Opinion
Record No. 1989-92-2
April 12, 1994
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CHESTERFIELD COUNTY WILLIAM R. SHELTON, JUDGE
John B. Boatwright, III (Boatwright Linka, on brief), for appellant
Richard B. Smith, Assistant Attorney General (Stephen D. Rosenthal, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Present: Chief Judge Moon, Judges Coleman and Elder
Argued at Richmond, Virginia
Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not designated for publication.
Earl C. Person was charged and convicted by a jury of having committed petit larceny after having been previously "sentenced in the United States for larceny or any offense deemed larceny." Code § 19.2-297 (emphasis added). On appeal, Person argues that the trial court erred in allowing into evidence certified copies of his prior convictions, proof of which he had offered to stipulate, and that the court erred by failing to give the jury a cautionary instruction. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the conviction.
Person's counsel objected when the Commonwealth moved the court to admit into evidence two certified copies of orders from the Circuit Court of Henrico County and one certified copy of a misdemeanor arrest warrant from the General District Court of Chesterfield County to prove Person's three prior convictions for petit larceny. Defense counsel contended that these documents would disclose "irrelevant and prejudicial" information to the jury; namely, that the orders contained information regarding the dispositions, whether his attorney was appointed or retained, and times and dates of the offenses. The trial court overruled Person's objection. We hold that it plainly appears from the record this information was not prejudicial.
The Commonwealth, bearing the burden of proof, is entitled to prove its case by evidence that is relevant, competent and material. It is not obliged to enter into an agreement that precludes it from putting on its evidence simply because the defendant is willing to make a qualified stipulation.Hudson v. Commonwealth, 9 Va. App. 110, 112, 383 S.E.2d 767, 768 (1989); Pittman v. Commonwealth, ___ Va. ___, ___, 434 S.E.2d 694, 695-96 (1993).
In Hudson, this Court held that the trial court erred in allowing into evidence the defendant's conviction orders reflecting sentences because the Commonwealth was required to prove only the fact of a past conviction. Here, to meet its burden of proof, the Commonwealth needed to show that Person had been "before sentenced in the United States." Code § 19.2-297 (emphasis added). Accordingly, the trial court correctly admitted into evidence copies of orders showing Person's prior sentences so that the Commonwealth could prove its case in chief. Unlike in Hudson, the disposition (the sentence) here supplied proof of an element of the charge.
On appeal, Person now argues that the orders also revealed prejudicial information, such as the underlying nature of the crimes, his having entered guilty pleas, costs having been assessed, and his having received various suspended sentences. Because Person failed specifically to state these reasons for his objection to the orders at trial, he has waived these issues for appellate review. Rule 5A:18; O'Dell v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 672, 679, 364 S.E.2d 491, 495, cert. denied, 488 U.S. 871 (1988) (Court will not consider a different ground for objection on appeal than raised at trial). See Brown v. Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 126, 380 S.E.2d 8 (1989).
Finally, Person argues that the trial court failed to give the jury a cautionary instruction. The judge did give an instruction which told the jury that appellant's prior convictions could not be used as evidence that Person was guilty of "felony petit larceny." The record does not show that Person offered any other instruction or suggested that the instruction was incomplete. Therefore, the objection he raises on appeal is barred because it was not raised in the trial court. Rule 5A:18.
Affirmed.