Opinion
E067291
03-02-2017
In re D.P. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. D.T., Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF RIVERSIDE COUNTY, Respondent; RIVERSIDE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SOCIAL SERVICES, Real Party in Interest.
Phillip Malisos, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Petitioner. Gregory P. Priamos, County Counsel, James E. Grown, Guy B. Pittman and Julie Koons Jarvi, Deputy County Counsel, for Real Party in Interest.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super.Ct.No. RIJ1200473) OPINION ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS; petition for extraordinary writ. Jacqueline C. Jackson, Judge. Petition denied. Phillip Malisos, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Petitioner. Gregory P. Priamos, County Counsel, James E. Grown, Guy B. Pittman and Julie Koons Jarvi, Deputy County Counsel, for Real Party in Interest.
PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND
D.P. was born in October 2007, and D.T. was born in April 2009. The family has a child welfare history. In 2009 real party in interest Riverside County Department of Public Social Services (the Department) received a referral indicating that mother left D.P. and D.T. (the children) home alone. The report also indicated that mother used controlled substances. The children were taken into protective custody and placed with father. Father was provided with sole legal and physical custody of the children. Dependency jurisdiction was terminated.
Petitioner Du.T. (father) stated the he was not D.P.'s biological father. However he was married to Da.T. (mother) and held himself out as D.P.'s father since D.P.'s birth. The Los Angeles Superior Court found father to D.P.'s presumed father.
In 2012 the Department received a 10-day referral regarding the family. It was discovered that father had an injury to the right side of his neck due to mother attempting to stab father with a pair of scissors. The children were present and witnessed the incident. The children were detained from mother and remained in father's care. Father was provided with family maintenance services. On January 3, 2013, jurisdiction was terminated, with father having sole custody of the children.
On August 8, 2013, an immediate response referral was received alleging general neglect and sexual abuse of the children. Mother was concerned that father was sexually abusing D.T. by becoming aroused while D.T. was sitting on father's lap. Mother reported that D.T. acted out sexually. Mother alleged that father penetrated D.T. with a toothbrush, but D.T. denied the allegations while being interviewed in front of father. D.P. stated that he witnessed the toothbrush incident. D.T. witnessed father "sock" mother in the face. It was subsequently reported that father was arrested for hitting mother. Mother admitted to past domestic violence.
The social worker informed mother that court intervention was necessary because mother and father (parents) engaged in domestic violence in front of the children. Court intervention was also necessary because father had sole physical custody of the children, but he was incarcerated. Moreover, mother had an extensive substance and mental health history.
On August 19, 2013, a Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 petition was filed on behalf of D.P. and D.T. The petition alleged that the children came under section 300, subdivisions (b) and (g). Both mother and father were named in the petition.
All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise specified.
On February 6, 2014, the juvenile court found true the b-1 through b-6 allegations in the petition. As to father, the court found that the parents engaged in domestic violence in the children's presence, and father had recently hit mother in the face resulting in his arrest. Father had a criminal history for arrests and/or convictions for "domestic violence, driving under the influence, possession of a loaded firearm, robbery, grand theft, resisting arrest, disorderly conduct, and prostitution." The court also found that father had a history with Los Angeles County and Riverside County children's services. Although father completed services, he allowed mother to reside in the home despite her continued drug use. The children were removed from parents' care. Father was provided with reunification services. Mother was denied services. Unsupervised day visits were authorized for father.
On April 2, 2014, father informed the social worker that he was living in a boarding home and working full time. Father was not in a relationship with anyone. He had been arrested in November 23, 2013, for driving under the influence, and pled guilty to a lesser charge. He was convicted on April 3, 2014, of reckless driving with alcohol or drugs; he was on summary probation for that conviction until April 2, 2017; and on summary probation for a domestic violence conviction until October 22, 2016. Father was not allowed to have any direct or indirect contact with mother. He had weekly supervised visits with the children.
On May 19, 2014, the juvenile court continued reunifications services for father.
On June 25, 2014, father informed the social worker that he was renting a room and looking for a job. He had unsupervised, whole-day visits on a weekly basis. The visits went well. On September 2, 2014, however, the Department received a referral with allegations against father. Therefore, the visits became supervised pending the outcome of the investigation.
