Opinion
F076032
02-14-2018
In re VANESSA R. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. FRESNO COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ANNA M., Defendant and Appellant.
Janette Freeman Cochran, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Daniel C. Cederborg, County Counsel, and Brent C. Woodward, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. 16CEJ300321)
OPINION
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Fresno County. Brian M. Arax, Judge. Janette Freeman Cochran, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Daniel C. Cederborg, County Counsel, and Brent C. Woodward, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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INTRODUCTION
On November 1, 2016, the Fresno County Department of Social Services (department) filed a juvenile dependency petition pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 to remove five children from the custody of Anna M. (mother). An amended petition was filed on November 2, 2016. The petition alleged neglect caused by mother's chronic drug abuse, and it sought to have no reunification services for the mother under the bypass provisions of section 361.5, subdivision (b)(13).
All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise designated.
The children and their respective ages when the petition was filed are Vanessa R. (11 years old), Isaiah R. (nine years old), Miguel R. (eight years old), K.S. (three years old), and A.S. (17 months old). The children's fathers, M.R. and P.S., were not actively involved in the dependency proceedings and are not parties to this appeal; their parental rights were also terminated.
Mother executed a waiver of rights and admitted the allegations in the petition. At the jurisdiction/disposition hearing on February 8, 2017, the juvenile court obtained an express waiver of mother's right to contest the hearing, found the allegations in the amended petition true, and detained the children. The court further found the bypass provision set forth in section 361.5, subdivision (b)(13) applied and denied mother reunification services. The court ordered visitation.
The case proceeded to a hearing pursuant to section 366.26 on July 19, 2017. Mother filed a petition pursuant to section 388 to modify the order of the juvenile court denying reunification services. The juvenile court denied mother's section 388 petition, found the four youngest children adoptable, and determined Vanessa, the oldest child, would be under long-term guardianship with a maternal relative. The court terminated mother's parental rights to the four youngest children.
On appeal, mother contends the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying her petition pursuant to section 388. Mother further argues the juvenile court erred in declining to find the parent-child benefit and sibling relationship exceptions to adoption applicable. We find no error and affirm the orders of the juvenile court.
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
Initial Proceedings
Mother had a prior dependency action in Madera County in 2009 in which the juvenile court ordered drug treatment as a component of her case plan. Mother completed the case plan, remained drug-free, and successfully reunified with her children. Mother was able to maintain sobriety, however, for only one year after the first dependency action was dismissed. Mother began using methamphetamine off and on between 2010 and 2011, when she felt her drug use was out of control. Mother voluntarily enrolled into a residential care facility and completed a six-month program there in 2011. After another year and a half, mother relapsed again. She enrolled into a treatment program in 2014, but remained there only one month.
At the jurisdiction/disposition hearing, mother testified she had more relapses, could only stay away from methamphetamine for about two years at a time, and had used controlled substances off and on for the prior 17 years. Mother had been in four substance abuse programs and only completed one.
On September 30, 2016, law enforcement removed mother's children because they were home alone, with the older children caring for the younger ones. On that date, mother tested positive for methamphetamine. On October 3, 2016, the department initiated a voluntary family maintenance plan of services. Mother was to enroll immediately into a random drug-test program and was to take a drug test after the meeting. The children were to stay with a family member until a social worker approved the children's return to mother's care. Mother was not to care for the children while under the influence of drugs. Mother was to have assessments for mental health, an addiction severity evaluation with recommended treatment, parenting classes, and domestic violence evaluation with recommended treatment. By October 20th, the department conducted another team meeting because mother was not compliant with voluntary family maintenance services. Also, mother used methamphetamine on October 18th.
The department placed a hold on the minors pursuant to section 300 on October 28, 2016. The department received a new report that mother had left the children unattended without supervision. Law enforcement found mother under the influence of a controlled substance and further reported the residence had no utility services or running water. The residence was also filthy, with dirty dishes, trash, rotten food, a refrigerator full of spoiled food and bugs, and human feces on the floor. Mother admitted to the law enforcement officer she was under the influence of methamphetamine and had snorted a line two hours before law enforcement arrived; she tested positive for that substance. The youngest children did not have clean clothes. The children were detained.
