Opinion
F075307
12-18-2017
In re R.R., et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. MADERA COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES , Plaintiff and Appellant, v. LINDA T., et al., Defendants and Respondents.
Miranda P. Neal, County Counsel, Derek J. Walzberg, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Appellant. Seth F. Gorman, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Respondent Linda T. Alexis C. Collentine, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Respondent C.R. Brian C. Bitker, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Respondent Jose G.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. Nos. MJP017169, MJP017170, MJP017682)
OPINION
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Madera County. Thomas L. Bender, Judge. Miranda P. Neal, County Counsel, Derek J. Walzberg, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Appellant. Seth F. Gorman, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Respondent Linda T. Alexis C. Collentine, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Respondent C.R. Brian C. Bitker, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Respondent Jose G.
-ooOoo-
Seven children were removed from mother's care due to her ongoing substance abuse and failure to protect them. The juvenile court found applicable the sibling relationship exception to termination of parental rights, under Welfare and Institutions Code, section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(v), with respect to the three youngest children, R.R., J.G., and E.M. The Madera County Department of Social Services (department) appeals, seeking to overturn the juvenile court's decision not to terminate the parental rights to the youngest three children. We agree with the department and reverse the order.
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise stated.
The department does not challenge the permanent plans concerning the four older children, Vanessa G., Jose G., Ruby G., and Luis G., for whom the department recommended a planned permanent living arrangement, with a goal of guardianship.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE
Detention
On July 15, 2015, the department filed a section 300 petition, alleging mother Linda T. failed to provide her then six children with adequate food, housing, and sanitation. Vanessa, Ruby, R.R. and J.G., then ages 13, 9, 3, and 2, respectively, were placed together in one foster care home; Luis, age 8, and Jose, age 11, were placed in another. The juvenile court sustained the petition on July 27, 2015. The petition was amended on August 7, 2015, to include an allegation that the children were at risk of physical harm as three of the children tested positive for methamphetamine in hair follicle drug screenings. Jurisdiction and Disposition
An uncontested jurisdiction hearing was held August 24, 2015, and the juvenile court adopted the recommended findings and order. Disposition was set for September 21, 2015.
In the report prepared in anticipation of disposition, the department recommended mother be denied reunification services under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(13). The department also recommended reunification services be denied father Jose G., pursuant to section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10), and father C.R., pursuant to section 361.5, subdivision (b)(1).
Reunification services need not be provided a parent with an extensive history of substance abuse and resistance to prior court ordered treatment within a specified amount of time. (§ 361.5, subd. (b)(13).)
Jose G. is the presumed father of Vanessa (born in 2001), Jose (born in 2004), Ruby (born in 2005), Luis (born in 2007), and J.G. (born in 2013).
Reunification services need not be provided a parent who has previously failed to reunify with another sibling or half sibling of the children at issue and has failed to treat the problem that led to the previous removal. (§ 361.5, subd. (b)(10).)
C.R. is the presumed father of R.R. (born in 2012).
Reunification services need not be provided a parent whose whereabouts is unknown. (§ 361.5, subd. (b)(1).)
Mother's prior history included dependency of the four oldest children in 2007 and all six children in 2013, both due to mother's substance abuse issues. In both dependency cases, dependency was dismissed at the 12-month review hearing and the children returned to mother's care. In the current dependency, the department recommended mother be denied services because, despite mother's completion of a previous substance abuse program, her ongoing use revealed her resistance to treatment and she was not making any efforts to address her substance abuse.
Disposition was held October 27, 2015. Mother opposed the recommendation to deny her services, stating she had been participating in services for about a month. She also claimed the department's assertion that she refused previous services was unfounded. The juvenile court rejected the department's recommendation to bypass services for mother, finding that, while mother did have a history of chronic drug abuse, she had participated in previous court-ordered treatment.
The juvenile court agreed that the fathers be denied services. It found section 361.5, subdivision (b)(1) applied to C.R., as his whereabouts were unknown, and that section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10) applied to Jose G., because he failed to participate in previous services and did not maintain contact with Mexican social services when he was deported.