D.T. had been diagnosed with having reactive attachment disorder and oppositional defiant disorder. She threw and destroyed objects in her foster home. She also had temper tantrums that lasted up to an hour. D.T. was in therapy, which appeared to be beneficial for her.
On November 14, 2014, the juvenile court continued reunification services for father. Visitation between father and the children was ordered to be "temporarily suspended." Further proceedings were set for January 12, 2015, for the consideration of visitation with father.
On November 24, 2014, a section 342 petition was filed alleging that D.P. came within the jurisdiction of the court under section 300, subdivisions (b) and (j), and D.T. came within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court under section 300, subdivisions (b) and (d).
The Department received a referral on September 14, 2014, stating that the children disclosed sexual abuse by father. The social worker interviewed the foster mother who stated D.T. had been acting out sexually and had severe temper tantrums. D.T. had disclosed to the foster mother that father inserted an object into her vagina, which caused her pain. D.T. reported being scared of father and did not want to visit with him.
The social worker interviewed D.T. She admitted that father "rubbed her genital area with an object onto her vagina." D.T. stated that the insertion was painful, and she asked father to stop. Father refused to stop and continued to insert the object into her vagina. D.P. witnessed the incident, which occurred once in father's home when D.T. was three years old. D.T. further disclosed during a RCAT interview that on multiple occasions, she would sit on father's lap while he was laying on the floor and "ride" him. D.T. stated that she would feel like her father was "poking" her. D.T. stated that mother would remove D.T. from father's lap. D.T. described to the social worker that she made noises of a sexual nature while she was on father.
D.P. admitted to the social worker that he witnessed father insert a toothbrush into D.T.'s vagina. In fact, father asked D.P. to retrieve the toothbrush from the bathroom. D.P. observed D.T. crying and telling father it was painful while father inserted the toothbrush. D.P. reported that the incident occurred two years earlier when he was five years old, and it happened once. D.P. also reported that father would have D.T. on his groin grinding on him. D.P. denied that father did anything sexually inappropriate to him.
The social worker interviewed mother. She stated that she had been sober from all substances for three days. During this interview, mother stated that she had no knowledge of father inserting any object into D.T.'s vagina. Mother admitted that father would place D.T. on his groin area while lying down and D.T. would make "groaning and screaming" sounds while grinding on him. Father would get an erection. This occurred multiple times a week since 2009, and mother would have to remove D.T. from father's groin.
On November 25, 2014, the juvenile court detained the children.
Father denied the allegations. He believed that mother made up the allegations as a way of gaining custody of the children. Father believed that mother was coaching the children regarding the allegations.
According to a sheriff's report, mother reported that D.T. disclosed father inserted a toothbrush handle into her vagina. Mother confronted father about D.T.'s disclosure and father denied the allegations. He called D.T. a liar and spit on mother's face. Mother grabbed scissors and stabbed father in the neck. Mother admitted to being under the influence of drugs and alcohol during the attack. The sheriff's report concluded that D.T. was inadvertently poked with a toothbrush with which she was masturbating when father grabbed the toothbrush from her hand. The police report concluded that father's actions were not criminal, and he did not intentionally harm D.T.
D.T. demonstrated being "hypersexual at her young age, flirting with every male and even inviting boys and girls to kiss and touch." D.T.'s therapist opined that these were signs of sexual abuse. On January 7, 2015, the therapist reiterated his position that visitation with father be suspended until further notice. On January 21 D.T.'s caretaker reported that D.T. continued to masturbate frequently. When D.T. was asked why she did this, she replied that she got it from father.
The therapist reported that D.T. remained negative about father and the exact nature of the sexual abuse could not be elicited from her. Since visitations were discontinued, there had been no major improvements in D.T.'s behavior. However, there was some progress in therapy. The therapist noted improvement in D.P.'s behavior since visitation had been discontinued.
On March 18, 2015, the juvenile court terminated father's services. The court found true the c-1 allegation in the amended section 342 petition and found that D.T. came within section 300, subdivision (c). The juvenile court also found true the j-1 allegation as to D.P. Father was provided with reunification services. The court authorized visitation between father and D.T. to occur in a therapeutic setting. The court authorized supervised visits between father and D.P. to occur no less than two times per week.
