Opinion
G056379
12-05-2018
In re P.S. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. ORANGE COUNTY SOCIAL SERVICES AGENCY, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. J.S., Defendant and Appellant.
Marissa Coffey, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Leon J. Page, County Counsel, and Karen L. Christensen, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent. No appearance for the Minors.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. Nos. 16DP0792, 16DP0793, 16DP0794 & 16DP0795) OPINION Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Orange County, Dennis J. Keough, Judge. Affirmed. Marissa Coffey, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Leon J. Page, County Counsel, and Karen L. Christensen, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent. No appearance for the Minors.
* * *
INTRODUCTION
J.S. (Father) appeals from the juvenile court's order terminating his parental rights as to now 14-year-old P.S., 12-year-old A.S., seven-year-old H.S., and six-year-old L.S. (collectively, the children), pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. (All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code, unless otherwise specified.) Father contends the juvenile court erred by finding the parent-child relationship exception under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) inapplicable as to P.S. He also contends the court erred by failing to find P.S. objected to the termination of parental rights within the meaning of section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(ii). Father has abandoned his challenge to the juvenile court's order terminating parental rights with regard to the children other than P.S. Because substantial evidence supports the juvenile court's findings, we affirm the order.
BACKGROUND
I.
THE JUVENILE COURT SUSTAINS THE JUVENILE DEPENDENCY PETITION FILED ON BEHALF
OF THE CHILDREN AND ORDERS BOTH REUNIFICATION SERVICES AND AN EVIDENCE
CODE SECTION 730 EVALUATION FOR FATHER; FATHER FAILS TO COMPLY WITH COURT
ORDERS; THE COURT TERMINATES SERVICES AND SETS A PERMANENCY HEARING.
In their appellate briefs, the parties cite to the background section of our prior unpublished opinion in In J.S. v. Superior Court (Feb. 27, 2018, G055676) as setting forth the relevant facts and procedural history in this case, which we quote in relevant part:
"In July 2016, the Orange County Social Services Agency (SSA) filed a juvenile dependency petition (the dependency petition) on behalf of the children, alleging the children came within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court under section 300, subdivisions (b) (failure to protect) and (j) (abuse of a sibling). The dependency petition summarized prior dependency proceedings involving this family as follows.
"In October 2012, the juvenile court sustained a juvenile dependency petition alleging the children came within section 300, subdivision (b) (failure to protect). The prior dependency petition had alleged that after the children's mother H.G. (Mother) had given birth to L.S., both Mother and L.S. tested positive for amphetamine and methamphetamine. Mother had admitted using methamphetamine during her pregnancy, having an unresolved substance abuse history, and having been under the influence of illegal drugs and alcohol while the sole caretaker of the children. The prior dependency petition alleged Father had committed acts of domestic violence in the children's presence including choking Mother on at least three occasions, punching holes in doors and walls, throwing objects, calling Mother 'bad names,' using profanity, yelling and screaming, and, on at least two occasions, threatening that if Mother were pregnant, he would kill her and then himself. Father was provided family maintenance services. In December 2013, juvenile dependency jurisdiction over the children was terminated and Father was granted custody of them; Mother was provided weekly visitation monitored by a third party.
"The dependency petition filed in 2016 alleged that since the termination of the prior juvenile dependency proceedings, Father allowed Mother, who had not completed court-ordered case plan services, to live with Father and the children and had allowed Mother to act as sole caretaker of the children. SSA had made multiple attempts to visit Mother at the home, including by way of 'a home entry welfare check warrant' with law enforcement assistance, but no one responded at the home even though cars were observed in the driveway. Father had not responded to attempts by SSA to contact him.
"The dependency petition further alleged that in June 2016, Mother gave birth to a baby and both tested positive for the presence of methamphetamine. The baby, who is not a subject of the instant dependency proceedings, was detained. The dependency petition alleged Mother continued to have an unresolved substance abuse problem that was not limited to the use of methamphetamine and marijuana, and also had unresolved mental health issues. Father also had a history of substance abuse but he reported he is 'clean now.'