A case plan was adopted for mother on December 7, 2015, and a six-month review hearing set for June 6, 2016. The siblings were to have scheduled visits every other Saturday. E .M.'s Detention
Mother's seventh child, E.M., was born in January of 2016. Both mother and E.M.'s alleged father, Ernesto M., tested positive for methamphetamine at the time of his birth. The department filed a section 300 petition January 14, 2016, alleging serious risk of harm because E.M. was born positive for methamphetamine (§ 300, subd. (a)); that mother failed to protect E.M. due to her substance abuse (§ 300, subd. (b)); and that E.M. was at risk of harm because his siblings were abused or neglected, as evidenced by the current dependency involving them (§ 300, subd. (j)). Mother claimed she was sober from the fifth to eighth month of her pregnancy, but used right before E.M.'s birth for labor pain. Mother claimed she did not receive prenatal care for E.M. because she had "too much to do with her current services." Jurisdiction as to E .M.
At jurisdiction on February 4, 2016, the juvenile court found true the section 300, subdivision (b) allegation; the section 300, subdivisions (a) and (j) allegations were found not true.
At the beginning of March, the department requested mother's visits be reduced to once a week because she had missed visits, was tardy for visits and left early, was confrontational with the staff, and provided inappropriate food at visitation. The department also noted behavioral problems with at least one of the children; Vanessa was refusing to attend visits because she found them not productive and boring. The motion on the reduced visitation was set to be heard in conjunction with the forthcoming review hearing. The juvenile court cautioned mother about her visits. Disposition as to E .M.
As to E.M., the department recommended the juvenile court deny mother services pursuant to section 361.5, subdivision (b)(13), and order services for father Ernesto M. Mother told the juvenile court she was participating in alcohol and drug-related services two times per week and had been doing so for a month. She said she was going to narcotic anonymous meetings two times per week and parenting classes once a month.
See footnote 3, ante.
On May 3, 2016, the juvenile court ordered services be provided to E.M.'s father, but denied them to mother. As stated by the juvenile court, mother "no doubt in my mind, is a chronic user, abuser of illegal drugs," and "has resisted prior court-ordered treatment" during the three years prior - following the petition. The juvenile court found no clear and convincing evidence that it would be in E.M.'s best interests to offer additional reunification services, as mother had only been in services for a month. Six-month Status Review Report
The status review report filed June 3, 2016, recommended mother's reunification services be terminated as to her oldest six children and that a section 366.26 hearing be set. The report stated Vanessa, Ruby and E.M. were in one home; Jose and Luis in another home; and R.R. and J.G. were in a third home. Each respective home expressed an interest in adopting the children in their care.
It was reported that Vanessa rarely attended sibling visits; that Ruby was not bonded with Jose, Luis, R.R. and J.G. and there was a lot of conflict during visitation between the siblings; and that the younger siblings were not bonded to their siblings, but were to each other. The department opined that the detriment of placing all of the children together would be that Vanessa, Jose or Ruby "would bear the brunt of the caring or concern for their siblings which has caused undue stressors on them already under the lack of care from [mother]." A regional center intern reported that neither R.R. nor J.G. had a bond with their siblings and that sibling visits were detrimental to them.
At the June 6, 2016, review hearing, after genetic testing revealed Ernesto M. was not the presumed father of E.M., the juvenile court set aside the declaration of paternity and found, as an alleged father, he was not entitled to services. On June 30, 2016, the juvenile court terminated mother's reunification services as to her oldest six children and set a section 366.26 hearing. A section 366.26 hearing was set for E.M. as well. Section 366 .26 Report
In December of 2016, the department filed a section 366.26 report stating Vanessa was in one home; Ruby and E.M. in another; Jose and Luis in a third; and R.R. and J.G. in a fourth. Mother had not visited with her children since June 22, 2016. At visits, the older children were observed encouraging R.R. to misbehave, causing J.G. to become aggressive. The department stopped visits between R.R. and J.G. and their siblings because it was deemed detrimental to their development and growth. When the visits stopped, R.R. and J.G.'s behaviors improved. Visits between Vanessa, Jose, Ruby and Luis continued. Jose and Luis were said to have a strong bond.
The department stated that, except for the oldest child, Vanessa, all of the children were considered adoptable. The department recommended a permanent plan living arrangement with a goal of guardianship for Vanessa, Jose, Ruby and Luis. As for R.R., J.G. and E.M., the department stated adoptive parents were identified and recommended termination of parental rights.