A child comes within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court under section 300, subdivision (c), if the "child is suffering serious emotional damage, or is at substantial risk of suffering serious emotional damage, evidenced by severe anxiety, depression, withdrawal, or untoward aggressive behavior toward self or others, as a result of the conduct of the parent or guardian or who has no parent or guardian capable of providing appropriate care."
After visitations with father resumed, the foster parents noted that D.P. had an increase in angry outbursts, tantrums, and mild to moderate property destruction. D.P. stated that during the reinstated visits with father, father asked D.P. to lie about D.T.'s report of alleged sexual abuse by father. D.P. stated that father told him to tell D.T. to recant what she had stated about being inappropriately touched by father. According to the therapist, D.P. appeared to be in distress regarding the conflict between visiting father and being asked to lie. During visits with father, D.P. appeared to be reliving the trauma of witnessing domestic violence as well as sexual abuse of D.T. by father. D.P. was diagnosed with having Post Traumatic Stress Disorder and ADHD. He was prescribed the medication Zoloft.
D.T. was diagnosed with having reactive attachment disorder and oppositional defiant disorder. She had been throwing and destroying objects in her foster home. Her case was assessed at Moreno Valley Children's Interagency Program. It was recommended that D.T. participate in the clinic for sexual abuse treatment because of her disclosure that she had been sexually abused by father. She had been attending treatment since the assessment. D.T. reported to her therapist that she felt scared because D.P. told her that father asked D.P. to ask D.T. to change her story regarding the sexual abuse. D.T. expressed sadness because her brother received presents from father but she did not. She appeared to be benefitting from therapy as her temper tantrums decreased. She continued to masturbate approximately three times per day, which was a reduction from approximately five times per day previously.
Father failed to follow through with a referral to attend individual therapy. He reported that he completed a domestic violence class but it was unclear if he had benefitted from the program. He did not follow through with a parenting class.
On July 20, 2015, the juvenile court authorized visits between father and D.T. with the therapist's approval. The court ordered an after-court visit between father and the children to be supervised by the social worker. After the hearing, the social worker supervised a visit. Father spent most of his time talking to D.P.; D.T. kept her distance from father.
D.T.'s therapist did not recommend that visitation between D.T. and father occur. D.T. consistently reported that she was fearful of father. She became tearful during her group therapy session while talking about the July 20, 2015, visit with father. D.T. did not like father hugging her, and she did not want to visit with him. Visits with father were not recommended because the visits would negatively impact D.T.'s mental health treatment.
On August 26, 2015, the juvenile court continued services to father. The court ordered visitation between father and D.T. to be in a therapeutic setting with the therapist's approval. The court ordered father to be referred for therapy as deemed necessary. The court authorized conjoint therapy for father and D.P., as deemed appropriate by the Department.
Father visited D.P. once a week for one hour on Fridays. The visits were closely supervised by the caregiver who reported that the visits were appropriate. On October 1, 2015, D.T.'s therapist reported to the social worker that D.T. still did not want to visit with father. The therapist opined against visitation between D.T. and father.
D.P. appeared to be benefitting from therapy. His tantrums had reduced, and he wet the bed only four times a week instead of seven. He continued to lie. D.T. continued to participate in the clinic sexual abuse treatment group. D.T. also appeared to benefit from therapy; her temper tantrums decreased, and she followed instructions and house rules.
According to the 12-month status review report, father resided in a shelter and was employed. He was making progress in his case plan. He had been referred to individual counseling, but had not yet completed the program. He attended parenting and domestic violence services, but did not provide any completion certificates. Father did not believe he needed counseling because he previously saw two therapists and stated that the sexual allegations against him came back unfounded.
D.P. continued to take Zoloft on a daily basis, and to benefit from therapy. D.T. benefitted from therapy as well. She continued in treatment to learn how sexual abuse happened in her family and to learn adaptive skills to help manage feelings related to her sexual abuse and disclosure. D.T. still masturbated approximately twice a day. She opened up more in group therapy and willingly talked about what happened to her.
On February 9, 2016, the social worker received a discharge summary from father's therapist. Father saw the therapist only three times, and maintained his innocence from the sexual abuse allegations. The therapist attempted to contact father several times from October 2015 to February 2016.
