¶ 8 Because the trial court effectively granted summary judgment regarding the existence, terms, and enforceability of the parties' settlement agreement, we employ the summary judgment standard of review. See Perry v. Ronan, 225 Ariz. 49, 52 ¶ 7, 234 P.3d 617, 620 (App.2010). Accordingly, we determine de novo whether any genuine disputes of material fact exist and whether the trial court correctly applied the law, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the Alling Group as the non-prevailing party.

Ariz. R.P. Spec. Act. 8(a); accord Potter v. Vanderpool, 225 Ariz. 495, 498, ¶ 6, 240 P.3d 1257, 1260 (App. 2010). We have exercised our discretion to determine whether the superior court properly rejected the settlement agreement the parties had entered into under Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure ("Civil Rule") 80(d), Perry v. Ronan, 225 Ariz. 49, 51-52, ¶¶ 5-7, 234 P.3d 617, 619-20 (App. 2010), and to determine whether a trial may be unnecessary. Harris Trust Bank of Ariz. v. Superior Court, 188 Ariz. 159, 162, 933 P.2d 1227, 1230 (App. 1996) ("[A]cceptance of special action jurisdiction is in the interests of judicial economy.").

¶ 34 At oral argument, the Robertsons suggested that this case was identical to Perry v. Ronan, 225 Ariz. 49, 234 P.3d 617 (App.2010), claiming in Perry the court had applied Hays to uphold a settlement agreement accepted beyond the undisclosed expiration date imposed by the clients. But in that case we concluded the offer could be accepted because of a delay in the communication of the offer and did not decide the attorney had authority beyond that authorized by his client.

However, in our discretion, we choose not to do so. See Perry v. Ronan, 225 Ariz. 49 , n.1, 234 P.3d 617 , 620 n.1 (App. 2010).

In addition, Garza's petition raises questions of statewide importance. SeePerry v. Ronan , 225 Ariz. 49, 52, ¶ 6, 234 P.3d 617, 620 (App. 2010). For these reasons, we accept jurisdiction of the petition for special action.

We could treat Barnes's failure to respond to Fink's arguments as a confession of error. See Perry v. Ronan, 225 Ariz. 49, n.1, 234 P.3d 617, 620 n.1 (App. 2010) ("[W]e may consider [a] failure to respond as a confession of error."). However, because the issue involves subject matter jurisdiction, in our discretion, we choose not to do so. --------

¶6 When the superior court grants a motion to enforce a settlement agreement based on the arguments of counsel and the evidence in the record, it effectively is granting summary judgment on "the existence and terms" of the settlement agreement. Canyon Contracting Co. v. Tohono O'Odham Hous. Auth., 172 Ariz. 389, 390, 837 P.2d 750, 751 (App. 1992); see also Perry v. Ronan, 225 Ariz. 49, 52, ¶ 7, 234 P.3d 617, 620 (App. 2010). Summary judgment is proper when "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."

The complaint sufficiently alleged a cause of action for unfair competition independent of any contractual obligations. See Joshua David Mellberg LLC v. Will, 96 F. Supp. 3d 953, 983 (D. Ariz. 2015) (setting forth the elements of an unfair competition claim); see also Perry v. Ronan, 234 P.3d 617, 622 (Az. Ct. App. 2010) ("[A]n action does not arise out of contract if the contract is only a factual predicate to the action but not the essential basis of it. . . .") (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). AFFIRMED.

On the contrary, basic contract principles do not apply in light of well-established Arizona cases interpreting and applying the applicable state statutes that govern the resolution in this action. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts and Perry v. Ronan , 225 Ariz. 49, 53, 234 P.3d 617 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010) are likewise inapplicable. Because the Court is granting the Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as to Count One, declaratory relief, there was no contract of insurance in place at the time of the accident and therefore the remaining Counts Two and Three of Plaintiffs' complaint fail as a matter of law.

Doc. 1-9 at 2. See, e.g, Perry v. Ronan, 234 P.3d 617, 621 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010) (binding settlement agreement created by offer and acceptance). GEICO raises four arguments for why Rider should be bound by Smith's offer. First, GEICO argues that Smith's lawyer acted with Rider's actual authority and Rider reneged on her promise to settle for the policy limit.