Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Mendocino County Super. Ct. Nos. SCUKJVSQ1215323, SCUKJVSQ1215325, SCUKJVSQ1213643.
JONES, P.J.
J.M. (father) is the father of three children who were involved in a dependency proceeding. The juvenile court removed the children from father’s custody and awarded sole legal and physical custody to their mother (dependency case). The juvenile court also granted respondent and third party David M.’s (David) request for disclosure of certain dependency case records pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 827 and California Rules of Court, rule 5.552.
Unless noted, all further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code. “[S]ection 827 covers who has the right to access and inspect confidential juvenile records and how those records should be released.” (R.S. v. Superior Court (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1049, 1053 (R.S.).) All further “rule” references are to the California Rules of Court.
Father appeals from the order granting disclosure of the dependency case records. He contends: (1) David failed to establish a legitimate need for the records or that the records had substantial relevance to that need; (2) the court failed to balance his and the children’s interests against those of David; and (3) the order does not promote the children’s best interests.
We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
We provide a brief overview of the lengthy dependency case and mention only those facts relevant to the issue father raises on appeal.
The Dependency Case
Father and N.M. (mother) have three children, born in 2001, 2004, and 2007. Father and mother separated and the children lived with father. In August 2012, the Mendocino Department of Social Services (Department) filed a section 300 petition on behalf of the children. The operative petition alleged father failed to protect the children from “exposure to marijuana in their home” and had put his “grandson at risk of, and was arrested for, child endangerment.” The court declared the children dependents of the court (§ 300, subd. (b)) and removed them from father’s custody. The court ordered supervised visitation and family reunification services for father.
In August 2012, law enforcement found a “marijuana grow” inside father’s house with “45 growing marijuana plants... and... dried marijuana trimmings. In the backyard of the home, law enforcement found a greenhouse with... 83 growing marijuana plants.” In 2008, law enforcement found a similar “indoor marijuana grow” in the house father shared with the children and the Department detained the children.
Father lived with his girlfriend, Kelli C. (Kelli), who was arrested in February 2013 for robbery, kidnapping and false imprisonment. At the time of her arrest, Kelli was under the influence of methamphetamine. The Department explained father’s decision to live with Kelli “necessitate[d] continued placement” for the children because father “resides with a person who is involved in drug use and criminal actions while [he] wants his children in his home, which puts the children at risk of harm.” In March 2013, the Department declined to allow father to have overnight visits with the children because his home had “been the scene of two responses from law enforcement within a thirty day period.” In October 2013, the court placed the children with mother under a family maintenance plan and terminated father’s reunification services. Father received supervised visitation with the children. The visitation was supervised, partly because father lived with Kelli.
In May 2014, the Department suspended father’s visits with the children. In a June 2014 interim review report, the Department recommended terminating father’s visitation. The report described a May 15, 2014 visit where father “physically assaulted” and verbally abused his seven-year-old child. The report also attached a May 2014 letter from the children’s psychologist recommending suspension of father’s visits as “warranted and in the best interest of the children[.]” At a June 2014 hearing, the court suspended father’s visits for 30 days. The court later reinstated visitation with certain conditions. In September 2014, the court granted mother sole legal and physical custody of the children and terminated dependency jurisdiction. Father received weekly supervised visitation.
We do not discuss the report or the psychologist’s letter in detail because these documents were disclosed by the court pursuant to a protective order restricting their use and dissemination. (See infra, p. 5.)
David’s Disclosure Request and the Court’s Order
Kelli and David had one child, G.M., born in January 2013. G.M. lived with Kelli and father. In February 2013, the Department filed a section 300 petition on behalf of G.M. In June 2013, the juvenile court awarded David sole legal and physical custody of G.M. and monitored visitation for Kelli. In June 2014, Kelli moved to modify visitation in the family court case, and sought unsupervised visitation with G.M. in the home she shared with father.
Mendocino County Superior Court case No. SCUK-CVFL-13-62317 (family court case).