At the scheduled permanency plan review December 13, 2016, mother requested a contested hearing on the proposed termination of her parental rights.
A permanent plan review hearing was set for the oldest children in June of 2017.
Minors' counsel stated that foster mother indicated Ruby wanted to visit R.R. and J.G. Minors' counsel would follow up with the department on the possible visits. The juvenile court ordered the department to take steps to encourage sibling interaction, as provided in section 16002.
At the contested section 366.26 hearing held February 15, 2017, the department asked that the section 366.26 report filed December 13, 2016, be entered into evidence, but stated it did not have additional evidence to present.
Mother testified that, before removal of the children, her children were together in her care and all got along with each other. They now missed each other and asked for each other. Mother thought adoption would affect the younger siblings, as they were very close. She testified she had not visited the children in four months, but blamed it on the department because they told her the children would be adopted and she could no longer visit. She acknowledged that she did not contact her attorney to verify this information.
Vanessa, Jose, Ruby, and Luis each testified. Vanessa, age 15, testified that she had a close relationship with R.R. and J.G., but hardly saw E.M. and did not really know him. She thought R.R., J.G. and E.M. would be sad and miss her if they were adopted, and it would affect her "[a] lot."
Jose, age 13, testified that he likes his siblings and misses them when they are not around. He thought they would miss him as well and did not know if it would make him happy or sad if R.R., J.G. and E.M. were adopted.
Ruby, age 11, testified that she loves her younger siblings, they love her, she misses them, and she thinks R.R. misses her, and it would make her sad if they were adopted.
Luis, age nine, testified that he and R.R. see each other once a week, he would be sad if he did not get to see her, and she would be sad if she did not get to see him. Luis testified that he loves J.G. and he thinks J.G. would miss him. Luis had only seen E.M. once or twice.
After hearing argument, the juvenile court stated it would not follow the department's recommendation to terminate parental rights, instead finding an exception based on section 366.26 subdivision (c)(1)(B)(v), "which is the sibling substantial interference with the sibling relationship" for R.R., J.G. and E.M. The juvenile court ordered the children remain dependents as placed, set a permanency planning review hearing to coincide with a June 5, 2017, hearing date for the older children, and ordered the department to prepare new findings and orders consistent with the ruling.
The department filed a notice of appeal March 14, 2017, in the matters of R.R., J.G. and E.M. Further Proceedings
On March 17, 2017, the juvenile court placed the matter on calendar for March 28, 2017, to clarify new findings and orders. At the March 28, 2017, hearing, the juvenile court stated he put the matter on calendar because he received orders to sign stating the permanent plan for R.R., J.G., and E.M. was legal guardianship, and he questioned whether that was accurate. Deputy county counsel, and counsel for mother, father and the minors all agreed that it "should be something akin to long-term foster care with the goal of guardianship, since guardianship was not exactly contemplated going forward and it was not identified as a viable option until the court found the exception to termination of parental rights applied." In order to clarify the matter, the juvenile court ordered the transcript of the February 15, 2017, hearing and continued the hearing to April 24, 2017.
At the April 24, 2017, hearing, the juvenile court noted that the transcript stated that the children were ordered to remain dependents as placed. But, the juvenile court stated it did not have findings and orders in the file and, if they were submitted, did not know what happened to them. The department was authorized to look at the transcripts to complete the findings and orders. The orders under section 366.26 were subsequently signed and filed on April 27, 2017, stating the children were found to be adoptable, that termination of parental rights was detrimental due to sibling relationships, and that the permanent plan was adoption.
As mother correctly notes, the department's notice of appeal is premature. The department filed notice of appeal March 14, 2017, but the juvenile court's final order was not filed until April 27, 2017. We, however, will treat the department's premature appeal as having been taken from the subsequently entered final order and review the appeal on the merits. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.406(d) ["notice of appeal is premature if filed before the judgment is rendered or the order is made, but the reviewing court may treat the notice as filed immediately after the rendition of judgment or the making of the order"].)