On February 8, 2017, mother did not contest the allegations of neglect. Minors' counsel conceded the bypass provision in section 361.5, subdivision (b)(13) applied to mother. Mother's counsel argued the best-interests-of-the-children exception of section 361.5, subdivision (c) was applicable to mother and she should receive reunification services. The juvenile court found the allegations of neglect true and, further, the bypass provision of section 361.5, subdivision (b)(13) applied. The court denied services to mother and set the matter for a section 366.26 hearing.
Hearing on Petition for Modification and Permanency Planning
On May 5, 2017, mother filed a petition for modification of the juvenile court's earlier order denying her reunification services. The petition stated mother was participating in services she obtained on her own, including enrollment in substance abuse treatment, parenting classes, a SAFE group program, personal therapy, and enrollment in Alcoholics Anonymous/Narcotics Anonymous. Mother stated she understood her mistakes and took previous services for granted, but she now understood her addiction and had the tools to prevent further substance abuse. Mother further stated she believed reunification services were in her children's best interests.
Mother attached certificates to her petition indicating she had completed the orientation phase with Fresno First CalWorks Residential Program and had begun the 12-week SAFE group program at Marjaree Mason Center, which included a domestic violence safety plan. In her brief for the hearing, mother included letters from a mental health clinician indicating she had been attending individual therapy sessions since February 22, 2017, and since then was in a residential treatment program for addiction recovery. In her hearing brief, mother argued it was in her children's best interests for her to receive reunification services inasmuch as the children had formed strong bonds with her and also with each other.
The department's report pursuant to section 366.26 recommended permanent plans of adoption and termination of mother's parental rights for the four younger children and legal guardianship for Vanessa with relative caregivers. Mother consistently visited the two older boys once a week. Although she had twice weekly visitations for the two younger boys, she was inconsistent in making both those visitations. Mother visited all five children consistently once a week. Mother played with the children and her interactions were appropriate; she was affectionate with all of the children.
Vanessa had started seeing an individual therapist to deal with anxiety and sadness over what she had experienced. Vanessa remained fearful of mother's ex-boyfriend. Isaiah and Miguel were also seeing therapists to deal with depression and, in Miguel's case, posttraumatic stress disorder. Although Vanessa was specifically adoptable because her relative caregivers were willing to adopt her, Vanessa told the social worker she did not want to be adopted. The social worker found the two older boys, Isaiah and Miguel to be generally and specifically adoptable because their caregivers wanted to adopt them. K.S. and A.S. were both generally and specifically adoptable with a paternal aunt from another state as a prospective adoptive parent. All prospective adoptive parents and guardians agreed to provide postadoptive contact between the siblings and for mother. The prospective adoptive parents were also willing to provide contact through FaceTime and Facebook. Vanessa's caregivers were willing to facilitate one in-person visit a month, although they believed there would be more than minimal contact.
The department remained concerned about mother's ability to provide for the emotional and physical well-being of the children due to her lengthy history of substance abuse going back 17 years. Mother also had a long history of unhealthy relationships involving domestic violence. Mother's history included her inability to maintain safe living environments for the children. Isaiah and Miguel are thriving in their placement with their caregivers with a plan of adoption. Relatives were interested in adopting K.S. and A.S., but their current caregivers—who had been caring for them for the previous seven months—were willing to provide a backup plan of adoption. The social worker was concerned that Vanessa appeared to have been "parentified." All the siblings looked forward to visits with each other. The social worker did not find mother's parent/child relationship with any of the four boys was significant enough that severing it would be detrimental to the children or supersede their need for the stability provided by adoption. Also, the permanency and stability of adoption outweighed the sibling relationships of the four boys.
In an addendum report, the department noted mother had been participating in a residential drug treatment program for five months. The department, however, remained worried mother would continue her historic pattern of short-term sobriety before eventual relapse because mother had failed to demonstrate her ability to maintain sobriety for an extended time despite participating in and completing multiple substance abuse programs. The department concluded it would be not be detrimental to the four boys to sever mother's parental rights. The prospective adoptive parents remained committed to adopting all four boys.