"In October 2016, the juvenile court sustained the dependency petition. In February 2017, the court ordered that reunification services be provided to Father and Mother. As to Father, the court ordered that he submit to a psychiatric evaluation under Evidence Code section 730, general counseling, anger management training, parenting education, substance abuse testing for 30 days, and, if he had a positive test, an outpatient substance abuse program and a 12-step program. The court extended the offer of reunification services to Father and Mother in August 2017. [¶] . . . [¶]
"SSA filed a 12-month status review report and two addendum reports in advance of the 12-month review hearing. SSA recommended that the juvenile court find that return of the children to Father's care posed a substantial risk of harm to them, terminate reunification services, and set a permanency hearing. The assigned social worker reported that Father had not cooperated with social workers and/or service providers in their attempts to initiate the court-ordered services. He remained 'unavailable or unwilling' to participate in such services. He also refused to review or discuss court-approved case plan services or provide proof of program participation or completion. The assigned social worker reported that she believed Father continued to reside with Mother. The assigned social worker reported that Father had visited the children, but the visits had become 'increasingly concerning due to his erratic behaviors.'
"At the 12-month review hearing in October and November 2017, Father testified he wanted the children returned to him but admitted he did not complete his case plan components. He testified that he did not participate in an Evidence Code section 730 evaluation and never called the evaluator to set up an appointment. He did not submit to 30 days of substance abuse testing; he stated he submitted to three random tests but after that, he 'just couldn't do it.' Citing his busy schedule, he did not attend an approved parenting class, anger management class or complete therapy.
"Father testified that he had allowed Mother to live in his home and care for the children. He stated that he now understood Mother posed a risk to the children. He stated that Mother no longer resided in the home as of a few weeks earlier.
"Following the presentation of evidence, the juvenile court found that the return of the children to Father or Mother would create substantial risk of detriment to the children's safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being and also found that reasonable services had been provided or offered to the parents. The court stated that while Father's and Mother's failure to make substantive progress toward alleviating the issues that led to the removal of the children was 'prima facie evidence that the children cannot safely be returned to the home,' that was only 'the beginning and certainly not the end of the inquiry.' The court found that Father was unable to isolate himself from Mother and meaningfully protect the children from her. Although Mother was an inappropriate caretaker of the children, Father left the children in her care in addition to allowing her to reside in the home with them. The court found Father failed to participate in services on even a 'rudimentary' level. The court stated: 'Father has indicated his inability to engage in the process on any level,' noting Father's 'profound reluctance . . . to participate in these services.' The court further found '[t]he most glaring, the most regrettable aspect of [his] failure to comply with the service plan [the] court would believe and find to be Father's failure to participate in the [Evidence Code section] 730 evaluation.'
"As the court explained its findings, Father told the juvenile court judge that the judge was 'insane' and Father stated he did not 'need to hear this crap anymore.' He also told the juvenile court judge that the judge was a 'bad person' and 'the devil' and left the courtroom.
"The juvenile court thereafter observed: 'Father's mood swings are dramatic. He is volatile.' The court expressed concern that some of Father's statements suggest a 'potential for self-injurious conduct and also there would be a corollary concern for [the] safety of the children physically and emotionally' necessitating an Evidence Code section 730 evaluation for which the court continued to authorize funding along with counseling and visitation with the children.
"The court terminated reunification services for Father and Mother and set a permanency hearing under section 366.26. Father filed a petition for a writ of mandate seeking to set aside the court's orders at the 12-month review hearing."
II.
WE DENIED FATHER'S PETITION FOR A WRIT OF MANDATE CHALLENGING THE COURT'S
FINDING THAT RETURNING THE CHILDREN TO FATHER WOULD CREATE A SUBSTANTIAL
RISK OF HARM TO THEM.
In J.S. v. Superior Court, supra, G055676, we denied Father's petition for a writ of mandate. We concluded: "Substantial evidence supported the court's finding that return of the children to Father would create a substantial risk of detriment to the safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the children. Father did not participate regularly or make substantive progress in his case plan. The court was most concerned that Father failed to submit to a psychiatric examination under Evidence Code section 730. The court's concern about Father's omission on that point was underscored by Father's volatile outburst during the 12-month review hearing. Father failed to communicate with the assigned social worker or make arrangements to work toward substantially complying with his case plan. Substantial evidence showed Father was unable to exclude Mother from the family home or otherwise protect the children from her. The juvenile court did not err by refusing to return the children to Father's care."