D.T. continued to state she did not want to visit with father. The therapist did not recommend visitation without knowing whether father had made progress in his own mental health treatment to be able to provide D.T. with "messages that promote healthy emotional development." The therapist opined that visitation should occur when it was in the child's best interest.
On March 23, 2016, the juvenile court continued reunification services to father and set an 18-month review hearing. The court authorized day visits between father and D.P. The court then authorized father's therapist and D.T.'s therapist to share information and/or treatment recommendations. The court also authorized visits between D.T. and father to occur in a therapeutic setting, and under supervision. Father's case plan called for him to participate in individual counseling to address the issues that brought the family to the attention of the Department and court, "including sexual abuse." Father was also ordered to participate in parenting and domestic violence classes. Father visited with D.P. on a weekly basis for six hours. The visits were not supervised and reportedly went well.
The social worker met with father and the therapist at the therapist's office. At the meeting, the social worker and therapist explained to father that it was "imperative for him to participate in general counseling to address the issues, including but not limited to sexual abuse, that brought the family to the attention of the Department and the Court." The social worker shared with father that D.T. was consistent in her story that father sexually molested her, and therefore she was in treatment for it. Father was adamant that he did not need therapy, and wanted the social worker to produce the police reports that exonerated him from sexual allegations by D.T. It was explained to father that D.T. believed that he had sexually molested her and she behaved as a sexual abuse victim. The social worker informed father that without his acknowledgment of D.T.'s feelings, visitation was harming to D.T. and reunification could not happen.
On May 4, 2016, father's therapist reported that father had made progress in terms of "forming a stronger working alliance with the therapist." Father's therapist had spoken with D.T.'s therapist, who informed father's therapist that D.T. had been consistent in stating she was molested, was afraid of father, and did not want to see him. This information made father's therapist very concerned about the seriousness of the matter, and the therapist consulted with a clinical and forensic psychologist regarding possible treatment plans. Father's therapist planned to remain the primary therapist while consulting with the psychologist. Father continued to believe that he did not need therapy to address issues of sexual abuse.
On May 9, 2016, the social worker referred D.T. for individual and family therapy. After review and consultation, it was determined that family psychotherapy was not clinically appropriate at that time. It was contraindicated for a victim of sexual abuse due to safety issues of the victim. The issues needed to be addressed individually prior to family counseling. D.T. was not ready to participate in family therapy because she refused to have contact with father. The clinical recommendation was to have D.T. continue to participate in group and individual therapy.
D.P. remained defiant at home and school. He intentionally urinated on the floor in his room when angry and would fight with other children. He was reauthorized for treatment services.
On May 19, 2016, a contested review hearing was set. An ICPC was ordered for the State of Pennsylvania with the maternal grandmother for possible placement of the children with her.
The social worker received a progress report from father's therapist on July 5, 2016. The social worker discussed the matter with father's therapist, and the therapist stated that she had discussed the treatment goals with father. On the same day, the social worker faxed a minute order to D.T.'s therapist; the order authorized father's therapist to coordinate a treatment plan. D.T.'s therapist continued to not recommend family psychotherapy because of D.T.'s consistent statements that father molested her and she did not want to see him.
A contested 18-month review hearing was held. The social worker, Jonah Anguka, testified. Anguka stated that he did not read the amended section 342 petition. Another social worker had been assigned to and investigated the section 342 petition. Anguka spoke with the investigation social worker regarding the section 342 petition. Anguka testified it was his understanding father sexually molested D.T. based on her "persistent statements" of molestation. Anguka did not receive a police report.
Anguka testified that father completed domestic violence classes. He did not receive a certificate or statement stating that father completed individual counseling. Anguka provided a referral for counseling to father. He stated that the only document given to father's therapist was the jurisdictional/dispositional report for the section 342 petition. Anguka also had a discussion with father's therapist. In father's presence, Anguka discussed D.T.'s disclosures. In therapy, father was to discuss with his therapist about D.T.'s disclosures.
Anguka testified that he discussed the matter with D.T.'s therapists. Anguka did not provide any documentation, reports, or petitions to any of D.T.'s therapists because D.T. had disclosed the information directly to the therapist. Anguka followed up to see that D.T. received the treatment that she needed.