The hearing on mother's petition for modification and the department's request to sever her parental rights to the four younger children pursuant to section 366.26 was held on July 19, 2017. Mother testified she had voluntarily participated in services including a domestic violence program at Marjaree Mason Center. She was attending NA/AA support groups three or four times a week and attending programs on nurturing parenting. Mother explained her circumstances were different because she was now paying attention in fine detail to her coping skills, and she was involved in a therapeutic community. The week before the hearing, mother had attended 44 hours of classes and was attending a personal therapy session each week. Mother was in an inpatient sobriety program and had been sober since February 16, 2017. Mother was paying attention in her classes and described herself as a sponge.
Mother was scheduled to finish her programing with Fresno First on August 21, 2017. She said Vanessa was excited to hear mother talking about her success in the program. Mother sought court-ordered reunification services. She believed she had learned how to better parent her children, and she was dealing with the past trauma she had suffered. Mother thought she had the tools to better assist her children with discipline and nurturing. She also believed it was in their best interests to be in a loving family with her as their parent, and reunification services would be the best thing for the children. Mother did not want her sons to be adopted.
Mother had supervised visitations with her children once a week for an hour. She believed an ongoing relationship between her and her children would be good for them because, although mother admitted she had made mistakes, she thought there were also good times when she was sober and able to be a parent. Mother explained the children were happy together, especially when they were not separated. Mother was concerned K.S. and A.S. would be adopted by a family living in another state far away. Mother was concerned her children, who always lived together, would now be separated. She described Vanessa as being her "mother hen" who always watched over her brothers and had a really good bond with them. Mother was concerned Vanessa would be alone.
The juvenile court observed the question concerning mother's section 388 petition was whether the circumstances had changed sufficiently under a preponderance of the evidence that it would be in the best interests of the children for mother to receive reunification services in order to reunify with the children. The court noted mother's history of child protective service referrals began in 2006 when she was 22 years old and continued throughout mother's adult life. Mother also began drug treatment programs in 2006. Mother completed a drug treatment program during her first dependency case, but thereafter struggled to maintain sobriety. The court found mother continued to relapse, and by her own testimony her longest period of sobriety was two years.
The court found mother failed to stabilize during voluntary family maintenance services and continued to use methamphetamine. The court was concerned Vanessa, Isaiah, and Miguel all required therapy to decrease symptoms of anxiety and depression. Miguel further suffered from posttraumatic stress disorder. The court found mother's five months of sobriety to be significant and wonderful, but noted she had not yet entered an aftercare program and had yet to achieve a permanent, stable drug-free lifestyle. The court concluded mother's circumstances were changing, but she had failed to change. The court denied mother's section 388 petition.
The juvenile court acknowledged mother loves her children, but she had failed them and this had led to the parentification of Vanessa. The court recognized the bond between mother and the children but also the damage she had done to them. The court found the children's need for permanency and stability at this stage of the proceedings favored adoption over parental rights. The court found mother's changing circumstances were tenuous against the children's need for security and the sense of belonging that a new family could offer. The court did not find the beneficial parent-child relationship applicable. The court also did not find the beneficial sibling relationship exception to adoption was applicable. The court ordered a guardianship for Vanessa. It found clear and convincing evidence the boys would be adopted and ordered adoption as the permanent plan for the boys and terminated mother's parental rights as to them.
DISCUSSION
I. Section 388 Petition
Mother contends the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying her section 388 petition. We disagree.
A petition to modify a juvenile court order under section 388 must allege facts showing new evidence or changed circumstances exist, and changing the court's order will serve the child's best interests. (§ 388, subd. (a).) The petitioner has the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.570(h)(1)(D).) In assessing the petition, the court may consider the entire history of the case. (In re Justice P. (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 181, 189.) We review the denial of a section 388 petition after an evidentiary hearing for abuse of discretion. (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318.) Where there is conflicting evidence, we reverse only if the evidence compels a finding for the appellant as a matter of law. (In re I.W. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1517, 1527-1529.)
The best interests of the child or children are of paramount consideration when, as here, a section 388 petition is brought after reunification services have been denied. (See In re Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 317.) In assessing the best interests of the child at this juncture, the juvenile court's focus is on the needs of the child for permanence and stability rather than the parent's interests in reunification. (In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 309.) "A petition which alleges merely changing circumstances and would mean delaying the selection of a permanent home for a child to see if a parent, who has repeatedly failed to reunify with the child, might be able to reunify at some future point, does not promote stability for the child or the child's best interests." (In re Casey D. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 38, 47.)
