Opinion
F073773
02-08-2017
In re EZEKIEL M., et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. MERCED COUNTY HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. REBECCA L., Defendant and Appellant.
Marissa Coffey, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. James N. Fincher, County Counsel, and Claire S. Lai, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. 15JP00156)
OPINION
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Merced County. Brian L. McCabe, Judge. Marissa Coffey, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. James N. Fincher, County Counsel, and Claire S. Lai, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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In this juvenile dependency case, two children, one-year-old Ezekiel M. and his newborn sister Janessa M., were removed from the custody of their mother, Rebecca L. (mother), and father, Jesse M. (father). The parents were not offered reunification services. At a subsequent Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing, the juvenile court found the children likely to be adopted and entered an order terminating parental rights. Mother appeals, arguing the juvenile court erred in terminating her parental rights because there is insufficient evidence to support the finding that Janessa is likely to be adopted. She asserts that since Janessa and Ezekiel are a sibling group, the termination of her parental rights as to both children must be reversed. We affirm.
Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The Merced County Human Services Agency (Agency) initiated dependency proceedings in September 2015 after mother and Janessa both tested positive for methamphetamine at Janessa's birth. Mother had not received prenatal care, her housing was unstable, and she did not have any provisions for the care of a newborn. Father was incarcerated for a parole violation. Both mother and father had histories of untreated substance abuse and multiple incarcerations for substance abuse related charges. Mother had seven other children, five of whom had been dependents and with whom she failed to reunify. Father had two other children who had been dependents; he was not offered services in their case.
The children were detained. Ezekiel was placed in a foster home, but Janessa, who born premature at 36 weeks gestation, remained hospitalized in a neonatal intensive care unit (NICU). Janessa was released from the hospital when she was eight days old and placed with Ezekiel in the same foster home. When she was two and half weeks old, Janessa had a medical exam which did not reveal any medical concerns. At a little over a month of age, Janessa appeared to be meeting her developmental milestones. Ezekiel was a healthy child with no medical concerns who appeared to be developmentally on target.
At the December 2015 combined jurisdiction and disposition hearing, the Agency recommended the juvenile court take jurisdiction over the children under section 300, subdivisions (b) (failure to protect) and (j) (abuse of sibling), and services be bypassed as to mother under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10), based on her failure to reunify with her other children and to make subsequent efforts to treat the problems that led to their removal, and as to father under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(11), as his parental rights over his other children had been terminated. The parents contested the recommendations to bypass services. The juvenile court found the children fell within the provision of section 300, subdivisions (b) and (j), declared them dependents, removed them from parental custody, and denied reunification services to mother and father. The parents were granted monthly supervised visits. The juvenile court set a section 366.26 permanency planning hearing for March 30, 2016.
Mother filed a notice of intent to file a writ petition. We dismissed action as abandoned, however, since neither mother nor her attorney filed a timely petition for extraordinary writ.
On March 14, 2016 mother filed a section 388 petition asking the juvenile court to provide her with reunification services as she had entered a residential treatment program and enrolled in mental health services. The juvenile court set a hearing on the petition for March 28.
Subsequent references to dates are to the year 2016, unless otherwise stated.
On March 17, the Agency filed its report for the section 366.26 hearing, in which it recommended termination of parental rights and a permanent plan of adoption. The children were living together in the same foster home, where they had been placed since they were first detained. The children were happy and healthy, and their social, emotional, physical and educational needs were being met. The care providers were committed to adopting them. Social worker Robin Silveira spoke to the care providers on January 6. They told Silveira they loved the children as their own and could not imagine their lives without them. They wanted the children to have a chance at a successful life and a stable and supportive family. The care providers were committed to the children's long term care and welfare.
The Agency's adoption team prepared an assessment pursuant to section 366.21, subdivision (i). Ezekiel had a medical examination on January 15, and there were no concerns. He appeared to be developing normally and was not a regional center client. He did not have any behaviors indicating mental health issues, appeared to be emotionally stable, and showed good bonding with his care providers. Janessa completed a medical examination on March 3; while there were no medical concerns, she appeared to be behind developmentally. Six-month-old Janessa did not make eye contact, her eyes did not track, she was not holding her head up, and her head appeared to have a flat side. The care providers shared these concerns so they asked for another developmental assessment. At the time Janessa was not a regional center client. Janessa appeared to be emotionally stable, was happy most of the time and showed good bonding with the care providers.
