a foster home.
On June 5, 2015, mother stated that she wanted the MGM considered for placement. On June 8, 2015, the MGM was referred to the Relative Assessment Unit (RAU). The social worker stated that the MGM was not considered for emergency placement due to concerns that she could not be protective. Although the social worker submitted a referral to RAU, she expressed her concerns that MGM may have been aware of mother's relapse, yet allowed her to drive a vehicle with the child while under the influence. Furthermore, a family member previously said that the MGM was addicted to pills and had her own addiction issues.
The court held a hearing on the section 387 petition on June 10, 2015, found that there was a substantial danger to the physical health of the children, and detained them in foster care. The court found there were no relatives who were able, assessed, and willing to care for the children available at the time.
The social worker filed a section 387 jurisdiction/disposition report on June 26, 2015, recommending that services be terminated as to both mother and father.
In an addendum report filed on July 23, 2015, the social worker reported that mother was asked about relatives that would be willing and able to care for the children. She indicated that there were no other relatives to consider. She added that she knew her children were in a good foster home and that the foster parent was taking good care of them.
On July 29, 2015, the court sustained the section 387 petition and removed the children from parental custody. The court terminated reunification services and set a section 366.26 hearing. It scheduled the permanency planning hearing under section 366.3 for the same day. Mother's counsel noted that DPSS "at one point in time" assessed the MGM for placement, and mother asked DPSS to continue to assess her. The court ordered DPSS to continue assessing the MGM for placement. However, the minute order did not reflect such order.
On November 5, 2015, the court, on its own motion, ordered the July 29, 2015 minute order corrected nunc pro tunc to reflect that DPSS was to continue assessing the MGM for possible placement. The court stated that it was through inadvertence and clerical error that the July 29, 2015 minute order did not correctly reflect the court's order.
Section 366.26 and the MGM's Section 388 Petition
The social worker filed a section 366.26 report/section 366.3 postpermanency status review report on November 16, 2015. The social worker recommended that parental rights be terminated, that the children remain in their present placement, and that adoption be the permanent plan. The social worker reported that the children were placed in a prospective adoptive home on October 1, 2015, and they were "flourishing in the home." The prospective adoptive parents were able to meet the children's needs, and they were committed to adopting them and providing them with a stable, loving, and permanent home. After the first visit after their move, mother had made the statement that she had never seen her children look happier. The MGM attended mother's visits with the children about once or twice a month. The prospective adoptive parents reported that the children often had difficulty getting back to their household routines after mother's visits, and that they were "most unruly and difficult to direct" after the MGM was present at a visit. The social worker noted that the children were very young and vulnerable and had already been through a great deal of trauma. They had formed a bond with the prospective adoptive family, referred to them as "my mommy and daddy," and were starting to have a difficult time separating themselves from them. The children reported fears of not being able to "go home" with them, and they had been requesting to end visits with mother early. Thus, DPSS felt that it was in the children's best interest for them to remain in the prospective adoptive home and not have any more placement changes.
On November 30, 2015, the court held a contested 366.26 hearing, and the court ordered DPSS to conduct a placement assessment for the MGM. The court then continued the matter. A referral was submitted to RAU that day.
The social worker filed an addendum report on January 7, 2016. A home evaluation was conducted on December 28, 2015. RAU requested that the MGM provide a lease with mother's name removed, a letter from the Housing Authority (since she lived in Section 8 housing) stating that she could have two children placed with her for six months or more, and a letter from her doctor stating that she could provide care while medicated; the MGM was taking three different medications for back pain.
The social worker further reported that mother had continuously lived with the MGM, with the exception of a few years. Mother began using methamphetamine with her best friend's mother and marijuana with a neighbor, while in the care of the MGM. The social worker opined that the MGM apparently did not provide any structure and boundaries for mother. Moreover, she did not appear to know when mother was under the influence of drugs, and she apparently enabled mother throughout her drug addiction. Furthermore, the social worker was concerned about the MGM's physical ability to provide adequate care and supervision to the children, particularly during their adolescent years, in light of her back pain and medication. The social worker continued to recommend that parental rights be terminated and that the children remain with the prospective adoptive parents.
The MGM filed a section 388 petition on March 28, 2016, and requested the court to change the children's placement and order them placed with her, and then begin permanency proceedings so she could adopt them. With regard to changed circumstances and best interest of the children, she attached a motion to the petition. The motion was entitled "motion for relative standing and placement." The MGM argued that the children should be placed with her pursuant to the factors listed in section 361.3. She alleged that her home was approved for placement by DPSS on January 11, 2016. The MGM concluded that the court should exercise its independent judgment, not just review DPSS's decision for an abuse of discretion, and place the children in her home so she could proceed with adopting them. She attached several documents to the motion, including a letter from her doctor stating she was able to safely care for her grandchildren, documentation that she attended a three-day program that educated her about addiction, and a letter from DPSS stating that her home was certified on January 11, 2016. However, the letter also advised the MGM that, even if her home was certified, placement was not guaranteed, as DPSS had the discretion to place the children in a home that was in their best interests.