Father had addressed the issues of domestic violence and parenting with a prior therapist, but he still needed to address D.T.'s disclosures of sexual abuse. This was the reason for referring father to his most recent therapist. Although father attended therapy, this was the one part of his case plan that he failed to complete.
When asked why D.P. could not go home with father, Anguka testified that the case was looked at in "a totality. At no point have we separated the children. We looked at the case for both children." Anguka also testified that he was concerned that father had not completed individual therapy. He stated that it was in the best interests of both children if father successfully completed individual counseling.
Anguka testified that father's case plan components were domestic violence; parenting; and individual counseling, which included sexual abuse. Anguka stated that sexual abuse needed to be addressed because D.T. consistently indicated that she had been abused. In this case, sexual abuse had not been addressed by father. According to D.T.'s therapist, therapy between D.T. and father was not advisable until father completed his individual therapy. According to D.T.'s therapist, father would not be able to deal with D.T.'s emotional health if he failed to adequately address the sexual abuse. Anguka was not asking that father be treated as a perpetrator of sexual abuse. In order for counseling to have been considered complete, it was not necessary for father to make any admission that he had been sexually inappropriate with D.T.
On November 21, 2016, D.P. told the social worker that father kept asking him to tell D.T. that he loved her. Father did this even though he had been admonished by the juvenile court from talking to D.P. about the case. The social worker testified that based on father talking to D.P. about the case, it appeared that father did not benefit from therapy. The social worker believed it would harm D.P. to be separated from D.T. This was based on the children always having resided together as well as the social worker's observations of the children. The children were "very, very close" to each other. Anguka testified that father stated in counseling that he did not want the children separated, and he believed that it would not be in their best interests to be separated.
Anguka testified about meeting with father and father's therapist at the therapist's office on April 22, 2016. At the meeting, Anguka informed father it was imperative for father to participate in general counseling, which included sexual abuse. Anguka explained to father the need to do the counseling, and make progress and benefit in order for him to have therapeutic visits or counseling with D.T. Since that meeting, father never complained to Anguka regarding his counseling, about whether father's needs were being adequately addressed.
On November 28, 2016, the juvenile court terminated reunification services and set a section 366.26 hearing. The court found that reasonable services were provided and there was no substantial probability of return based on "how the last set of services went." The court ordered no visitation between D.T. and father. Father was granted supervised visits with D.P. twice monthly. The court authorized the children to be placed with the maternal grandmother in Pennsylvania; the ICPC had been approved.
On November 29, 2016, father filed a notice of intent to file a writ petition. On January 25, 2017, father filed his petition for extraordinary writ.
DISCUSSION
In his writ petition, father contends that substantial evidence does not support the court's finding that reasonable services were offered to father, and the finding of detriment to return the children to father. For the reasons set forth below, we deny father's writ and affirm the juvenile court.
A. SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT REASONABLE SERVICES WERE OFFERED TO FATHER
Father contends that the juvenile court's finding that reasonable services were provided to father is not supported by substantial evidence.
When a finding that reunification services were adequate is challenged on appeal, an appellate court reviews it for substantial evidence. (Melinda K. v. Superior Court (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 1147, 1158.) "[W]ith regard to the sufficiency of reunification services, our sole task on review is to determine whether the record discloses substantial evidence which supports the juvenile court's finding that reasonable services were provided or offered." (Angela S. v. Superior Court (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 758, 762.) "We must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the department and indulge all legitimate and reasonable inferences to uphold the order." (Mark N. v. Superior Court (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 996, 1010.) "The adequacy of the reunification plan and of the department's efforts to provide suitable services is judged according to the circumstances of the particular case." (Id. at p. 1011.)
"'In almost all cases it will be true that more services could have been provided more frequently and that the services provided were imperfect. The standard is not whether the services provided were the best that might be provided in an ideal world, but whether the services were reasonable under the circumstances.'" (In re Julie M. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 41, 48.)