The "'escape mechanism'" provided by section 388 after reunification efforts have ceased is only available when a parent has completed a reformation before parental rights have been terminated. (In re Kimberly F. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 519, 528.) This is because, if a parent's circumstances have not changed sufficiently to permit placement of the child with that parent, reopening reunification "does not promote stability for the child or the child's best interests" when the child is otherwise adoptable. (In re Casey D., supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at p. 47.)
The juvenile court found mother's circumstances were changing but had not yet changed. The court was concerned mother's five months of sobriety was an inadequate track record given her history of 17 years of drug abuse. Mother had completed drug treatment programs in the past, only to relapse and continue to abuse methamphetamine. As the court noted, mother was not yet living outside the inpatient treatment facility and had not shown she could live on her own in a stable manner. Mother's visits with the children were supervised and of limited duration. Although mother was beginning to show insight into the causes of her addiction and its effects on her parenting skills, the court did not err or abuse its discretion in finding mother had not demonstrated sufficient changed circumstances.
Without dismissing or diminishing mother's accomplishments, her ability to maintain sobriety within the confines of a structured setting was nonetheless insufficient to demonstrate she had made sufficient inroads into her persistent substance abuse problem so that returning her children or resuming reunification services would be appropriate. (See In re C.J.W. (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 1075, 1081 [parents with extensive drug use history did not show changed circumstances where rehabilitation efforts were only three months old at time of § 366.26 hearing]; In re Cliffton B. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 415, 423 [seven months' sobriety does not constitute changed circumstance where parent has history of periods of sobriety and relapse]; In re Kimberly F., supra, 56 Cal.App.4th at p. 531, fn. 9 ["It is the nature of addiction that one must be 'clean' for a much longer period than 120 days to show real reform"].)
Mother's showing that her circumstances were changing was insufficient. (In re Casey D., supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at p. 49.) The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in finding mother failed to show a genuine change in circumstances that would merit considering resuming reunification services or placing her children with her. Accordingly, we need not reach the issue of whether it was also in the children's best interests to grant mother reunification services.
II. Parent-child Benefit Exception
Once reunification services are ordered terminated, the focus shifts to the needs of the children for permanency and stability. The burden is on the parent to prove changed circumstances. (In re Marilyn H., supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 309.) If the children are likely to be adopted, adoption is the norm. Indeed, the court must order adoption and its necessary consequence, termination of parental rights, unless one of the specified circumstances provides a compelling reason for finding termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child. (In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 53.)
Although section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B) acknowledges termination may be detrimental under specifically designated circumstances, a finding of no detriment is not a prerequisite to the termination of parental rights. (In re Jasmine D. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1347.) It is the parent's burden to show termination would be detrimental under one of the exceptions. There is a strong preference for adoption. (In re Zachary G. (1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 799, 809.)
There is a split of authority concerning the standard of review in this context. (See In re K.P. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 614, 621-622 & In re Bailey J. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1314-1315 [hybrid combination of substantial evidence and abuse of discretion standards; applying substantial evidence test to determine existence of a beneficial sibling relationship and the abuse of discretion test to whether that relationship constitutes a compelling reason for determining termination would be detrimental to the child]; In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 576 [substantial evidence test: "On review of the sufficiency of the evidence, we presume in favor of the order, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, giving the prevailing party the benefit of every reasonable inference and resolving all conflicts in support of the order"]; In re Jasmine D., supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 1351 [abuse of discretion test].) Mother recognizes the split of authority, but asserts, as does the department, our review should be for substantial evidence.