III.
SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT THE PERMANENCY HEARING
This summary of evidence presented at the permanency hearing is limited to evidence relevant to the issues raised in this appeal.
A.
SSA's Reports
At the permanency hearing, the juvenile court admitted into evidence SSA's reports dated March 7, March 15, April 12, and April 25, 2018 and heard live testimony. In the permanency hearing report dated March 7, 2018, SSA recommended that the court find the children adoptable, terminate parental rights, and find that the termination of parental rights would not be detrimental to the children. SSA's reports contained the following information.
Beginning with their first placement in August 2016, the children have had a total of four placements, culminating in their placement with their current caregivers (the caregivers) on August 4, 2017. None of the children has since returned home.
The caregivers have cared for all four of the children and their medical, developmental, educational, and emotional needs. The caregivers have taken the children to all necessary medical and dental appointments and enrolled them in school. The children reported feeling safe and comfortable living with the caregivers. P.S. has her own bedroom in the caregivers' home. At some point, the caregivers reported P.S. and one of her sisters as having "insecure relationships" with them which they also described as superficial at times. The caretakers thereafter reported that the children continued to bond with, and show both physical and verbal affection toward, the caregivers.
SSA reported that Father regularly visited the children. He brought them gifts and food and would ask them about school and would help them with homework. The visits were loving and affectionate. In December 2017, P.S. reported that visits with Father were good. When asked if she would feel safe if the monitors were not at the visits with Father, P.S. responded that she was "not sure" and that "it depends if he gets mad or not." The caretakers reported that over time, the children did not seem as excited about visits with Father.
SSA further reported the caregivers had not only bonded with the children, but were also willing to provide a secure, nurturing, and permanent home for all of them. Each of the children reported liking the caregivers and being happy living with them. P.S. stated she wished she could reunite with Father, but, if that were not possible, she would like the caregivers to adopt her.
On March 1, 2018, each of the children was asked about SSA's recommendation that they be adopted. Each child agreed with the recommendation. When asked why she agreed to be adopted, P.S. explained she "didn't want things to stay like this." When asked what she meant by "things," P.S. did not elaborate.
SSA reported that in April 2018, the social worker met with P.S. privately and informed her that she would be required to appear at the permanency hearing and might testify. The social worker asked P.S. if she knew the purpose for the hearing. P.S. replied that "it was for termination of parental rights," which she understood to mean "her parents would no longer be legally considered her parents" and that she "might not have a relationship with her father anymore." P.S. expressed that she felt sad about the situation and loved Father, but that she still wanted to be adopted because her desire for permanency and normalcy outweighed not being able to have a relationship with her parents. P.S. stated that "she wanted her life to be normal and did not want things to continue on like this (referencing visitation and meeting with therapists and social workers.)"
B.
P.S.'s Testimony
P.S., who was 13 years old at the time, testified at the permanency hearing. She confirmed that she was aware of SSA's recommendation that Mother's and Father's parental rights be terminated, which would mean "somebody else has the rights over us." She stated the social worker explained that the termination of her parents' rights meant that, legally, they would not be her parents anymore.
P.S. testified she knew the caregivers were willing to adopt her and, if they did, they would become her legal parents; she felt "fine" about that plan. P.S. stated she understood that if her parents' rights were terminated and she were adopted, she would potentially have no contact with her parents until she became an adult. P.S. was asked, "Given that understanding, what is your position about having your parental rights terminated?" She responded she did not want that to happen, but also she did not want "a ton of random people coming and asking [her] questions all the time." She agreed she would be "okay" if the caretakers adopted her, although she felt "kind of sad" to not have contact with her parents until she was an adult. P.S. was asked, "When you say 'sad,' is it sad enough that you don't want [Mother's and Father's] rights terminated or that you're okay and understand you can see them when you're 18 or older?" She responded she was okay with an order terminating parental rights because, in addition to having the process over with, "then I'd have a family," which she thought she and her siblings deserved.