In this case, as provided in detail above, the records shows that reasonable services were provided to father. On March 18, 2015, the juvenile court found true the c-1 and j-1 allegations in the amended section 342 petition, and defendant was provided with reunification services. On March 23, 2016, the court continued reunification services to father and set an 18-month review hearing. On April 8, 2016, the Department filed an Ex Parte Application and Order to Approve a Case Plan. The case plan called for father to participate in family and group counseling with the children as deemed necessary by the therapist. Father's responsibilities were to participate in a parenting class and general counseling, where he would "address the issues that brought the family to the attention of the Department and Court including sexual abuse." Father completed both a parenting and domestic violence class.
Here, the main concern with father's services was therapy to address the sexual abuse allegations. Father had previously been referred to individual therapy on April 8, 2015, but he failed to follow through with the program. Father was re-referred to therapy on March 23, 2016. On April 5, 2016, father was given the referral, which he signed.
On April 22, 2016, the social worker, Anguka met with father and his therapist in the therapist's office. Anguka provided the therapist with the jurisdiction report for December 18, 2014, regarding sexual abuse allegations made against father by D.T. At the meeting, the therapist and Anguka explained to father that it was imperative for him to participate in counseling to address the issues that brought the family to the dependency system, which included sexual abuse. Father was informed that the court had authorized his therapist and D.T.'s therapist to share information and treatment recommendations. Anguka shared with father that D.T. was consistent in her story that father sexually molested her. Father wanted Anguka to produce the police report that exonerated father from the sexual abuse allegations. Father was told that D.T. believed father sexually molested her and she exhibited behaviors of a sexual abuse victim. Anguka explained that visitation was harmful to D.T. without father's acknowledgement of her feelings. Without this acknowledgment and having good quality visitation, father was told that reunification may not happen.
On May 9, 2016, the social worker referred D.T. for individual and family therapy; however, after consultation, it was determined that family psychotherapy was not clinically appropriate at that time. On July 5, 2016, the social worker faxed to D.T.'s therapist a copy of the court's order authorizing father's therapist to coordinate a treatment plan. D.T.'s therapist continued to recommend no family therapy.
In his writ petition, father suggests that Anguka was unaware or did not understand what issues needed to be addressed because he did not read the section 342 petition or the police report. According to the record, however, another social worker was previously assigned to this case and investigated the section 342 petition. Anguka had conversations with the investigating social worker about the section 342 petition. Moreover, Anguka discusses with the parents what was required and what was needed to address the issues that brought the family into the dependency system.
Father misstates the evidence and asserts that the social worker provided services to him as if father had been the perpetrator of sexual abuse. In the record, however, Anguka testified that he specifically was not asking father be treated as a perpetrator of sexual abuse. The following exchange took place between Anguka and father's counsel:
"[Counsel:] Understanding that [D.T.] made the disclosure, were you asking the father to be treated as a perpetrator of sexual abuse.
"[Anguka:] No, no.
"[Counsel:] Just to address [D.T.'s] issues; correct?
"[Anguka:] Correct.
"[Counsel:] So in order for Father's individual therapy to be completed, it wouldn't be necessary for him to make any admissions that he has been sexually inappropriate with [D.T.]; correct?
"[Anguka:] No, no.
"[Counsel:] So that was not the result you were seeing in counseling; is that correct?
"[Anguka:] No.
"[The Court:] 'No,' that is not correct; or 'no,' that is not what you were seeking?
"[Anguka:] That is not what I was seeking."
The evidence, therefore, shows that the social worker did not provide services to father as if he was a perpetrator of sexual abuse. Anguka testified that sexual abuse needed to be dealt with because D.T. consistently indicated that she had been abused.
In arguing that substantial evidence did not support that services were reasonable, father asserts that D.T. had "been given a false memory of an inappropriate act by her father that did not occur." Father asserts that D.T.'s therapist was given incorrect information and therefore was unable to treat the underlying issues. Father, however, fails to present any evidence to indicate that D.T. had been given a "false memory." In fact, D.T. consistently indicated the sexual abuse that occurred between father and D.T. D.P. also indicated that he witnessed the toothbrush incident between father and D.T., and that father told D.P. to ask D.T. to lie about the incident. Moreover, there was evidence that father would place D.T. on his groin area where she would grind on him, resulting on father having an erection. D.T. disclosed that on multiple occasions, she would sit on father's lap while he was on the floor and she would "ride" him. D.T. stated that she would feel father poking her. D.T. described to the social worker that she made noises of a sexual nature while she was on father. D.T.'s therapy was based on her disclosure that she had been abused by father. Father was told on numerous occasions that he needed to discuss the disclosures in his own therapy sessions.
