Opinion
No. CV 99-0590484
June 19, 2001 CT Page 8015
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
On or about June 18, 1999, the plaintiff, Bishnu Persaud, filed this action against his employer, the defendant, Capewell Components Company, LLP (hereinafter, Capewell), alleging that Capewell intentionally injured him by requiring him to work with dangerous and defective machinery which it knew was substantially certain to cause injury. Capewell first filed its answer denying the allegations and then, on December 27, 2000, sought to intervene as a co-plaintiff, pursuant to the Workers' Compensation Act (hereinafter, the Act), General Statutes § 31-293. Capewell maintains that because the plaintiff's injuries arose in the course of his employment and it has paid sums of money pursuant to the Act, it is entitled to intervene.
General Statutes § 31-293 states in relevant part: "Liability of third persons to employer and employee. Limitations on liability of architects and engineers. Limitations on liability of insurers, self-insurance service organizations and unions relating to safety matters. (a) When any injury for which compensation is payable under the provisions of this chapter has been sustained under circumstances creating in a person other than an employer who has complied with the requirements of subsection (b) of section 31-284, a legal liability to pay damages for the injury, the injured employee may claim compensation under the provisions of this chapter, but the payment or award of compensation shall not affect the claim or right of action of the injured employee against such person, but the injured employee may proceed at law against such person to recover damages for the injury; and any employer or the custodian of the Second Injury Fund, having paid, or having become obligated to pay, compensation under the provisions of this chapter may bring an action against such person to recover any amount that he has paid or has become obligated to pay as compensation to the injured employee."
The plaintiff objects to this motion essentially arguing that the above referenced section and intervention mechanism does not apply to actions by an employee against an employer. This court agrees. The legislature authorized suits by an employee against "a person other than an employer" only and further allowed an employer such as Capewell, who has paid compensation under the Act, to bring a suit "against such person." See General Statutes § 37-293 (a); see also Chotkowski v. State, 240 Conn. 246, 277, 690 A.2d 368 (1997) ("Our rules of statutory construction are clear. If words of a statute are clear, the duty of a reviewing court is to apply the legislature's directive. . . . `Where [a] statute presents no ambiguity, we need look no further than the words themselves which we assume express the intention of the legislature.'"). Capewell, as the employer, cannot bring suit against itself. This same conclusion was reached in Vitale v. Ravizza Bros., Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain at New Britain, Docket No. 497335 (December 18, 2000, Shapiro, J.) ( 28 Conn.L.Rptr. 651); Miller v. Nexus Corp., Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield at Bridgeport, Docket No. 345522 (October 1, 1999, Melville, J.) ( 25 Conn.L.Rptr. 529);Kane v. Villafane, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk at Stamford, Docket No. 157326 (September 29, 1998, Karazin, J.) ( 22 Conn.L.Rptr. 605); Szilagyi v. The University Club of Hartford, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford-New Britain at New Britain, Docket No. 470482 (May 6, 1996, Arena, J.) ( 16 Conn.L.Rptr. 632); Scandura v. Friendly Ice Cream, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford-New Britain at Hartford, Docket No. 529109 (February 21, 1995, Wagner, J.) ( 13 Conn.L.Rptr. 512).
The plaintiff's objection to Capewell's motion to intervene was initially sustained by this court on January 29, 2001. A motion for reconsideration was then filed which was first granted but then denied after Capewell failed to appear at court. Evidently the nonappearance resulted from some confusion and this court again scheduled the matter for a hearing on May 21, 2001.
As noted by the plaintiff, the title to General Statutes § 31-293 reads, in part, "[l]iability of third persons to employer and employee." In construing the term "third party" in the context of an alteration or modification of a product under the product liability statutes, General Statutes § 52-572p, our Supreme Court stated in Elliot v. Sears, Roebuck Co., 229 Conn. 500, 508, 642 A.2d 709 (1994), that "[t]he term `third party' is not defined in the act. Where a statute . . . does not define a term, it is appropriate to focus upon its common understanding as expressed in the law and upon its dictionary meaning. . . . AirKaman, Inc. v. Groppo, 221 Conn. 751, 756-57, 607 A.2d 410 (1992). The dictionary definition of `third party' is `[o]ne not a party . . . to . . . an action'; Black's Law Dictionary (6th Ed. 1990); and therefore does not include a plaintiff." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) The same situation exists in this case.
Capewell argues that it should be allowed to intervene solely to prevent double recovery by the plaintiff. The plaintiff, however, has indicated by its responses to Capewell's interrogatories, questions eighteen and nineteen, that it is not seeking damages for any sums paid by Capewell. Thus, this argument fails.
This court notes that an insurance company that provided workers' compensation coverage (and presumably seeks to prevent double recovery) is not allowed to intervene under § 31-293(a). Johndrow v. State, 24 Conn. App. 719, 721, 591 A.2d 815 (1991).
For the foregoing reasons, Capewell's motion to intervene is denied.
Berger, J.