This prompted David to file a request for disclosure of juvenile case file for each of the children ((form JV-570), collectively disclosure request). David sought “all pleadings... and all records” in the dependency case, including “delivered service logs and records related to [father]’s supervised visitation with his children.” The disclosure request alleged Kelli sought unsupervised visitation with G.M. and that Kelli resided with father, who “poses a significant threat to the safety and welfare of [G.M.]” David explained he “need[ed] the juvenile court records to provide [to] the family court to protect his child from [father].” Father objected, urging the court to summarily deny the disclosure request because: (1) David had not shown good cause for the release of the records; (2) the release of the records was not in the children’s best interests; (3) David’s’s interest in the records did not outweigh the confidentiality of the records; and (4) David did not establish the relevance of the records in the family court case.
At a hearing, father reiterated his objection that David had not established good cause for the release of children’s entire dependency case files. Counsel for the minors agreed the disclosure request was “overbroad” but opined “there’s some things, perhaps... any problems or issues in visits that could be relevant” in the family court case because Kelli and father lived together and were “sort of a package deal.” Mother’s counsel stated mother did not object to the disclosure request, and noted mother “had contact with [David] regarding some of the issues with parenting that she saw” and could “potentially be a witness” in the family court case. In response, David’s counsel argued calling “mother to testify wouldn’t be sufficient” because “she’s not a percipient witness to what transpired” at father’s May 2015 visit with the children. David’s counsel explained Kelli was seeking unsupervised visitation with G.M. in the home she shared with father, and if father “shouldn’t have contact with his own children, David doesn’t believe that he should have contact with [G.M.] either[.]”
The court concluded David had “narrow[ed] the scope” of the disclosure request and had “articulated a reasonable concern about the safety of [G.M.] should the child be allowed to have unsupervised contact with [father] while the child is in the custody of [Kelli]....” The court explained it was “aware from participation in these children’s cases that there was an incident of inappropriate physical contact between [father] and one of his children at a visit[.]” The court stated it would review the dependency case file in camera, select which documents to disclose, and redact them.
In a written order, the court ordered disclosure of the following dependency case records: (1) the Department’s June 2014 interim review report recommending termination of father’s visits with the children; (2) a “delivered service log” describing father’s May 2014 supervised visit with the children; (3) the psychologist’s May 2014 letter recommending the court suspend father’s visits with the children; and (4) the June 2014 minute order of the hearing on the Department’s request to terminate visitation. The court determined David demonstrated the dependency case records were “necessary and have substantial relevance to [his] legitimate needs[.]” The court also stated it had balanced David’s needs with the children’s best interests and concluded the “need for disclosure outweighs the policy considerations favoring confidentiality of juvenile records.” The court issued a protective order limiting the “names of the children... to [their] initials” and limiting disclosure of the records “for use solely in the family [court] case, presentation to the party and the Court, not disclosed in any other context without further order of the Court.”
Father appealed, and petitioned for a writ of supersedeas requesting this court stay the juvenile court’s order. We granted the writ petition and stayed the use of the records ordered disclosed by the juvenile court pending resolution of father’s appeal.
DISCUSSION
Father claims the court erred by granting David’s disclosure request. We disagree. As we explain below, the court did not abuse its discretion by ordering disclosure of limited dependency case records pursuant to a protective order.
I.
The Juvenile Court’s Authority to Disclose Juvenile Court Records
Juvenile court records are confidential. (J.E. v. Superior Court (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1329, 1337; In re Keisha T. (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 220, 231 (Keisha T.).) Section 827, however, permits disclosure of juvenile court records to certain persons, including any “person who may be designated by court order of the judge of the juvenile court upon filing a petition.” (§ 827, subd. (a)(1)(P); In re B.F. (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 811, 818 (B.F.).) A section 827 petition must identify “[t]he specific records sought” and “describe in detail the reasons the records are being sought and their relevancy to the proceeding or purpose for which petitioner wishes to inspect or obtain the records.” (Rule 5.552(c)(1), (2).) To prevail, the petitioner must show good cause. (Rule 5.552(e).) The petitioner has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence “the records requested are necessary and have substantial relevance to the legitimate need of the petitioner.” (Rule 5.552(e)(6).)