P.S. testified she spent a lot of time with the caregivers who help her with her homework, prepare food for her, watch television with her, and talk with her about a wide range of issues, including hard things at school and solving problems with her siblings. She testified that she felt safe with the caregivers and that what they do for her helps her feel like they are her family.
With regard to Father, P.S. described Father's visits and how they eat food and play card games together and how he helps her with her homework and talks with her. She testified she liked the visits because she got to see Father which made her happy. She testified she felt safe when she was with him. When asked how sad she would be on a scale from one to 10 if she were unable to have contact with Father until she turned 18 years old, she responded "five."
P.S. testified that she had been told she had the right to object to Father's parental rights being terminated. She stated she was not sure whether she had an objection, but confirmed she did not feel pressure by anyone to say that she wanted to be adopted by the caregivers. She stated she felt conflicted about Father's parental rights. She further testified she thought she needed to agree to adoption in order to stay with the caregivers because if she did not allow herself to be adopted, she would be moved out of their home. No one talked to her about legal guardianship. She thought she would prefer to have a plan that would allow the caretakers to be her legal guardians and allow her to continue to have contact with Father.
P.S. was asked, "Knowing that you don't necessarily have to be adopted to stay where you're currently living, would you like to object to your parents' parental rights being terminated?" She replied, "I'm not sure" and stated she could not think of any question she had that if answered would help her be sure. She stated she did not want to come to court anymore. She stated her first choice of a plan would be that she have the opportunity to stay with the caregivers but continue to visit Father. P.S. further testified:
"Q. P[.S.], I know you're not sure and the court asked you about being torn between, you know, having your rights terminated and not having your rights terminated.
"If the court terminated your parental rights, okay, if the court decided after he hears all the evidence and he thinks that's the best thing to do, when it comes up to adoption, you have to sign the adoption paperwork, okay? So you have to consent to [the caregivers] becoming your legal parents.
"Did you understand that?
"A. Yes.
"Q. Would you agree for them to become your legal parents?
"A. Yes.
"Q. When you look at your life and your [siblings] and living with [the caregivers], I know you said it's family, is that the kind of family that you're looking for?
"A. Yes.
"Q. Do they provide you with, you know, a home that's comfortable to live in?
"A. Yes.
"Q. Is there any arguing or fighting or any of those kinds of things that go on in this home?
"A. No.
"Q. Would you say it's a calm home to live in?
"A. Yes.
"Q. With respect to [the caregivers], are they good to your [siblings]?
"A. Yes.
"Q. Do you think that they have you and your [siblings'] best interests at heart?
"A. Yes.
"Q. With respect to your dad—I'm going to talk about your dad for right now because he's had most of the visits, okay? Do you think he can provide that same kind of stability?
"A. Yes.
"Q. Okay. When was the last time you lived with him?
"A. A while ago.
"Q. Is it different though than what [the caregivers] have been providing for you and your [siblings]?
"A. Not really.
"Q. Okay. Is that why you're torn?
"A. Yes."
The court asked P.S. how she would feel if "the court stuff" were over, either if the court ordered adoption or legal guardianship, how would she feel in "deciding between one or the other in terms of [her] own feelings." P.S. responded, "I'm not sure."
Shortly after Father heard the read back of P.S.'s testimony, he informed his attorney he would waive his right to further observe the proceeding. He left the courtroom and did not return for the remainder of the proceeding which spanned several days.
C.
Social Worker Nguyen Phan's Testimony
At the permanency hearing, social worker Nguyen Phan testified that the caregivers have assumed a parental role in the children's lives. Phan observed the caregivers help the children with homework, assign chores, share dinner with the children, set boundaries, and otherwise support the children's needs. Phan testified the children respect the caregivers' authority but also share fun activities and talk with the caregivers about their difficulties.
Phan testified the caregivers are committed to proceeding with the adoption of the children. The caregivers knew the children months before the children were placed with them because the caregivers worked for the group home where the children had previously resided.