Under any of these standards of review, the practical differences between them are insignificant because they all give deference to the juvenile court's judgment. (See In re Jasmine D., supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 1351.) Evaluating the factual basis for the juvenile court's exercise of discretion is similar to analyzing the sufficiency of the evidence for the ruling. We give broad deference to the judge. The reviewing court should interfere only if under all the evidence viewed most favorably in support of the trial court's action, it finds no judge could reasonably have made the order. (Ibid.) Similarly, a substantial evidence challenge to the juvenile court's failure to find a beneficial parental relationship or a sibling relationship cannot succeed unless the undisputed facts establish the existence of those relationships, since such a challenge amounts to a contention the "undisputed facts lead to only one conclusion." (In re I.W., supra, 180 Cal.App.4th at p. 1529; see In re Bailey J., supra, 189 Cal.App.4th at p. 1314.)
To the extent we draw inferences from the record, we may do so only as to those legitimate inferences upholding the decision of the trial court. (In re Laura F. (1983) 33 Cal.3d 826, 833; In re Angelia P. (1981) 28 Cal.3d 908, 924.) We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the juvenile court's judgment, contradicted or uncontradicted, and in assessing the evidence, we do not reweigh it. (In re Shelley J. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 322, 329.) Where there is a conflict in the evidence, we indulge all reasonable inferences in support of the trial court's finding. (In re Brison C. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1373, 1378-1379; In re Joshua H. (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 1718, 1728.)
For the section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) exception to apply, the relationship between parent and child must promote the well-being of the child to such a degree that it outweighs the well-being of the child in a permanent home with adoptive parents. The juvenile court balances the strength and quality of the natural parent-child relationship in a tenuous placement against the security and sense of belonging a new family would confer. If severing the natural parent-child relationship would deprive the child of a substantial and positive emotional attachment so that the child would be greatly harmed, the preference for adoption is overcome and the natural parent's rights are not terminated. (In re Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575.)
Interactions between the natural parent and child will always confer some incidental benefit to the child. The significant attachment from child to parent results from the adult's attention to the child's needs for physical care, comfort, affection, and stimulation. The relationship arises from day-to-day interaction, companionship, and shared experiences. The exception applies only where the court finds regular visits and contact have continued or developed a significant, positive, emotional attachment from child to parent. (In re Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575.)
The factors to consider when testing whether a parental relationship is important and beneficial include the age of the child, the portion of the child's life in the parent's custody, the positive or negative effect of interaction between the parent and child, and the child's particular needs. The relationship must be such that the child would suffer detriment from its termination. (In re Angel B. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 454, 467.) Mother failed to show how the children would suffer detriment on the termination of parental rights.
The juvenile court and the parties noted it was uncontested mother loved her children and had positive visits with them. These positive qualities, however, are not enough to establish the statutory exception to adoption. The parent bears the burden of showing more than loving contact and pleasant visits. (In re L.Y.L. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 942, 953-954.) The parent has the burden of proving the statutory exception applies. (In re Breanna S. (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 636, 646.) Although day-to-day contact is not necessarily required, it is typical. A biological parent who has failed to reunify with an adoptable child may not derail adoption merely by showing the child would derive some benefit from continuing the parent-child relationship during periods of visitation. (In re Jason J. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 922, 937.) Mother needed to demonstrate she occupied a parental role in her children's lives resulting in a significant, positive, emotional attachment from child to parent. (In re Breanna S., supra, at p. 648.)
Here, the evidence mother occupied this crucial role in her children's lives was wanting. (In re L.Y.L., supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at p. 954.) Indeed, if anyone filled the role of parent to the four boys, it was Vanessa, who is herself a child. The juvenile court correctly noted mother's conduct had parentified Vanessa in an inappropriate way, necessitating psychological therapy for the child. The two older boys were also receiving therapy caused not only by mother's drug use and abusive relationships, but by her neglect of all five children. Mother has failed to show detriment or harm if the parent-child relationship ended. (In re Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575.) We agree with the department; there was insufficient evidence from mother demonstrating the benefits of maintaining the parent-child relationship would outweigh the benefits to the children of adoption.
III. Sibling Relationship Exception
At a hearing held pursuant to section 366.26, a juvenile court must make one of four possible alternative permanent plans for a minor child. The permanent plan preferred by the Legislature is adoption. If the court finds the child is adoptable, it must terminate parental rights absent circumstances under which it would be detrimental to the child. (In re Ronell A. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1352, 1368.)