“‘[I]f the court determines that there may be information or documents in the records sought to which the petitioner may be entitled, the... court... must conduct an in camera review of the juvenile case file and any objections and assume that all legal claims of privilege are asserted.’ [Citation.] ‘In determining whether to authorize inspection or release of juvenile case files, in whole or in part, the court must balance the interests of the child and other parties to the juvenile court proceedings, the interests of the petitioner, and the interests of the public.’ (Rule 5.552(e)(4).) To grant the petition, the court must determine... ‘the need for discovery outweighs the policy considerations favoring confidentiality of juvenile case files.’ (Rule 5.552(e)(5).) ‘The court may permit disclosure of juvenile case files only insofar as is necessary....’ (Rule 5.552(e)(6).)” (B.F., supra, 190 Cal.App.4th at p. 818.)
“A juvenile court has broad and exclusive authority to determine whether, and to what extent, to grant access to confidential juvenile records. [Citation.] ‘“The juvenile court has both the ‘sensitivity and expertise’ to make this determination. [Citation.]”’ [Citation.] We review the court’s decision for abuse of discretion. [Citations.]” (R.S., supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at p. 1055, fn. omitted.)
II.
The Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion By Ordering Disclosure of Limited Dependency Case Records Pursuant to a Protective Order
Father contends the court erred by granting the disclosure request for several reasons. First, father claims David failed to establish a legitimate need for the dependency case records. (Rule 5.552(e)(6).) We disagree. David sought the dependency case records to protect his child from father. (Rule 5.552(c).) “‘It is the right and duty of parents under the law of nature as well as the common law and the statutes of many states to protect their children... and to do whatever may be necessary for their care, maintenance, and preservation.’” (Lipscomb By And Through DeFehr v. Simmons (9th Cir.1992) 962 F.2d 1374, 1386, fn. 2; Williams v. Garcetti (1993) 5 Cal.4th 561, 570 [parents have a legal responsibility to care for and protect their children].) In the family court case, Kelli sought unsupervised visitation with G.M. in the home she shared with father. Father’s visitation with the children had been suspended after he “physically assaulted” and verbally abused one of his children. As a result - and as the juvenile court recognized - David had a “reasonable concern” for the safety and welfare of G.M. while he visited Kelli at “her home where [father] resides.”
David also established the dependency case records were necessary. (Rule 5.552(e)(6).) In his disclosure request, David alleged he needed the dependency case records to protect G.M. from father. At the hearing, David explained he could not call mother to testify in the family court case because she was not present at the May 2014 visit. (In re Anthony H. (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 495, 498, 505 (Anthony H.) [grandmother needed her grandson’s juvenile records to “review and use as evidence” in her federal civil rights action; without the records “it would be extremely difficult to determine whether there had been any wrongdoing, and if so, to prove it”].) The fact that mother “was a percipient witness to the order suspending Father’s visits as she was in court on the day the order was entered” is of no moment. It is undisputed mother did not witness the incident where father “physically assaulted” one of his children. Finally, forcing the children to testify in the family court case would require them to relive the incident, and possibly further traumatize them. (See R.S., supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at p. 1056 [releasing a child’s videotaped interview was “less traumatic” than forcing the child to “endure the rigors and stigma of civil litigation”].)
We reject the minor’s claim that David did not establish the dependency case records were substantially relevant in the family court case. (Rule 5.552(e)(6).) At the hearing, David explained “if [father] shouldn’t have contact with his own children, ” he should not “have contact with [G.M.] either[.]” Counsel for the children noted dependency case documents reflecting “problems or issues in [father’s] visits” would be relevant in the family court case. We agree. Kelli requested unsupervised visitation with G.M. in the home she shared with father. The dependency case records were therefore relevant in the family court case on the issue of whether Kelli should have unsupervised visitation with G.M. at her home.
Father’s reliance on People v. Superior Court (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 488 (People) is misplaced. In that case, a grand jury sought access to juvenile court records pursuant to section 827, but the grand jury did not support “its petition with any particular facts showing ‘good cause’ for the records except to state that the records were required in connection with an ongoing ‘public watchdog’ investigation being conducted by [the grand jury] under Penal Code section 925. [Citations.]” (People, supra, at p. 490.) The appellate court affirmed the juvenile court’s denial of the petition, concluding the grand jury did not provide the court with any “specific facts concerning [the] need for the records or their relevance to any legitimate grand jury activity[.]” (Id. at p. 492.) In reaching this conclusion, the appellate court rejected the grand jury’s argument that it was entitled to “unrestricted access” to the juvenile court records “with ‘no questions asked[.]’” (Id. at p. 493.)