The social worker filed an addendum report on March 30, 2016, and recommended that, based on the best interest of the children, they remain with the prospective adoptive parents.
The court held a combined hearing pursuant to sections 388 and 366.26 on April 5, 2016. At the outset, the court stated that it reviewed all the reports submitted and the section 388 petition, and that it intended to follow DPSS's recommendation. It then proceeded to hear testimony. The relative assessment worker testified that she received the first referral to assess the MGM's home on June 8, 2015; however, she could not assess the home since mother was still living there. She said mother was listed on the lease up until January 2016, and that it was the MGM's responsibility to have mother move out and then notify the RAU. The assessment worker said she never got a call from the MGM when mother moved out. However, she received a second referral on December 8, 2015, and did the assessment then. She testified that her job was to visit the home and run the background checks, but not to make the actual placement decision. She certified the home on January 11, 2016.
The social worker who made the permanent placement recommendation testified as well. The case went to a different permanent placement worker in July 2015, when parental rights were terminated; however, that worker left DPSS in mid-October, which is when he received the case. He said he received notification that the MGM had been approved on January 11, 2016; however, he reviewed the reports filed by the previous social worker and determined that it was not in the children's best interest to place them with the MGM. He said he did not base his decision on the fact that the children were already in a prospective adoptive home. Rather, his decision was based on mother's case history. He noted his concern that both times the children were removed from her custody, she was living with the MGM. The placement social worker had serious concerns about the MGM's ability to protect the children, as well as her lack of supervision and boundaries in the home. He was also concerned that the MGM would not be able to function as a primary caretaker because she had medical issues and was taking pain medication. He had some information that she was abusing her medication. He also testified that he submitted a referral to the RAU as soon as he was aware there was a court order in place, in November 2015.
Finally, the MGM testified. She said that when the children were originally detained from mother in May 2014, she did not ask to be assessed for placement, since mother lived in her home. The MGM said she never followed up at a later point to ask to be considered for placement. She did, however, say that she became interested in placement when the children were removed the second time. She also testified that she was partially disabled because of her back. She was unable to sit or stand for long periods of time. Additionally, the MGM testified that she was not aware that mother used drugs when she was a minor in her care. She did not discover that mother was using drugs until it was brought to her attention, when the children were first removed from mother's care in May 2014. The MGM also testified she took a class to learn about addiction; however, when asked if she would now recognize if mother was under the influence of drugs, she said, "Not necessarily," and said it would depend on how much drugs mother took and when she took them.
During closing arguments, counsel for both mother and father argued that DPSS abused its discretion in not placing the children with the MGM; they contended that the placement social worker did not do a proper assessment since he did not consider any of the factors listed in section 361.3. County counsel argued that a proper assessment was done, in that the RAU did the assessment pursuant to section 361.3 and approved the MGM for placement. However, she reminded the court that being approved for placement by the RAU did not automatically mean the children would be placed with the MGM. Counsel acknowledged that there were timing mistakes with the assessment; however, the MGM would not have been the appropriate placement for the children regardless.
After hearing testimony and closing arguments, the court clarified that it was addressing the section 388 petition as a motion for relative placement. It then cited section 361.3 and explained that the statute assured that when a child was taken from his or her parents' care, an interested relative's application for placement would be considered before a stranger's request; however, section 361.3 did not constitute a relative placement guarantee. The court went on to state its belief that the MGM was not able to protect the children. Mother was living with her when she was addicted to drugs, and the MGM was torn between protecting her own daughter (mother) and the children. The court stated that the MGM should have known mother was addicted and should have protected the children. The court thus denied the MGM's section 388 petition. The court then found it likely that the children would be adopted, terminated parental rights, and ordered adoption as the permanent plan.
ANALYSIS
The Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion in Denying the MGM's Motion
The MGM and father both argue that the juvenile court and DPSS erred in denying her section 388 motion, in that they failed to consider the factors in section 361.3 with regard to the MGM's request for placement of the children. They request this court to reverse the court's order denying the MGM's motion, as well as the order terminating parental rights. The MGM asserts that the matter should be remanded for the juvenile court to conduct another hearing to properly evaluate her placement request under section 361.3. Alternatively, she contends that if this court concludes the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying her placement request, we should remand the matter with directions to place the children in her care. We affirm the court's denial of the MGM's motion.