There are statutory exceptions permitting the juvenile court, in exceptional circumstances, to choose an option other than adoption. (In re C.B. (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 102, 122.) One statutory exception to adoption applies when "[t]he parents have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship." (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) Another statutory exception to adoption applies when "[t]here would be substantial interference with a child's sibling relationship, taking into consideration the nature and extent of the relationship, including, but not limited to, whether the child was raised with a sibling in the same home, whether the child shared significant common experiences or has existing close and strong bonds with a sibling, and whether ongoing contact is in the child's best interest, including the child's long-term emotional interest, as compared to the benefit of legal permanence through adoption." (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(v).)
The parent has the burden of producing evidence to establish the existence of the parent-child beneficial relationship or sibling relationship exception to adoption. (In re K.P., supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 621; In re Lorenzo C. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1330, 1343-1345.) Once the juvenile court finds a parent has met his or her burden to establish the requirements of the exception, the juvenile court may choose a permanent plan other than adoption if it finds the beneficial parent-child or sibling relationship to be "a compelling reason for determining that termination would be detrimental to the child." (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B).)
When the juvenile court finds the parent has not met his or her burden of producing evidence establishing the existence of the beneficial parent-child relationship or sibling relationship exception, our review is the same as in evaluating the parent-child benefit exception. (See In re I.W., supra, 180 Cal.App.4th at p. 1528; In re Breanna S., supra, 8 Cal.App.5th at p. 647.) "When the juvenile court concludes the benefit to the child derived from preserving parental rights is not sufficiently compelling to outweigh the benefit achieved by the permanency of adoption, we review that determination for abuse of discretion." (In re Breanna S., at p. 647; see In re K.P., supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at pp. 621-622.)
In evaluating the applicability of the sibling relationship exception, the juvenile court "is directed first to determine whether terminating parental rights would substantially interfere with the sibling relationship." (In re L.Y.L., supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at pp. 951-952; see In re Daisy D. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 287, 293 [exception applies only when adoption would result in a substantial interference with children's' sibling relationship(s)].) "If the court determines terminating parental rights would substantially interfere with the sibling relationship, the court is then directed to weigh the child's best interest in continuing that sibling relationship against the benefit the child would receive by the permanency of adoption." (In re L.Y.L., at p. 952.) "The sibling relationship exception 'permits the trial court to consider possible detriment to the child being considered for adoption, but not a sibling of that child.'" (In re D.M. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 283, 291.) It is a "rare" case in which the court will find this exception to adoption applies, particularly when the proceedings concern a young child whose needs for a competent, caring and stable parent are paramount. (In re Valerie A. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 987, 1014.)
There is no doubt all five children had strong sibling bonds. The question, however, is whether those bonds supersede the needs of the boys for stable and nurturing parental bonds. The juvenile court's conclusion the sibling relationship did not overcome the children's need for permanency was established by substantial evidence. Furthermore, mother acknowledges in her opening brief that all of the caretakers had agreed to ongoing contact between the children. Although the two youngest boys were going to adoptive parents in a neighboring state, they were being adopted by relatives who presumably would bring the children into more frequent contact. Also, the relatives agreed to maintain Internet contact between the children. Thus, there is little or no evidence the sibling relationships would end.
It is the parent's burden to establish there would be substantial interference with the sibling relationship. (In re D.O. (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 166, 176.) Since mother presented no evidence termination of parental rights would substantially interfere with the minors' sibling relationship, and the evidence does not otherwise compel a finding in favor of mother on this point, the juvenile court did not err in declining to apply the sibling relationship exception to adoption based on mother's failure of proof. Even if, however, the termination of parental rights would substantially interfere with the relationship shared by the siblings, the juvenile court would not have abused its discretion in concluding the benefits of continuing the sibling relationship did not outweigh the benefits of a permanent home for the minors through adoption. (In re Celine R., supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 61.) The juvenile court's determination was not beyond the bounds of reason. (In re Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp. 318-319.)
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court's orders denying mother's section 388 petition, selecting guardianship as the long-term plan for Vanessa, finding adoption as the long-term plan for the four boys, and terminating mother's parental rights to the four boys are affirmed.
/s/_________
PEÑA, J. WE CONCUR: /s/_________
GOMES, Acting P.J. /s/_________
DETJEN, J.