Opinion
Civil Action No. 3:00-CV-1014-D
February 6, 2001
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
The parents of a child who died tragically on a school-sponsored field trip sue the school district and the teacher-sponsor. Because plaintiffs have failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the court grants defendants' motions to dismiss.
I
Colt Perryman ("Colt"), a freshman at defendant Dallas Independent School District's ("DISD") Talented and Gifted Magnet School, fell from the top of Emory Peak while climbing to its summit during an annual school-sponsored trip to Big Bend National Park ("Big Bend"). Supervising Colt during the trip and the Emory Peak ascent were defendant Lee Bloomfield ("Bloomfield"), a teacher at Colt's school, and Steve Jean ("Jean"), a parent-volunteer. During his climb to Emory Peak, which involved a lengthy hike followed by a scramble along rock cliffs, Colt became separated from the others in the group. According to plaintiffs, Jean encouraged Colt to finish the ascent despite Jean's own reservations about the safety of doing so. Colt continued, and although he reached the summit, he did not immediately follow the rest of the group back to the trail. Colt was not seen alive again. His body was found two days later at the bottom of a 450-foot cliff.
For purposes of deciding defendants' motions to dismiss, the court takes as true the facts alleged by plaintiffs in their complaint. See Royal Bank of Canada v. FDIC, 733 F. Supp. 1091, 1094 (N.D. Tex. 1990) (Fitzwater, J.). The court draws all inferences in favor of plaintiffs as the nonmovants. Id.
Colt's parents, plaintiffs Michael Perryman and Barbara Perryman (collectively, "the Perrymans"), sued DISD and Bloomfield under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, basing their claims on theories of state-created danger, special relationship, and policy or custom. DISD and Bloomfield moved to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). The court granted their motion, holding that the Perrymans had failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted. The court granted the Perrymans leave to amend, and they timely filed an amended complaint.
The Perrymans assert in their amended complaint that DISD and Bloomfield failed to properly instruct, train, and supervise Colt on the Emory Peak hike. They allege that DISD and Bloomfield violated Colt's substantive due process rights by inadequately instructing and supervising Colt. Specifically, the Perrymans posit that DISD failed to train Bloomfield and Jean and that DISD and Bloomfield knowingly subjected Colt to a "state-created danger." Am. Compl. ¶ 4. In separate motions, defendants move anew to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).
II
To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege (1) a violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States and (2) demonstrate that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. Leffall v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 28 F.3d 521, 525 (5th Cir. 1994). To hold a municipal or local government body liable for the deprivation of a constitutional right, the plaintiff must also identify a policy or custom that caused the plaintiff's injury. See Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978).
A
As a threshold matter, the court considers whether plaintiffs have alleged a violation of a constitutionally protected right. The Perrymans assert that defendants violated Colt's "constitutionally protected right to life" and his "rights, safety and welfare." Am. Compl. ¶¶ 4.23, 4.10. These claims arise under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In addition to guaranteeing fair process, the Due Process Clause bars "certain government actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them[.]" Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986). Violations of substantive due process are actionable under § 1983. See Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990). In particular, the Perrymans' complaint alleges violations of the substantive due process rights of bodily integrity and life. See Ps. Resp. 4.
The Due Process Clause "is phrased as a limitation on the State's power to act, not as a guarantee of certain minimal levels of safety and security." DeShaney v. Winnebago Co. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989). Nevertheless, in addition to protecting the right to life, see County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 840 (1998), the substantive component of the Due Process Clause also protects "a student's liberty interest in maintaining bodily integrity." Moore v. Willis Indep. Sch. Dist., 233 F.3d 871, 875 (5th Cir. 2000). As this court noted in its prior order dismissing plaintiffs' claims, substantive due process has been applied to intentional abuse caused by school officials. See, e.g., Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d 443, 446-49 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (addressing case in which classroom teacher subjected student to intentional sexual abuse); Jefferson v. Ysleta Indep. Sch. Dist., 817 F.2d 303, 305 (5th Cir. 1987) (addressing case in which teacher intentionally tied second-grade student to chair during two-day period). The Fifth Circuit has never held that substantive due process is violated in circumstances like the present case, which involves no allegations of intentional abuse. Addressing in its prior order the sufficiency of plaintiffs' original complaint, the court held that, at most, plaintiffs alleged that school officials were deliberately indifferent to Colt's right to bodily integrity. See Aug 8, 2000 Order 3-4. Deliberate indifference does not support a claim for a violation of due process. Id. at 4.