The Agency opined the children were "generally adoptable" due to their young age, and because they were healthy and developmentally on track, "although Janessa may be a little behind developmentally." The Agency noted a prospective adoptive family had been identified for the children, and they were currently in the home with the permanent plan of adoption. The Agency opined another adoptive home could be found for them if the prospective adoptive family was unable to adopt them. The Agency did not consider the children to be "hard-to-place minors."
The prospective adoptive parents (PAP) were assessed. They had raised their own biological children to adulthood and were able to care for the children full time at home. They had known the children for six months and felt they bonded with the children almost immediately. They had provided attentive care to the children and had been meeting all of their needs. The PAP and children showed positive bonding, and the children appeared to have adjusted well to their home. On January 6, Silveira explained the responsibilities of adoption to the PAP, who indicated they understood and were willing to assume them. The PAP were committed completely to the plan of adoption, and were eager to adopt the children as they had become family in their eyes. The PAP had been communicating well with the Agency concerning the children's needs and asking questions. The PAP had proven to be dedicated to providing the best possible care for the children and were in the process of completing their home study.
The parents had been visiting the children once per month since December 2015. During visits, the parents focused most of their attention on Ezekiel, who showed no preference for them. The parents would hold Janessa throughout the visit, but rarely engaged with her to make eye contact. Neither parent commented on Janessa's inability to hold her head up or her lack of eye contact. The social worker noted there was no emotional bond or attachment between the children and their parents, and opined that termination of parental rights would not adversely impact the children.
On March 23, the Agency filed a response to mother's section 388 petition. The Agency asserted it was not in the children's best interest to offer mother reunification services because there was not a substantial positive emotional attachment. Neither Ezekiel nor Janessa knew mother as their primary caretaker. While Ezekiel enjoyed his parents' attention during visits, he was not sad when visits ended. Janessa had grossly visible delays that mother had not questioned or commented on. Instead, mother was more concerned with Janessa's ears being clean than the fact she was not tracking with her eyes or holding her head up. During visits, mother paid more attention to Ezekiel than Janessa, and did not see there was a problem with Janessa's development.
On March 28, the hearing on mother's section 388 petition, as well as the section 366.26 hearing, were continued to May 3.
On April 6, the Agency filed an ex parte application for authorization for Janessa to be given anesthesia so she could undergo magnetic resonance imaging (MRI). The Agency explained that Janessa was born at home approximately three weeks premature, and was admitted to the NICU due to prematurity, in-utero exposure to methamphetamine, and mother's limited prenatal care. A head ultrasound was completed when Janessa was three days old, which showed she had "mild" ventriculomegaly but no brain hemorrhage. The discharge notes indicated an outpatient MRI or commuted tomography (CT) scan should be considered if there were concerns about possible developmental delays. No one noticed any developmental delays until Janessa was approximately four months old. Due to the observed delays, her doctor referred her to Valley Children's Hospital (VCH) for an MRI to assess Janessa's brain for microcephaly and developmental delays. To complete the MRI, Janessa needed to be put under general anesthesia. The Agency recommended the court authorize the MRI, which was scheduled for April 13. That same day, the juvenile court issued an order granting the application.
On April 18, father filed a section 388 petition in which he requested he be provided reunification services. Father asserted he had been released from custody and was in a residential drug treatment program. The juvenile court set a hearing on the petition for May 3. In a written opposition filed on April 27, the Agency argued it was not in the children's best interest to offer father reunification services, as they did not have a substantial positive emotional attachment with him. The Agency noted that father never commented or questioned Janessa's grossly visible delays. The Agency recommended termination of parental rights and that the court appoint the current care providers as prospective adoptive parents.
A contested combined hearing on the parents' section 388 petitions and for permanency planning was held over two days, on May 3 and 11. Father, mother and the social worker each testified.
As pertinent here, mother admitted she did not have an adequate opportunity to bond with Ezekiel or Janessa as her visits were only once a month. Mother received an April 27 letter from social worker Robin Silveira regarding Janessa's development, which was addressed to both parents. Silveira stated that Janessa had been diagnosed with pontine hypoplasia, which "is linked to a different gene disruption" that occurs during early prenatal brain development. Silveira explained that Janessa would have global delays, her head would be smaller, and she may never be able to talk, sit, walk, or roll over. She also might have seizures and would most likely need regional center support for the remainder of her life. Silveira stated that Janessa would be referred to all agencies that would support her development.