DISCUSSION
The department appeals from the orders of the juvenile court finding the sibling relationship exception to adoption applied to R.R., J.G., and E.M. The department contends the juvenile court's findings are not supported by substantial evidence and that the juvenile court abused its discretion in making its findings. We agree. Legal Authority
California has a comprehensive statutory scheme establishing procedures for the juvenile court to follow when and after a child is removed from the home for the child's welfare. (§ 300 et seq.; see generally Cynthia D. v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 242, 247-250.) "The objective of the dependency scheme is to protect abused or neglected children and those at substantial risk thereof and to provide permanent, stable homes if those children cannot be returned home within a prescribed period of time." (In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 307.) When the child is removed from the home, the court first attempts, for a specified period of time, to reunify the family. (Cynthia D. v. Superior Court, supra, at pp. 248-249.) Where, as here, those efforts fail, "the court must terminate reunification efforts and set the matter for a hearing pursuant to section 366.26 for the selection and implementation of a permanent plan. (§ 366.21, subd. (g).)" (Id. at p. 249.)
"Once reunification services are ordered terminated, the focus shifts [from the parent's interests] to the needs of the child for permanency and stability." (In re Marilyn H., supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 309.) At the selection and implementation hearing held pursuant to section 366.26, a juvenile court must choose one of the several "'possible alternative permanent plans for a minor child.... The permanent plan preferred by the Legislature is adoption. [Citation.]' [Citation.] If the court finds the child is adoptable, it must terminate parental rights absent circumstances under which it would be detrimental to the child." (In re Ronell A. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1352, 1368.) There are only limited circumstances which permit the court to find a "compelling reason for determining that termination [of parental rights] would be detrimental to the child ...." (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B).)
One such circumstance under which termination of parental rights would be detrimental is when "[t]here would be substantial interference with a child's sibling relationship, taking into consideration the nature and extent of the relationship, including, but not limited to, whether the child was raised with a sibling in the same home, whether the child shared significant common experiences or has existing close and strong bonds with a sibling, and whether ongoing contact is in the child's best interest, including the child's long-term emotional interest, as compared to the benefit of legal permanence through adoption." (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(v).) "[T]he application of this exception will be rare, particularly when the proceedings concern young children whose needs for a competent, caring and stable parent are paramount. [Citation.]" (In re Valerie A. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 987, 1014.) Standard of Review
We acknowledge the parties' discussion in their respective briefing regarding the split of authority as to whether the substantial evidence standard, the abuse of discretion standard, or a hybrid standard is to be used for a juvenile court's ruling regarding the application of the parent-child relationship and sibling relationship exceptions. (In re Bailey J. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1314-1315) [hybrid combination of substantial evidence and abuse of discretion standards]; In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 576 [substantial evidence test]; In re Jasmine D. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1351 [abuse of discretion test].) The department asserts the hybrid standard of review applies, as does J.G.'s father; mother, joined by R.R.'s father, asserts the substantial evidence standard applies. We will apply the hybrid standard of review, but find, in this case, that the juvenile court's decision does not withstand any of the standards of review.
"Since the proponent of the exception bears the burden of producing evidence of the existence of a beneficial parental or sibling relationship, which is a factual issue, the substantial evidence standard of review is the appropriate one to apply to this component of the juvenile court's determination." (In re Bailey J., supra, 189 Cal.App.4th at p. 1314.) "The other component of ... the sibling relationship exception is the requirement that the juvenile court find that the existence of that relationship constitutes a 'compelling reason for determining that termination would be detrimental.' (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B), italics added.) A juvenile court finding that the relationship is a 'compelling reason' for finding detriment to the child is based on the facts but is not primarily a factual issue. It is, instead, a 'quintessentially' discretionary decision, which calls for the juvenile court to determine the importance of the relationship in terms of the detrimental impact that its severance can be expected to have on the child and to weigh that against the benefit to the child of adoption. [Citation.] Because this component of the juvenile court's decision is discretionary, the abuse of discretion standard of review applies." (Id.; accord In re C.B. (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 102, 123.) Analysis
In its decision to find the sibling relationship exception applicable, the juvenile court at first stated it would tentatively find the parent-child relationship exception applied, because "mom has maintained regular visitation and the child will benefit from continuing relationship." The department argued against this decision, noting mother stopped visiting the children in June of 2016, eight months before the section 366.26 hearing. The department further argued mother did not have the type of relationship which, if severed, would deprive the children of a substantial positive, emotional attachment. The department also argued the sibling relationship exception was not present, as nobody identified that any of the three children at issue would suffer detriment if mother's rights were terminated. In its argument, the department cited the report from the Madera County Behavioral Health "clinician," which stated R.R. and J.G. had not bonded with their siblings and that E.M. was too young to have a bond.