In response to defendants' motions to dismiss, the Perrymans dispute this interpretation of the law. Arguing that deliberate indifference is sufficient to constitute a violation of substantive due process, the Perrymans cite Doe, in which the Fifth Circuit held that municipal and supervisor liability for a teacher's sexual abuse of his student would be predicated on a showing of deliberate indifference. See Doe, 15 F.3d at 452-53. Reliance on Doe, however, confuses the degree of fault required to support municipality liability for the alleged underlying constitutional violation with the level of culpability associated with the underlying violation itself. See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389 n. 8 (1989) (distinguishing between culpability for municipal liability and underlying constitutional violation). In other words, while deliberate indifference to a constitutional violation may render a defendant liable for the violation, deliberate indifference does not alone embody the violation. Moreover, the Perrymans' suggestions of intentional conduct cannot overcome defendants' motions to dismiss. In their amended complaint, the Perrymans assert that parent volunteer Jean "directed Colt to make the climb" to the summit of Emory Peak. Am. Compl. ¶ 3.10. This assertion does not allege that Jean intentionally harmed Colt, but merely that Jean intentionally placed Colt in a dangerous situation. Such an allegation does not of itself state a violation of a constitutional right.
B
Absent an allegation that DISD or Bloomfield intentionally harmed Colt, the Perrymans argue that Colt was exposed to a state-created danger. The court has already considered the viability of this claim, recognizing that "[t]he state-created danger theory has never been adopted in this Circuit." Aug. 8, 2000 Order at 2 (quoting Randolph v. Cervantes, 130 F.3d 728, 731 (5th Cir. 1997)). Similarly, the Perrymans' reliance on the special relationship doctrine to support their state-created danger claim is misplaced. "[T]he special relationship doctrine is properly invoked in cases involving harms inflicted by third parties, and it is not applicable when it is the conduct of a state actor that has allegedly infringed a person's constitutional rights." Leffall, 28 F.3d at 529. Although the Perrymans contend that the doctrine is not limited merely to situations involving harm caused by third parties, they do not cite any controlling case in which the injury was solely the result of the victim's accident.The Perrymans also stress in their amended complaint that this trip was part of the school curriculum, not an extracurricular activity. They apparently advance this allegation to distinguish Leffall, in which the Fifth Circuit rejected a special relationship claim in the context of a school's supervision of an after school dance. See id. at 526. The distinction is immaterial, however, because the Perrymans' state-created danger claim fails regardless whether the injury occurred during or after school. Accordingly, the court holds that the Perrymans cannot state a claim under either the state-created danger doctrine or the special relationship doctrine.
C
The Perrymans also allege that DISD violated Colt's substantive due process rights by failing to train Bloomfield or Jean. The Perrymans assert that DISD had "a policy of not training its teachers in fundamental, obvious rules of outdoor education." Am. Compl. ¶ 4.01. They also allege that this lack of instruction extended to the preparation of parent volunteers. Id. at ¶ 4.14. This failure to train, the Perrymans argue, directly resulted in Colt's death.A municipality may, under certain circumstances, be held liable for constitutional violations committed by its employees resulting from its failure to train employees. See City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 388. The failure to train doctrine merely establishes municipal liability for the constitutional violations of municipal employees. It does not provide an end run around having to prove the violation of a constitutional right. Accordingly, the Perrymans cannot state a failure to train claim without identifying a constitutional violation.
Although the Perrymans have indicated that the constitutionally protected rights at issue in this case include the substantive due process rights to life and bodily integrity, they have not articulated how defendants violated these rights. In fact, the Perrymans' two theories of the alleged constitutional violation — the state-created danger and special relationship claims — are not viable on the facts alleged and the inferences drawn from them. See supra § II(B). Finally, absent any allegation that DISD employees intentionally caused the violation of Colt's due process rights, DISD cannot be held liable under the failure to train doctrine.