Father testified he also was provided with a copy of the April 27 letter from Silveira. Father said during his first visits with Janessa he told mother that her head felt "a little odd" to him, as it did not seem stable. He thought her head was small for her body, but it did not strike him until he received the letter. --------
When mother received Silveira's letter, she researched the condition and learned it was a rare genetic disease. Mother claimed she could take care of a child like Janessa with help and support. Mother understood that Janessa would need care for the rest of her life, but she was willing to learn what she needed to do to care for Janessa. Mother went to a family resource center, where she obtained information on Janessa's condition and registered for a support group. She also went to Central Valley Regional Center (CVRC), but was told she needed to have Janessa in her care to register her. CVRC confirmed that Janessa had not been registered.
Mother noticed there was something wrong with Janessa's development during their visits; Janessa's eyes would sometimes "go cross-sided," although during the last two visits Janessa was asleep most of the time. Mother stated that a "few times, in the beginning," when Janessa was being taken to the doctor, she asked social workers supervising her visits why they were doing so and what medication she was on, but they did not answer her questions. Mother claimed she stopped asking questions about the children because they would not give her any information. Mother had not made any inquiries since Silveira became the social worker on the case, although she admitted Janessa's developmental delays had become more obvious since January. Neither mother nor her attorney questioned the adequacy of the Agency's adoption assessment or whether the children were likely to be adopted.
Silveira testified that she had been the social worker on the case since December 2015. Silveira had supervised mother's visits with the children; mother never asked her about Janessa's delays or medical needs, or to attend Janessa's medical appointments. The parents visited Janessa on the day she had her MRI; Silveira told them not to give her any food because of the MRI. At the end of the visit, the parents asked Silveira what an MRI was and why Janessa was having it. Silveira explained the concerns about Janessa's development. Mother did not ask to be present during the MRI. She called Silveira a week later and asked about the MRI, but Silveira did not have the results. When Silveira received the results, she sent them in the April 27 letter.
It was not clear what Janessa's condition was until the April diagnosis. At birth the hospital said Janessa possibly had microcephaly, but she did not receive a specific diagnosis until April 27. The Agency ordered the MRI at the suggestion of the "round table," which is a group of community agencies that look at a child's development and refer him or her to the correct agencies. Silveira stated that Janessa would definitely be a CVRC client, but CVRC had not yet conducted its assessments.
Silveira visited the children in the foster home once a month. She first started noticing some problems with Janessa in February when she saw her at the home; Janessa did not look quite right. The foster parents also started having concerns about Janessa's development at that time; they had not mentioned any concerns to Silveira before then. The foster parents knew about Janessa's possible microcephaly, which Silveira discussed with them. In March, Janessa's condition was more pronounced. After Silveira reviewed the case and spoke with the care providers, the Agency "jumped in" and started requesting appointments. Silveira did not mention her concerns to mother or tell mother that Janessa was being referred. There was no indication from the medical providers that the Agency had delayed in obtaining care for Janessa.
It was still Silveira's opinion that there was not a substantial emotional attachment between the children and mother. Her opinion was based on her observations of the children with mother and with the current care providers. Silveira had observed four visits with mother; Ezekiel was indifferent when mother briefly left the room during some of the visits, and at the end, he ran to the care providers, who were waiting to pick the children up.
Janessa's obvious delays included not tracking with her eyes, not holding her head up, not sitting up on her own, and not smiling. The foster parents reported that Janessa did not cry when she was with them. Silveira did not know if Janessa's developmental delays could impact her ability to bond, as she did not know the part of the brain that was affected. Silveira did not see any difference in Janessa's behavior between the time she spent with her parents versus the time she spent with her foster parents. Silveira confirmed her opinion regarding Janessa's best interest in terms of adoption was based primarily on her assessment of the foster parents' ability to provide adequate care and treatment compared with her assessment of mother's and father's ability to provide proper medical care and treatment.
Mother's attorney argued that mother's circumstances had changed and it was in the best interest of the children to put them back with mother who had the ability to do at least as much as the current caregivers, especially if the Agency would provide services. Mother's attorney asked the juvenile court to grant her section 388 petition. Father's attorney also asked the juvenile court to grant his section 388 petition, arguing that father's circumstances had changed and he was willing to allow the children to stay with mother until he could provide them with a home.