The parent-child relationship exception requires a finding that the parent has maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).)
The juvenile court questioned the clinician's expertise, stating it did not know her education, training or experience, and did not know what the opinion was based on. The juvenile court then agreed that the parent-child exception did not show mother's visitation had been "stellar," but it did find the sibling relationship exception applied.
As to R.R., J.G. and E.M., the evidence before the juvenile court was that E.M. was one year old at the time of the section 366.26 hearing and had lived his entire life in foster care, first with Vanessa and Ruby and then just with Ruby when Vanessa was moved to another foster home without siblings. R.R. and J.G., ages three and two years old, respectively, when removed from mother's custody, spent the following year and a half in foster care, first with Vanessa and Ruby and then just the two of them together. Neither R.R., J.G. or E.M. were old enough to voice an opinion on their relationship with their siblings.
At the hearing, mother described the relationship between all of the siblings, when in her care, as getting along "really well," asking about each other and missing each other when they were not all present. Mother opined that if R.R., J.G. and E.M. were adopted, Vanessa would cry and tell her she missed her sister R.R.
Vanessa, age 15, testified that she had a "pretty close" relationship with R.R. and J.G., but hardly saw E.M. She testified that, at visits, R.R. hugs her and calls her "big sister." According to Vanessa, she saw J.G. "once in awhile" at visits. When asked how she thought R.R. would be affected by adoption, Vanessa said, "[s]he will miss us" and would be sad.
Jose, age 13, testified that he saw R.R. once a week at visits and would miss her if she was not around. He thought she would miss him too, and that she would be sad. He thought J.G. would be sad as well. He did not get to see E.M.
Ruby, age 11, testified that she loved R.R. but had not seen her lately. She missed her and thought R.R. missed her as well. They played together at visits and got along. She thought she would be sad if R.R. were adopted. She thought the same about J.G. and E.M. While she thought R.R. would miss mother, she did not think J.G. or E.M. would.
Luis, age nine, testified that he got along with R.R., saw her weekly, thought she would miss him if he was not around. He would be sad if he no longer got to see her. He felt the same way about J.G., but had only seen E.M. once.
As explained by our Supreme Court in In re Celine R., the sibling relationship exception permits the trial court to consider possible detriment to the child being considered for adoption, but not a sibling of that child. While the sibling relationship exception "concerns the sibling relationship in general, the statute continually refers to that relationship's impact on the child being considered for adoption, not the impact on the sibling or anyone else." (In re Celine R (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 54; § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(v).) "The language focuses exclusively on the benefits and burdens to the adoptive child, not the other siblings. The court is specifically directed to consider the best interests of the adoptive child, not the siblings, and must ultimately determine whether adoption would be detrimental to the adoptive child, not the siblings." (In re Daniel H. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 804, 813.) "Nothing in the statute suggests the Legislature intended to permit a court to not choose an adoption that is in the adoptive child's best interest because of the possible effect the adoption may have on a sibling." (In re Celine R., supra, at p. 54.)
As summarized in In re Celine R.:
"The sibling's relationship with the child is not irrelevant. Certainly, evidence of the sibling's relationship with the child and, if the sibling is articulate, perhaps of the sibling's views of that relationship, might be relevant as indirect evidence of the effect the adoption may have on the adoptive child. A nonadoptive sibling's emotional resistance towards the proposed adoption may also implicate the interests of the adoptive child. In an appropriate case, the court should carefully consider all evidence regarding the sibling relationship as it relates to possible detriment to the adoptive child. But the ultimate question is whether adoption would be detrimental to the adoptive child, not someone else. This conclusion does not mean that the court must totally disregard the interests of the sibling or the significance of the sibling relationship when it orders adoption. When appropriate, the court can encourage the adoptive parents to agree to visits among the siblings although ... it cannot require them to do so." (In re Celine R., supra, 31 Cal.4th at pp. 55.)