Father never asserted in the juvenile court at earlier hearings that services were inappropriate or inadequate. If father had felt that the services offered to him were inadequate, "[he] had the assistance of counsel to seek guidance from the juvenile court in formulating a better plan: '"The law casts upon the party the duty of looking after his legal rights and of calling the judge's attention to any infringement of them. If any other rule were to obtain, the party would in most cases be careful to be silent as to his objections until it would be too late to obviate them, and the result would be that few judgments would stand the test of an appeal."'" (In re Christina L. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 404, 416.)
Here, the Department's counsel stated at the hearing that there had been numerous hearings within the prior six months, and not once did father raise the issue of reasonable services. Father never argued throughout the many hearings that he was not receiving appropriate services. In fact, the evidence shows that father was referred and re-referred to counseling. The social worker spoke with father and his therapist as to what was needed to be worked on in therapy. The social worker attempted to coordinate communication between father's therapist and D.T.'s therapist. Again, "'In almost all cases it will be true that more services could have been provided more frequently and that the services provided were imperfect. The standard is not whether the services provided were the best that might be provided in an ideal world, but whether the services were reasonable under the circumstances.'" (In re Julie M., supra, 69 Cal.App.4th at p. 48.)
Based on the above, we find substantial evidence supports the juvenile court's finding that services provided to father were reasonable.
B. SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE JUVENILE COURT'S FINDING OF DETRIMENT
Father contends that substantial evidence does not support the finding of detriment to return D.P. to father.
Section 366.22, subdivision (a), provides in relevant part: "the court shall order the return of the child to the physical custody of his or her parent or legal guardian unless the court finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the return of the child to his or her parent or legal guardian would create a substantial risk of detriment to the safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the child. The social worker shall have the burden of establishing that detriment. . . . The failure of the parent or legal guardian to participate regularly and make substantive progress in court-ordered treatment programs shall be prima facie evidence that return would be detrimental. In making its determination, the court shall review and consider the social worker's report and recommendations and . . . the efforts or progress, or both, demonstrated by the parent . . . ." (§ 366.22, subd. (a), italics added.)
"Appellate justices review a respondent court's decision after a section 366.22 ruling as follows: 'Evidence sufficient to support the court's finding "must be 'reasonable in nature, credible, and of solid value; it must actually be "substantial" proof of the essentials which the law requires in a particular case.'" [Citation.] "Where, as here, a discretionary power is inherently or by express statute vested in the trial judge, his or her exercise of that wide discretion must not be disturbed on appeal except on a showing that the court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice. [Citations.]" [Citations.]' [Citations.] In the presence of substantial evidence, appellate justices are without the power to reweigh conflicting evidence and alter a dependency court determination." (Constance K. v. Superior Court (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 689, 705.)
In this case, substantial evidence supports the juvenile court's ruling that returning D.P. to father's care would create a substantial risk of detriment to D.P.'s safety, protection, or physical or emotional wellbeing. Here, father made adequate but incomplete progress on his case plan. Also, the evidence showed that father did not benefit from therapy. On June 24, 2016, D.P. reported to the social worker that father kept asking D.P. to tell D.T. to tell the social worker that she wanted to visit with father. Father asked this of D.P. even though father had already been admonished by the court from talking to D.P. about the case. Father had not demonstrated insight of new skills to assist him in providing the children with a safe and stable home and family life. His failure to successfully participate in services placed the children at risk of physical and emotional harm.
The social worker believed that it would harm D.P. to be separated from D.T. This was based on the children always having lived together, as well as the social worker's observations of the children. The children were "very, very close" to each other. Even father stated in counseling that he did not want the children separated, and he believed that it would not be in their best interests to be separated. Moreover, D.P. was not returned to father's care not only because the Department did not want to separate the children, but also because father failed to complete his counseling, as ordered by the court.
Based on the above, we find that substantial evidence supports the juvenile court's finding that the return of D.P. to father's custody would create a substantial risk of detriment to him.
DISPOSITION
The petition is denied.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
MILLER
J. We concur: HOLLENHORST
Acting. P. J. SLOUGH
J.