County counsel argued that both parents failed to meet their burdens of proof on the section 388 petitions as to both changed circumstances and best interest. County counsel further argued it was in the children's best interest to terminate parental rights. County counsel acknowledged that Janessa was "truly a difficult child to place for adoption[,]" but the "foster parents had identified to the Agency that they're willing to adopt Janessa [which], given the severity of her disabilities, is a very unusual circumstance." County counsel thought it would have to be a "very high showing" to show any plan other than adoption as identified by the Agency would serve a better purpose for Janessa. County counsel further argued there was no compelling reason that termination of parental rights would be detrimental; while it was not known whether Janessa would be able to bond with the care providers, Ezekiel had bonded with them. County counsel asked the court to follow the Agency's recommendation to terminate parental rights and order adoption as the children's permanent plan.
The children's attorney joined in County counsel's arguments, adding that the parents' circumstances were just beginning to change and it was not in the children's best interest to disrupt their current placement. The children's attorney stated that the children deserved permanency and should not have to wait for their parents to address their issues.
The juvenile court took the matter under submission and issued a ruling on May 17. With respect to the section 388 petitions, the juvenile court found that while the parents had begun serious efforts to address their issues, those efforts did not rise to the level necessary to grant the petitions. Accordingly, the court denied both petitions. With respect to the section 366.26 hearing, the court adopted the Agency's findings and recommendations, which it made its orders, including a finding that "[t]here is clear and convincing evidence that it is likely the child will be adopted." The court explained that while it was very impressed with what the parents were doing, it was too late in the process.
DISCUSSION
Mother argues there is not substantial evidence to support the juvenile court's finding that Janessa is likely to be adopted within a reasonable time if parental rights were terminated. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1).) Relying on In re Valerie W. (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1 (Valerie W.), mother argues there is not substantial evidence of adoptability because the Agency did not provide the juvenile court, either in its adoption assessment or in an addendum report, with the results of Janessa's court-ordered MRI, include medical documentation of Janessa's diagnosis of pontine hypoplasia and her prognosis, or indicate that the PAP had been advised about the condition and its implications, yet remained willing and able to adopt both children. Without such information, mother contends there is insufficient evidence that Janessa and Ezekiel, as a member of the sibling group, are likely to be adopted.
"Once [the juvenile] court sets a hearing pursuant to section 366.26 to select and implement a permanent plan for a dependent child, the agency must prepare an assessment [Citations], frequently referred to as an adoption assessment. Such an adoption assessment provides the information necessary for the juvenile court to determine whether it is likely the child will be adopted ...." (In re G.M. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 552, 559 (G.M.).) As pertinent here, the assessment must address the child's medical, developmental, scholastic, mental, and emotional status; analyze the likelihood the child will be adopted if parental rights are terminated; describe the efforts made to identify a prospective adoptive parent; and include "[a] preliminary assessment of the eligibility and commitment of any identified prospective adoptive parent." (§ 366.21, subd. (i)(4); Valerie W., supra, 162 Cal.App.4th at pp. 11-12.) "A child's current caretaker may be designated as a prospective adoptive parent if the child has lived with the caretaker for at least six months, the caretaker currently expresses a commitment to adopt the child, and the caretaker has taken at least one step to facilitate the adoption process. (§ 366.26, subd. (n)(1).)" (G.M., supra, 181 Cal.App.4th at p. 559.) "The assessment report is 'a cornerstone of the evidentiary structure' upon which the court, the parents and the child are entitled to rely." (Valerie W., supra, 162 Cal.App.4th at p. 11.)
Here, while mother asserts the assessment report was inadequate, she admits she did not challenge its inadequacy in the juvenile court and recognizes she has thereby forfeited any objection to the adoption assessment. (In re A.A. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1292, 1317 (A.A.).) Instead, we turn to whether substantial evidence supports the adoptability finding.
Both the evidentiary standard that applies to this issue in the juvenile court and our standard of review on appeal are well settled. At a section 366.26 hearing, the court must determine by clear and convincing evidence whether it is likely the minor will be adopted. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1).) If the court finds a likelihood of adoption, the court must terminate parental rights, in the absence of statutory exceptions that mother does not argue are applicable here. (In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 53 [if evidence at section 366.26 hearing shows child is likely to be adopted, juvenile court "must order adoption and its necessary consequence, termination of parental rights, unless one of the [statutorily] specified circumstances provides a compelling reason for finding that termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child."]; A.A., supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at p. 1320.)