A. Father Has No Standing
At the outset, DPSS argues that father has no standing to appeal relative placement. We agree. "A parent cannot raise issues on appeal which do not affect his or her own rights. [Citation.] That is, a parent's interest is in reunification." (In re Devin M. (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1538, 1541.) "Once a parent's reunification services have been terminated, the parent has no standing to appeal relative placement preference issues." (In re Jayden M. (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 1452, 1460.) Here, father's reunification services were terminated. Thus, he has no standing to appeal based on section 361.3. (Jayden M., at pp. 1459-2460.) We further note father's argument that because the court and DPSS failed to comply with section 361.3, the order terminating his parental rights should be reversed. For the reasons stated post, we reject this argument.
B. Relative Placement Preference
Section 361.3, subdivision (a), states in relevant part: "In any case in which a child is removed from the physical custody of his or her parents pursuant to Section 361, preferential consideration shall be given to a request by a relative of the child for placement of the child with the relative." "'Preferential consideration' means that the relative seeking placement shall be the first placement to be considered and investigated." (§ 361.3, subd. (c)(1).) In other words, section 361.3 "assures interested relatives that, when a child is taken from her parents and placed outside the home pending the determination whether reunification is possible, the relative's application will be considered before a stranger's application." (In re Sarah S. (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 274, 285 (Sarah S.).) "Section 361.3 identifies factors the court and social worker must consider in determining whether the child should be placed with a relative." (In re K.L. (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 52, 66, fn. 4 (K.L.); see § 361.3, subd. (a)(1)-(8).)
"[T]he abuse of discretion standard should be applied to the review on appeal of the juvenile court's determination regarding relative placement pursuant to section 361.3. . . . Broad deference must be shown to the trial judge. The reviewing court should interfere only '"if we find that under all the evidence, viewed most favorably in support of the trial court's action, no judge could reasonably have made the order that he did." [Citation.]'" (In re Robert L. (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 1057, 1067.)
C. The MGM's Reliance Upon Section 361.3 Was Misplaced
The MGM appeals the denial of her section 388 petition, which the court treated as a motion for relative placement. In her motion, the MGM asked for placement of the children pursuant to the factors listed in section 361.3. She concluded that the court should order the children placed in her home and then begin "permanency proceedings so that she may adopt her grandchildren." She attached a declaration to the motion stating her belief that it was in the children's best interest "for them to be placed with [her] for adoption and not be adopted to a non-relative." It appears that the MGM was arguing for the court to apply the section 361.3 factors in order to place the children with her for adoption. The problem is that "the statutory preference for placement of a dependent child with a relative [pursuant to section 361.3] does not apply to a placement made as part of a permanent plan for adoption." (Sarah S., supra, 43 Cal.App.4th at pp. 276-277, fn. omitted; see K.L., supra, 248 Cal.App.4th at p. 65 [section 361.3 does not apply to the selection of a child's adoptive placement].) "In defining the guidelines governing the decision whether a child should be placed with a particular relative, section 361.3 repeatedly refers to 'placement' without mention of adoption or any sort of permanent placement (the only exception being when 'new placements' become necessary). [Citation.] It requires consideration of the parents' wishes [citation], of the caretaker's ability to protect the child from his or her parents [citation], and of the ability of the relative to facilitate court-ordered reunification efforts [citation], factors that are wholly or largely irrelevant once parental rights are terminated. By its own terms, therefore, section 361.3 applies when 'a child is removed from the physical custody of his or her parents' and thus must be 'placed' in a temporary home, not when reunification efforts have failed and a permanent plan for adoption has been approved (or when a child has otherwise been freed for adoption)." (Sarah S., supra, 43 Cal.App.4th at p. 284; see § 361.3, subds. (d), (a)(2), (a)(6)(D), and (a)(6)(E).) Furthermore, section 366.26, subdivision (k) "overrides section 361.3 when it comes to placements for adoption." (Sarah S., at p. 285.) It provides that "[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law, the application of any person who, as a relative caretaker or foster parent, has cared for a dependent child for whom the court has approved a permanent plan for adoption, or who has been freed for adoption, shall be given preference with respect to that child over all other applications for adoptive placement if the agency making the placement determines that the child has substantial emotional ties to the relative caretaker or foster parent and removal from the relative caretaker or foster parent would be seriously detrimental to the child's emotional well-being." (§ 366.26, subd. (k), italics added.) Therefore, "the preference afforded by section 361.3 applies to placements made before the juvenile court has terminated reunification services. When reunification has failed, however, and the juvenile court has before it a proposed permanent plan for adoption, the only relative with a preference is a 'relative caretaker' (if there is one seeking to adopt) and the only preference is that defined by subdivision (k) of section 366.26 (that is, a preference to be first in line in the application process)." (Sarah S., supra, 43 Cal.App.4th at pp. 285-286, italics added.)