Mother relies heavily on In re Naomi P. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 808 (Naomi P.), in which the appellate court found the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the sibling relationship exception applicable. We find Naomi P. distinguishable. In that case, the minor was placed with the maternal cousin in November 2001; the maternal cousin lived close to the maternal grandmother, who was the legal guardian of the mother's three older children. The minor's placement permitted frequent visitation between the siblings. (Id. at pp. 812-813.) The maternal cousin became the minor's legal guardian after reunification services were terminated, and the minor continued to have weekly visits with her siblings. (Ibid.)
In December of 2003, the minor was removed from the maternal cousin's custody and placed with V., a nonrelative family friend. (Naomi P., supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at pp. 813-814.) V. facilitated weekly visits between the siblings in the maternal grandmother's home, including overnight and weekend visits. (Id. at p. 814.) V. reported that she would never stop the minor from seeing her siblings. (Id. at p. 815.) One of the siblings testified he visited the minor at V.'s house, loved the minor, saw her on a regular basis, and would be angry if he were not able to see her again. (Id. at pp. 816-817.) Another sibling testified he saw the minor frequently, talked to her on the phone, considered her as part of his family, and wanted to continue to see her. (Id. at pp. 817-818.) The third sibling testified she visited the minor frequently, was attached to her, and did not want her to be adopted because she was part of their family. (Id. at pp. 818-819.)
Contrary to the instant case, the minor in Naomi P. had frequent and pleasant visits with her siblings, including overnight and weekend visits. Here, the visits were less frequent, occurring every other week, and were less extensive, as no overnight or weekend visits occurred. In addition, the visits were found to be detrimental to R.R. and J.G. when the older children encouraged the younger children to misbehave and the visits were suspended after a year.
In Naomi P., the minor's siblings testified as to their close relationship with the minor and that they considered her part of their family. Here Vanessa testified she was "pretty close" with R.R. and J.G., saw J.G. "once in a while," and hardly saw E.M. She thought R.R. would "miss us" and be sad if she was adopted. Jose thought he would miss R.R. and that she would miss him. He thought both R.R. and J.G. would be sad. He did not see E.M. Ruby testified she had not seen R.R. lately. She missed R.R. and thought she would be sad if she were adopted. She thought the same about J.G. and E.M. She did not think J.G. or E.M. would miss mother. And Luis thought he would miss R.R., whom he believed he saw once a week, and felt the same about J.G., although he had only seen E.M. once. The testimony of the four older children is somewhat suspect, in light of the record which indicates that visits with R.R. and J.G. were suspended sometime in the second half of 2016 and the hearing took place in February of 2017.
We find that the facts do not establish a significant period of time R.R., J.G. and especially E.M., lived with their older siblings or continued to have shared experiences with them such that ongoing contact with them would be in their best interest or that there would be any significant effect on their long-term emotional interest if parental rights were terminated. The fact that the older siblings would be sad if R.R., J.G. or E.M. were adopted or that they thought R.R., J.G. or E.M. would be sad does not compel a finding that R.R., J.G. or E.M. would suffer detriment sufficient to outweigh the benefits they would obtain through adoption. (In re L. Y. L. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 942, 952.) R.R., J.G. and E.M.'s levels of maturity were not adequately advanced to be able to experience more than the simplest level of a sibling bond. When weighed against the benefit to R.R., J.G. and E.M. of a secure, stable, and permanent home, the facts do not establish that termination of parental rights would substantially interfere with a sibling relationship.
As stated in In re I.R. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 201, 215, in which the appellate court reversed the juvenile court's finding that a sibling relationship applied, "the sibling exception is intended to preserve sibling relationships of deeper and greater significance than the ones here, where one of the siblings is too young to even understand that the minors are [his] siblings."
The record does not disclose substantial evidence that a close sibling bond existed or compelling evidence that termination would be detrimental to the minors based on the proffered exception. Since the juvenile court found R.R., J.G. and E.M. likely to be adopted and no facts support any option for a permanent plan other than adoption, reversal is required.
DISPOSITION
The orders of the juvenile court are reversed. The juvenile court is directed to vacate the section 366.26 hearing finding the sibling exception applicable and to enter orders terminating parental rights and placing R.R., J.G. and E.M. for adoption.
/s/_________
BLACK, J. WE CONCUR: /s/_________
DETJEN, ACTING P.J. /s/_________
PEÑA, J.
Judge of the Fresno Superior Court assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution. --------