"Although a finding of adoptability must be supported by clear and convincing evidence, it is nevertheless a low threshold: The court must merely determine that it is 'likely' that the child will be adopted within a reasonable time. [Citations.] We review that finding only to determine whether there is evidence, contested or uncontested, from which a reasonable court could reach that conclusion. It is irrelevant that there may be evidence which would support a contrary conclusion." (In re K.B. (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1275, 1292 (K.B.).) Moreover, we review the record in the light most favorable to the juvenile court's findings, and draw all inferences from the evidence that support the court's determination. (In re Nada R. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 1166, 1177.)
"The adoptability issue at a section 366.26 hearing focuses on the dependent child, e.g., whether his or her age, physical condition, and emotional state make it difficult to find a person willing to adopt." (A.A., supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at p. 1311.) "It is not necessary that the child already be in a potential adoptive home or that there be a proposed adoptive parent 'waiting in the wings.' [Citation.] [¶] Conversely, the existence of a prospective adoptive parent, who has expressed interest in adopting a dependent child, constitutes evidence that the child's age, physical condition, mental state, and other relevant factors are not likely to dissuade individuals from adopting the child. In other words, a prospective adoptive parent's willingness to adopt generally indicates the child is likely to be adopted within a reasonable time either by the prospective adoptive parent or by some other family." (A.A., supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1311-1312.)
In assessing adoptability, courts have divided children into two categories: those who are "generally adoptable" and those who are "specifically adoptable." A child is "generally adoptable" if the child's traits, e.g., age, physical condition, mental state and other relevant factors do not make it difficult to find an adoptive parent. A child is "specifically adoptable" if the child is adoptable only because of a specific caregiver's willingness to adopt. (In re R.C. (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 486, 492-494.) " 'When a child is deemed adoptable only because a particular caregiver is willing to adopt, the analysis shifts from evaluating the characteristics of the child to whether there is any legal impediment to the prospective adoptive parent's adoption and whether he or she is able to meet the needs of the child.' " (Id. at p. 494.)
In our view, identifying a child as "generally" or "specifically" adoptable obfuscates the adoptability issue before the juvenile court, as those terms are not mentioned in section 366.26 and the juvenile court is not required to assess a child's general and specific adoptability or make such findings. Instead, section 366.26 merely requires the juvenile court to determine if the child is likely to be adopted within a reasonable time. In other words, it requires the juvenile court to determine if the child is adoptable.
It is undisputed that Janessa has extensive special needs. It is well established that for a child with special needs, an adoptability finding can be upheld "if a prospective adoptive family has been identified as willing to adopt the child and the evidence supports the conclusion that it is reasonably likely that the child will in fact be adopted within a reasonable time." (K.B., supra, 173 Cal.App.4th at p. 1292.)
Here, the foster parents, who at the time of the section 366.26 hearing had cared for both children since their detention eight months earlier, had been identified as the children's PAP. On January 6, Silveira explained to the PAP the responsibilities of adoption, which the PAP indicated they understood and were willing to assume. There is nothing in the record to suggest that the PAP had changed their mind, even after Janessa's diagnosis. Both Silveira and the PAP, who knew about Janessa's possible microcephaly, began having concerns about Janessa's development in February, which they discussed at that time. Despite those concerns, Silveira reported in the March adoption assessment that the PAP, who she stated had been providing the children with the best possible care, were completely committed to adoption. When Janessa's condition became more pronounced in March, the PAP spoke with Silveira, who sought out referrals that led to obtaining the MRI in April. At the section 366.26 hearing in May, Silveira remained of the opinion that adoption was in Janessa's best interest, with her assessment being based on a comparison of the PAP's ability to provide adequate care and treatment for Janessa with the parents' ability to do so. Moreover, County counsel acknowledged in closing argument that while Janessa was a difficult child to place for adoption, the PAP were willing to adopt Janessa despite the severity of her disabilities. Every indication at the section 366.26 hearing was that the children would be adopted by the PAP within a reasonable time.
Mother contends that the PAP's willingness to adopt cannot support the adoptability finding because the Agency did not provide any medical documentation setting forth the nature of Janessa's genetic condition or provide information about the cost of Janessa's required care or her prognosis, and the record does not affirmatively show the PAP were fully informed of the results of the MRI or the severity of Janessa's condition, yet were willing and able to provide for Janessa's needs. She further asserts there is no information about whether the PAP changed their mind about adopting Ezekiel given Janessa's condition, as they may have felt they could care for only one of the children given Janessa's global disabilities.
