Schack v. Wainwright, 5th Cir. 1968, 391 F.2d 608, cert. denied 1968, 392 U.S. 915, 88 S.Ct. 2078, 20 L.Ed.2d 1375. See also Perry v. Jones, 5th Cir. 1971, 437 F.2d 759. Actual censorship of attorney-inmate mail — be it incoming or outgoing — might very well infringe unconstitutionally in the prisoner's rights of access to the courts.

Both Plaintiffs had jobs as law clerks subsequent to their transfers. A record clearly demonstrating the ability to initiate and prosecute pro se claims in federal, state and administrative courts is inapposite of a legitimate claim of denial of access. See, Perry v. Jones, 437 F.2d 759 (5th Cir. 1971); Conway v. Dunbar, 448 F.2d 765 (9th Cir. 1971); Conway v. Oliver, 429 F.2d 1307 (9th Cir. 1970); Wilson v. Prasse, 404 F.2d 1380 (3rd Cir. 1968) on remand, 325 F. Supp. 9 (1971), aff'd, 463 F.2d 109 (9th Cir. 1972); Lingo v. Boone, 402 F. Supp. 768 (N.D.Cal. 1975); Urbano v. McCorkle, 334 F. Supp. 161 (N.J. 1971). See, also, Carter v. Telectron, Inc., 452 F. Supp. 939 (S.D.Tex. 1976).

Federal Courts are reluctant to interfere with the administration of state prisons, absent some indication that the delay resulted in an actual denial of access to the courts. Martin v. Wainwright, supra; Perry v. Jones, 437 F.2d 759 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 914, 92 S.Ct. 235, 30 L.Ed.2d 189 (1971). It is well established that a single delay or interference with a prisoner's mail service does not constitute a denial of an individual's right to access to the courts and that such delay does not raise a question of constitutional proportion.