In requesting placement of the children for adoption pursuant to section 361.3, the MGM appeared to be conflating the relative preference of section 361.3 for temporary placements and the caretaker preference of section 366.26, subdivision (k). However, "[t]here is no relative placement preference for adoption." (In re Lauren R. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 841, 855.) We further note that, by the time the MGM filed the section 388 petition requesting the relative placement preference, the court had already terminated the parents' reunification services and set a section 366.26 hearing. Section 361.3 no longer applied; thus, her reliance on that statute was misplaced. Additionally, the MGM was not the children's caretaker; consequently, she was not entitled to the caretaker preference under section 366.26, subdivision (k), either.
Therefore, the MGM's argument that the court abused its discretion in denying her motion for placement of the children because it failed to apply the section 361.3 factors is completely meritless.
D. The Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion
Unfortunately, the erroneous reliance on section 361.3 continued through the hearing on the motion. Consistent with the MGM's misplaced reliance on section 361.3 in her motion, the parties at the hearing on the motion based their arguments on section 361.3. At the outset of the hearing, counsel for the MGM asserted the MGM's request for placement. She then proceeded to call as witnesses the relative assessment worker and the social worker who made the permanent placement recommendation. The placement social worker testified that he worked for the "permanent placement unit" and that he received the case after reunification services were terminated. He testified that his job was to decide if the children should be placed with the MGM. Thus, the MGM argued for permanent placement of the children, based on the section 361.3 factors. All the parties, including mother and father, followed suit and argued that the MGM was not properly evaluated under section 361.3.
Even if the court was required to consider the section 361.3 factors in the context of her motion, the MGM's claim that the court did not comply still fails. The court heard testimony from the relative assessment worker, the placement social worker, and the MGM. During closing arguments, counsel for mother explicitly listed all the section 361.3 factors and argued that the placement social worker failed to evaluate such factors in determining not to place the children with the MGM. Counsel for father similarly argued that the placement social worker failed to consider such factors and thoroughly reviewed the specific factors about which he had questioned the social worker. The court expressly stated, twice, that it considered all the arguments made at the motion on the hearing. The court also cited section 361.3 in making its ruling, and noted that the statute "does not constitute, quote, a relative placement guarantee." Therefore, contrary to the MGM's position, the record demonstrates that the court did consider and evaluate the section 361.3 factors in making its decision.
In any event, "[t]he overriding concern of dependency proceedings . . . is not the interest of extended family members but the interest of the child." (Lauren R., supra, 148 Cal.App.4th at p. 855.) Indeed, "[t]he linchpin of a section 361.3 analysis is whether placement with a relative is in the best interests of the minor." (Alicia B. v. Superior Court (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 856, 862-863.) In explaining its ruling, the court discussed mother's extensive history with drugs (at least 10 years) and noted that she was living with the MGM while she was addicted to drugs, and she had her older children removed from her custody when she was living there. The court commented that the MGM "was there and was watching it," and she should have protected the children. However, she was torn and chose to protect mother instead. The court considered the MGM's failure to protect and how well the children were doing in their current placement, and it concluded that it could not grant the MGM's motion. We cannot say that this conclusion was an abuse of discretion. We specifically note that the children, as well as mother's three older children, were all removed from mother's custody while she was living with the MGM. The record indicates that the MGM allowed mother to drive a vehicle with one of her children while under the influence. Moreover, the MGM testified that she did not know mother was using drugs until it was brought to her attention in May 2014, when the children were removed. However, mother started using methamphetamine and marijuana as a minor, and she had an extensive history of heroin and other drug use. Although the MGM took a class to learn about addiction, she admitted she would still not necessarily know if mother was under the influence. Thus, the evidence supported the court's conclusion that the MGM was unable to protect the children.
We further note that the children were bonded with the prospective adoptive family, and they were thriving in their home. Even mother remarked that she had never seen her children look happier, when she visited them. The prospective adoptive parents were able to meet the children's needs, and they were committed to adopting them and providing them with a stable, loving, and permanent home.
We acknowledge the MGM's argument that, had she been timely assessed when the court originally made its order to assess her on July 29, 2015, she would have been approved for placement before the children were moved to the prospective adoptive home on October 1, 2015. In support of her claim, she cites the RAU's approval of her home. However, even though the MGM's home was certified for placement, as both the relative assessment worker and placement social worker testified, the placement worker makes the final decision. Therefore, although there was a clerical error in that the July 29, 2015 minute order failed to reflect the court's order to assess the MGM for possible placement, the delay in the assessment had no apparent effect on the final decision.
Ultimately, the court reached the conclusion that removing the children from their current placement in favor of placement with the MGM would not be in the children's best interest. In view of the record, the court's conclusion was not arbitrary or unreasonable.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
HOLLENHORST
Acting P. J. We concur: McKINSTER
J. MILLER
J.