The record is silent on whether the PAP were apprised of the results of the MRI or told about Janessa's condition. Nevertheless, the record shows the PAP, who had been Janessa's sole caregivers, were responsible for arranging Janessa's medical and dental examinations, and presumably took her to them. The record also shows the PAP were aware of her delays and were instrumental in obtaining a diagnosis for her. To assume that Janessa was formally diagnosed, yet the diagnosis was never revealed to the PAP, requires us to engage in pure speculation. Mother never raised her concerns to the juvenile court, where both her concerns and their legal significance, if any, to the issue of Janessa's adoptability could have been litigated. By arguing them now, mother asks this court to reweigh the evidence and draw questionable inferences on conflicting, or nonexistent, evidence. Such second guessing is not within our appellate authority. (In re Laura F. (1983) 33 Cal.3d 826, 833 ["our task is not to reweigh the evidence or to express an independent judgment thereon but merely to decide whether there is sufficient evidence to support the findings of the [juvenile] court."].)
Mother contends the juvenile court should have ordered the Agency to provide a comprehensive adoption assessment of the children once it learned that Janessa may be unable to bond with the PAP, who expressed a desire to adopt before learning of Janessa's diagnosis. She asserts the juvenile court erred in adopting the Agency's recommendation without any independent assessment and, given the "glaring lack of obviously necessary information," it was impossible for the juvenile court to find, by clear and convincing evidence, it was likely Janessa would be adopted within a reasonable time. Mother relies on Valerie W., supra, 162 Cal.App.4th 1, and In re Brian P. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 616 (Brian P.), to support her argument that there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court's adoptability finding as to Janessa.
In Valerie W., the appellate court determined an assessment was statutorily insufficient because it not only inadequately assessed a child's medical condition, it also failed to consider whether one of the children's caregivers was qualified to adopt them and whether there was a legal impediment to joint adoption. (Valerie W., supra, 162 Cal.App.4th at p. 4.) The inadequate report, which the appellant challenged in the juvenile court, resulted in a conclusion that substantial evidence did not support an adoptability finding. (Id. at p. 7; see A.A., supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at p. 1317.) The court did not address the question of whether the minor was adoptable. Rather, it held only that the reports did not provide enough information to make that determination.
In contrast here, mother did not challenge the adequacy of the assessment report in the juvenile court. Moreover, while there was no written assessment discussing Janessa's diagnosis or the PAP's willingness to adopt, there was testimony on the subject. Mother did not object to this procedure, seek a continuance or ask the juvenile court to order an updated assessment, thereby forfeiting any challenge to the procedure. (In re Dakota S. (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 494, 501-502; In re Christopher B. (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 551, 558.) This case is distinct from Valerie W. both because deficiencies in the assessment were remedied by further information provided at the hearing and the issue here is not whether the reports were so deficient as to undermine the juvenile court's conclusion, but whether the evidence adduced in the written reports and testimony was sufficient for the court to find that Janessa was likely to be adopted in a reasonable time.
Mother's reliance on Brian P., a termination-of-parental-rights case that resulted in a reversal on the finding of adoptability, is also misplaced. The case is distinguishable on a critical fact, namely the juvenile court did not have the benefit of an adoption assessment report, which the appellate court stated "would have presented the kind of facts needed to support a finding of adoptability." (Brian P., supra, 99 Cal.App.4th at p. 624.) In contrast here, the juvenile court had an adoption assessment which, coupled with the testimony at trial, provided sufficient evidence for the juvenile court to determine Janessa's adoptability.
Finally, mother compares Janessa's situation to that in In re Asia L. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 498, in which the appellate court reversed an order terminating parental rights after concluding there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court's adoptability finding. The case, however, is inapposite, as there the social services agency recognized the children required specialized placement, but did not identify any prospective adoptive families. (Id. at pp. 511-512.) Here, there were PAP who were willing to adopt Janessa despite her severe disabilities.
To entertain the possibility that these PAP may not adopt the children, as mother would have us do, is mere speculation. We prefer the more commonsensical view that "when there is a prospective adoptive home in which the child is already living, and the only indications are that, if matters continue, the child will be adopted into that home, adoptability is established. In such a case, the literal language of the statute is satisfied, because 'it is likely' that that particular child will be adopted." (In re Jayson T. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 75, 85.) For all the reasons stated above, we conclude there was substantial evidence to support the juvenile court's adoptability finding.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court's May 17, 2016 findings and orders are affirmed.
/s/_________
GOMES, J. WE CONCUR: /s/_________
HILL, P.J. /s/_________
SMITH, J.