Phan did not discuss the option of legal guardianship with P.S. or any of the children because the caregivers are not open to legal guardianship or any permanent plan living arrangement other than adoption. The caregivers do not want to continue their relationship with Father and Mother because of their past experience with visitation, including at least one negative experience monitoring visitation, and because of concerns regarding the instability of the relationships involved. Phan explained that if the court were to order something other than adoption as the permanent plan, the children would be removed from their placement with the caregivers.
Phan further testified that she was not concerned regarding P.S.'s remarks she would be sad to lose her relationship with Father because she believed that would be a normal reaction for someone of her age. Phan acknowledged reports that Father had a close and loving relationship with the children. Phan did not think lack of contact with Father would be emotionally harmful to P.S. because she would have the support of the caregivers and would otherwise be surrounded by family members who would help her emotionally address that loss.
IV.
THE JUVENILE COURT TERMINATES PARENTAL RIGHTS AND FINDS NO EXCEPTION
APPLICABLE; FATHER APPEALS.
The juvenile court found the children, including P.S., adoptable. The court also found Father's visits to have been regular, but found none of the exceptions to the termination of his parental rights to be applicable. As the court found the benefit of adoption outweighed that of maintaining the parental relationship between the parents and P.S., and that P.S. was likely to be adopted, the court ordered Father's and Mother's parental rights as to P.S. terminated and placed P.S. for adoption; the court issued the same orders with regard to P.S.'s siblings. The court's order further noted that P.S. and her siblings were to be placed together.
Father appealed.
DISCUSSION
Section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B) allows the juvenile court to decline to terminate parental rights over an adoptable child if it finds "a compelling reason for determining that termination would be detrimental to the child" because, inter alia, "[t]he parents have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship" and/or "[a] child 12 years of age or older objects to termination of parental rights." (Id., subd. (c)(1)(B)(i), (ii).) Father argues the juvenile court erred by terminating his parental rights as to P.S. because the parent-child relationship exception applied and also because P.S., who was over 12 years old at the time of the court's order, objected to the termination of parental rights. Father's arguments are without merit.
Father has the burden of proving both prongs of the parent-child relationship exception were satisfied. (In re L. Y. L. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 942, 949.) We consider whether substantial evidence supported the juvenile court's determination the parent-child relationship exception did not apply. (In re Cliffton B. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 415, 424-425.)
As to the parent-child relationship exception to the termination of parental rights, although the juvenile court found that Father had maintained regular and consistent visitation, the court found that Father did not show P.S. would benefit from continuing the parent-child relationship within the meaning of section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i).
In In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 575-576, the court stated: "In the context of the dependency scheme prescribed by the Legislature, we interpret the 'benefit from continuing the [parent/child] relationship' exception to mean the relationship promotes the well-being of the child to such a degree as to outweigh the well-being the child would gain in a permanent home with new, adoptive parents. In other words, the court balances the strength and quality of the natural parent/child relationship in a tenuous placement against the security and the sense of belonging a new family would confer. If severing the natural parent/child relationship would deprive the child of a substantial, positive emotional attachment such that the child would be greatly harmed, the preference for adoption is overcome and the natural parent's rights are not terminated. [¶] Interaction between natural parent and child will always confer some incidental benefit to the child. The significant attachment from child to parent results from the adult's attention to the child's needs for physical care, nourishment, comfort, affection and stimulation. [Citation.] The relationship arises from day-to-day interaction, companionship and shared experiences. [Citation.] The exception applies only where the court finds regular visits and contact have continued or developed a significant, positive, emotional attachment from child to parent. [¶] At the time the court makes its determination, the parent and child have been in the dependency process for 12 months or longer, during which time the nature and extent of the particular relationship should be apparent. Social workers, interim caretakers and health professionals will have observed the parent and child interact and provided information to the court. The exception must be examined on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the many variables which affect a parent/child bond. The age of the child, the portion of the child's life spent in the parent's custody, the 'positive' or 'negative' effect of interaction between parent and child, and the child's particular needs are some of the variables which logically affect a parent/child bond."