People is inapposite. Here, David did not seek “unrestricted access” to the dependency case files: he sought limited information about a specific incident that led the court to suspend father’s visitation. (People, supra, 107 Cal.App.4th at p. 493.) In People, the grand jury did not allege any facts concerning its “need for the records or their relevance to any legitimate grand jury activity.” (Id. at p. 492.) Unlike People, David provided specific facts demonstrating his need for the records and their relevance to the family court case. (Ibid.)
Father faults David for initially seeking disclosure of the entire dependency case file. David’s initial disclosure request may have been overbroad, but we do not fault him. “[W]ithout possession of the juvenile court file, it would be difficult to list the documents in detail or know which documents would be useful or relevant[.]” (Anthony H., supra, 129 Cal.App.4th at p. 505.) David appropriately narrowed the scope of his disclosure request at the hearing.
Next, father claims the court did not balance David’s need for disclosure against his “privacy interests” and those of the children. We are not persuaded. In its written order, the court stated it balanced David’s needs with the children’s best interest (Rule 5.552(e)(4)) and concluded the “need for discovery outweighs the policy considerations favoring confidentiality case files.” (Rule 5.552(e)(5).) We reject father’s suggestion - unsupported by authority - that the court was required to explain on the record “how [it] was balancing the multiple interests as required by the Rules of Court.” That father preferred a different result does not demonstrate the court failed to balance the appropriate factors in Rule 5.552(e)(4), nor does it demonstrate the court abused its discretion. It did not.
Father’s reliance on B.F., supra, 190 Cal.App.4th 811, does not alter our conclusion. In B.F., a juvenile court abused its discretion by granting the de facto parents’ request for access to the mother’s court-ordered psychological evaluation because the court “elevated the [de facto parents’] interests to those of the parents, failed to consider [the mother’s] interests and concluded without basis that the children’s interests required disclosure of the psychological evaluation.” (Id. at p. 820.) The B.F. court also concluded the de facto parents had no legitimate interest in seeing the evaluation because they did not need it “to provide care for the children. Insofar as the [de facto parents] were interested in adopting the children, that interest was not ripe for presentation to the court, as the case was still in the reunification phase.” (Id. at p. 821, fn. omitted.) This case is nothing like B.F. Here, David had a legitimate interest in - and need for - the dependency case records because his interest was the safety of his own son. The juvenile court did not elevate David’s interests over those of anyone else.
Finally, father contends the disclosure order was not in the children’s best interest. We acknowledge the need for maintaining the confidentiality of the dependency case records, but we also consider the importance of protecting G.M. and the risks associated with forcing the children to testify in the family court case about father. Here, the court protected the children by ordering disclosure of limited dependency case records, redacting the children’s names from those records, and by issuing a protective order limiting the use and disclosure of the records. (In re R.G. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1408, 1417 [court balanced the relevant interests and “removed the names of the children... to further protect their privacy”]; see also In re Michael B. (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 1698, 1706 [disclosure of minor’s juvenile court records in a related family law proceeding “was limited, permitting disclosure only to a family law court, if that court determined to avail itself of the records for purposes of a hearing or hearings relating to custody and visitation of the minor”].)
“[T]here may be situations in which competing interests require the disclosure of some material in a juvenile court record.... [T]he juvenile court that is in the best position and statutorily authorized to make the decision of whether and what material should be released.” (Keisha T., supra, 38 Cal.App.4th at p. 233.) Here, the court was justified in ordering disclosure of limited dependency case records pursuant to a protective order. “We are satisfied, from our review of the record, that the court considered the various interests and concerns of all the parties” as required by section 827 and Rule 5.552 and did not abuse its discretion by ordering disclosure. (R.S., supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at p. 1056.)
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s order authorizing disclosure of limited dependency case records pursuant to a protective order is affirmed.
We concur: Simons, J., Bruiniers, J.