Opinion
A148671
05-03-2017
In re K.L. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. CONTRA COSTA COUNTY CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES BUREAU, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CESAR L., Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
(Contra Costa County Super. Ct. No. J16-00002)
K.L.'s paternal grandfather (grandfather) repeatedly sexually abused her over a four-year period. Her father, Cesar L. (father), knew of the abuse and did not stop it. Instead, he continued to allow grandfather access to K.L. A juvenile court determined then eight-year-old K.L. came within Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (d); at a dispositional hearing, the court denied father reunification services and ordered "no contact or visitation between father" and K.L.
Unless noted, all further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code. This opinion omits information about K.L.'s mother, who is not a party on appeal, and information about grandfather's sexual abuse of other victims.
Father appeals. He claims the court erred by ordering no contact with K.L. We disagree and affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In early 2016 — when K.L. was eight — the Contra Costa County Children & Family Services Bureau (Bureau) filed a section 300, subdivision (d) petition; as amended, the petition alleged grandfather began sexually abusing K.L. when she was four years old and that grandfather committed "multiple acts of sexual abuse" against her, including vaginal and anal penetration. The petition further alleged father knew of the abuse, failed to protect K.L., and allowed grandfather access to K.L. even after she informed father "on many occasions that she was being sexually abused on an ongoing basis." The court detained K.L. and placed her in foster care.
K.L. confirmed the abuse in interviews with a social worker and a sexual assault response team nurse. K.L. told the social worker the abuse often happened while father was present, asleep. On several occasions, K.L. " 'told [her] dad' " what grandfather was doing, but he "said to 'forget about it' and 'to be quiet.' " K.L. told father about the sexual assaults because " 'your dad is supposed to protect you.' " The medical examination conclusively established K.L. "ha[d] been sexually abused." Police officers arrested father. In a police interview, father admitted knowing grandfather was abusing K.L.; he did not "call the police because he was afraid [grandfather] might get in trouble." Father did not tell grandfather to stop abusing K.L. — he felt he was in a " 'tough situation' " because he and K.L. were living with grandfather and they had nowhere else " 'to go.' "
At the conclusion of the jurisdictional hearing, the court determined K.L. came within section 300, subdivision (d). The Bureau's dispositional report recommended bypassing reunification services pursuant to section 361.5, subdivision (b)(6) based on father's knowledge grandfather was sexually assaulting K.L. and his "conscious and informed decision to protect [grandfather] and not his daughter." The Bureau also recommended no visitation or contact between father and K.L. but noted K.L. "appears to have [a] main attachment" toward father. Father was "incarcerated pending criminal charges."
At the June 2016 dispositional hearing, counsel for father objected to the recommended denial of reunification services, arguing K.L. was "attached" to father and "loves him very much." Counsel also objected to the recommended denial of visitation and the no-contact order, claiming there was no evidence "contact would be detrimental to [K.L.]." Counsel for K.L. disagreed and argued it would not be in K.L.'s best interest to have visits with father, noting "I don't believe she wants to see her father."
At the conclusion of the dispositional hearing, the court denied reunification services (§ 361.5, subd. (b)(6)). The court also found visitation and contact with father would be highly detrimental to K.L. and ordered no contact or visitation. As the court explained, contact between K.L. and father would be "highly detrimental to her in light of what brought this child before the Court. . . . [T]here's more than ample evidence. Also, father does await trial on rather serious charges relating to his failure to protect his child from the extensive sexual abuse that she suffered at the hands of . . . grandfather; which father, in his own words, admitted that he knew what was going on." The court noted the Bureau or K.L.'s counsel could file a section 388 petition if K.L.'s therapist determined contact with father would be no longer be detrimental.
We grant the Bureau's unopposed request for judicial notice of various documents issued in father's criminal case, including a protective order prohibiting him from contacting K.L. until January 2019, and an abstract of judgment showing father pled guilty to two counts of a lewd or lascivious act on a child under 14 (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a)) and was sentenced to state prison. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d); 459, subd. (a).) We decline the Bureau's request to dismiss the appeal as moot and consider the appeal on its merits.
DISCUSSION
A juvenile court has broad discretion to fashion dispositional orders, including orders regarding visitation, based on " 'what would best serve and protect the child's interest . . . .' " (In re Neil D. (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 219, 225.) As a result, "[a]n order setting visitation terms is generally reviewed for abuse of discretion." (Los Angeles County Dept. of Children & Family Services v. Superior Court (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 692, 699, fn. 6.) " 'The appropriate test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason. When two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, the reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision for that of the trial court.' " (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318-319.) An abuse of discretion does not occur unless the juvenile court " ' " ' "has exceeded the limits of legal discretion by making an arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd determination." ' " ' " (In re Tamneisha S. (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 798, 806.) "The abuse of discretion standard warrants that we apply a very high degree of deference to the decision of the juvenile court." (In re J.N. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 450, 459, italics added.)
Here, the court concluded contact with father would be "highly detrimental" to K.L. and ordered no contact between them. This conclusion was not an abuse of discretion. (See In re J.N., supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at p. 459 [no abuse of discretion in finding contact with mother would not be in child's best interest].) The undisputed evidence established father knew grandfather was sexually assaulting K.L.: she told father about the abuse because " 'your dad is supposed to protect you.' " Instead of protecting K.L. and stopping the abuse, father allowed grandfather to continue to sexually assault K.L. Father's knowing failure to protect K.L. from the sexual abuse led to his arrest and criminal prosecution. Ample evidence supports the court's determination that contact with father would be highly detrimental to K.L. (§ 361.5, subd. (f) [when court does not order reunification services, the court "may continue to permit the parent to visit the child unless it finds that visitation would be detrimental to the child"].) "On this record, the court's no-contact order is not arbitrary and capricious." (In re J.N., supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at p. 460.)
DISPOSITION
The dispositional order is affirmed.
/s/_________
Jones, P. J. We concur: /s/_________
Simons, J. /s/_________
Needham, J.