Opinion
No. 3D21-2367
02-22-2023
Robert H. Yaffe, P.A., and Robert H. Yaffe ; Shutts & Bowen LLP, and Douglas M. Kramer ; Shutts & Bowen LLP, and Daniel Nordby (Tallahassee), for appellant. Duane Morris LLP, and Kevin E. Vance (Boca Raton); Duane Morris LLP, and Richard D. Shane, for appellee.
Robert H. Yaffe, P.A., and Robert H. Yaffe ; Shutts & Bowen LLP, and Douglas M. Kramer ; Shutts & Bowen LLP, and Daniel Nordby (Tallahassee), for appellant.
Duane Morris LLP, and Kevin E. Vance (Boca Raton); Duane Morris LLP, and Richard D. Shane, for appellee.
Before LOGUE, MILLER, and BOKOR, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Having carefully reviewed the language of the contract at issue under traditional rules of interpretation, Hahamovitch v. Hahamovitch, 174 So. 3d 983, 986 (Fla. 2015) ("Where a contract is clear and unambiguous, it must be enforced pursuant to its plain language."); Kel Homes, LLC v. Burris, 933 So. 2d 699, 703 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) ("[T]he use of different terms in paragraphs 24 and 28 tends to indicate that a different meaning was intended. As a general proposition, the use of different language in different contractual provisions strongly implies that a different meaning was intended."), we affirm the trial court's well-reasoned order granting summary judgment for Appellee.