At the conclusion of the permanency hearing, the court explained its ruling, stating that it noted that when P.S. and her sibling A.S. (the two eldest of the children) were given the opportunity to testify, and after being told that they had a right "to veto essentially adoption, that there was what the court would describe as equivocation." The court continued: "The equivocation balanced out in terms of their needs for normalcy and security. [The] Court was struck by the testimony of the children as to certainly their dislike for visits with Father in the setting of the current context and presence of social workers in their lives."
The court further stated: "The court posed the question to the children, if those issues were subtracted, how that would affect their feelings? Their dislike of the social worker[']s involvement, and the court process and the venue for the visitation did not materially alter the quality of their equivocation. It didn't ameliorate it. There's a bond between the children and Father and undoubtedly there's one with Mother, as counsel has observed, by virtue of the fact of having lived with each parent over significant periods of time.
"The situation is important for these children at this crucial juncture in their lives. The court noted that absent a clear—absent a statement the child did not want to be adopted, the responsibility for deciding this case was the court's. This is an adult issue for adults to resolve. . . .
"So the children are of an age range but again time is fleeting. The ability to be nurtured in an environment and home is certainly important. The court reflects on the nature and quality of the relationship. The children, each of the children have in their term with their parents, with Father and Mother, and the court would find—the court is to weigh the benefits to be derived through this relationship against the values and benefits to be gained through legal permanency.
"There, in listening to the children's testimony, which the court has considered, along with the equivocation, is the overall theme for a desire for normalcy and stability. Under the case authority that has been presented to the court, this court . . . cannot find respondent parents have carried their burden of proving that the nature and quality of the relationship as measured from the children's point of view is [of] such a nature that its severance would greatly harm the children and the benefits to be gained by adoption preponderate and outweigh the dislocation that is going to be a part of freeing the children for adoption."
The juvenile court's findings are supported not only by SSA's reports that were admitted into evidence at the permanency hearing, but also directly by P.S.'s testimony. P.S. testified that she spent a lot of time with the caregivers who helped her, prepared food for her, and talked with her about different issues. She stated she felt safe and as though she had a family while living with them. She stated she would be fine with the caregivers adopting her.
This case is distinguishable from In re S.B. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 289 and In re Amber M. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 681. In those two cases, the children in question were under the age of 12 years old and did not testify regarding their bonds with their parents and with their prospective adoptive parents, or regarding permanency plan preferences. --------
Although P.S. also testified that she would consider it ideal if she were allowed to both live with the caretakers and continue to visit Father without the involvement of the court or social workers, that scenario was not an option in this case. The caregivers were not open to any permanent plan other than adoption.
We recognize, as did the juvenile court, that Father and P.S. love each other, they had a bond, and P.S. enjoyed her visits with Father. However, under well-settled law, these facts are not enough to establish the application of the parent-child relationship exception to adoption. (In re C.F. (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 549, 558-559 [a parent "may [not] establish the parent-child beneficial relationship exception by merely showing the child derives some measure of benefit from maintaining parental contact"].) In In re Helen W. (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 71, 81, a panel of this court held that the parent-child relationship exception did not apply, although the children referred to the mother as "'Mom,'" the mother and her children loved each other, and the mother provided for her children's needs during visits.
Although P.S. testified the prospect of not seeing Father until she turned 18 years old made her sad, she rated the level of sadness she thought she would experience as a five on a scale of one to 10. P.S.'s equivocation about adoption did not show that that severing the natural parent-child relationship would deprive P.S. of a substantial, positive emotional attachment such that she would be greatly harmed. Substantial evidence showed P.S. was bonded with the caregivers who have occupied a parental role in P.S.'s life since her placement with them in August 2017. P.S. was never equivocal about her paramount desire to attain normalcy, permanency, and the family unit she experienced with caregivers.
The record does not show P.S. objected to the termination of parental rights within the meaning of section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(ii). Substantial evidence supported the juvenile court's findings the exceptions to the termination of parental rights set forth in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) and (ii) were inapplicable.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
FYBEL, J. WE CONCUR: MOORE, ACTING P. J. THOMPSON, J.