Perry Homes v. Cull

483 Citing cases

  1. In re ADM Investor Services, Inc.

    304 S.W.3d 371 (Tex. 2010)   Cited 68 times
    Applying Perry Homes test in context of forum-selection clauses and holding that motion to transfer venue did not waive contractual right

    There is a strong presumption against such waiver. See Perry Homes v. Cull, 258 S.W.3d 580, 590 (Tex. 2008) (observing strong presumption against waiver of arbitration clause); Automated, 156 S.W.3d at 559 (stating that waiver in arbitration clause context is analogous to forum-selection clauses). In Perry Homes, we adopted a test considering the totality of the circumstances.

  2. Fid. Auto Grp. v. Hargroder

    689 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. App. 2024)   Cited 2 times

    (mem. op.) (citation omitted); see also Perry Homes v. Cull, 258 S.W.3d 580, 588 (Tex. 2008) ("Although the federal courts do not defer to arbitrators when waiver is a question of litigation conduct, they consistently do so when waiver concerns limitations periods ….").

  3. IBS Asset Liquidations LLC v. Servicios Multiples Del Norte SA de CV

    419 S.W.3d 573 (Tex. App. 2013)   Cited 9 times
    Concluding there was no showing of prejudice because court could not ascertain contents of discovery requests from "sparse record" and complaints about delay were too generalized

    WAIVER OF ARBITRATION “There is a strong presumption against waiver of arbitration, but it is not irrebuttable ....” Perry Homes v. Cull, 258 S.W.3d 580, 584 (Tex.2008). Waiver of arbitration is a question of law.

  4. Hogg v. Lynch, Chappell & Alsup, P.C.

    480 S.W.3d 767 (Tex. App. 2015)   Cited 61 times
    Holding arbitration waived when party participated in litigation "only up until the point that she received an adverse ruling from the district court and was faced with the possibility of having the court impose case-crippling sanctions"

    Although LCA's motion for summary judgment contains several exhibits, including discovery materials and affidavits from LCA attorneys, that could be relevant to whether Ms. Hogg waived her right to arbitration, we decline to consider those exhibits in our analysis to the extent they were not before the trial court when it heard and denied Ms. Hogg's motion to compel arbitration. SeePerry Homes v. Cull, 258 S.W.3d 580, 596 n. 89 (Tex.2008) (“[b]ecause we limit our review to the record before the trial judge, we do not consider the Defendants' additional seven volumes of discovery exhibits filed after the arbitration award” in determining whether defendant waived her right to arbitration). With these understandings in mind, we turn to the background of this appeal as reflected in the appellate record.

  5. Lalonde v. Gosnell

    593 S.W.3d 212 (Tex. 2019)   Cited 61 times
    Holding that when there are no disputed facts, waiver presents a question of law, which is reviewed de novo

    We need not decide whether prejudice—a conceptually distinct concept from waiver—is required to effect a waiver because prejudice is established on this record. In cases involving contractual arbitration and forum-selection clauses, we have noted that a "strong presumption against waiver" exists and that the presumption "should govern" in "close cases," Perry Homes v. Cull , 258 S.W.3d 580, 593 (Tex. 2008), such that "doubts" as to waiver are "resolved in favor of arbitration," In re Poly-Am., L.P. , 262 S.W.3d 337, 348 (Tex. 2008) ; see also, e.g. , RSL Funding, LLC v. Pippins , 499 S.W.3d 423, 430 (Tex. 2016) (arbitration); In re Nationwide Ins. Co. of Am. , 494 S.W.3d 708, 718 & n.1 (Tex. 2016) (forum-selection clauses, which are "analogous to arbitration clauses"); In re D. Wilson Constr. Co. , 196 S.W.3d 774, 783 (Tex. 2006) (arbitration); EZ Pawn Corp. v. Mancias , 934 S.W.2d 87, 89 (Tex. 1996) ("The FAA [Federal Arbitration Act] disfavors waiver, and there is a strong presumption against waiver." (citing Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp. , 460 U.S. 1, 24, 103 S.Ct. 927, 74 L.Ed.2d 765 (1983), and Prudential Sec. Inc. v. Marshall , 909 S.W.2d 896, 899 (Tex. 1995) )).

  6. G.T. Leach Builders, LLC v. Sapphire V.P.

    58 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 532 (Tex. 2015)   Cited 347 times   6 Legal Analyses
    Holding evidence did not establish that party "substantially invoked the judicial process to the extent required to demonstrate a waiver of its right to arbitration"

    Id. § 22.225(c), (e); see also Richmont Holdings, Inc. v. Superior Recharge Sys., L.L.C., 392 S.W.3d 633, 635 n.3 (Tex.2013) (per curiam) (“We have jurisdiction to hear an appeal from an interlocutory order denying arbitration when the court of appeals' decision conflicts with prior precedent.”). In this case, the court of appeals' holding creates such an inconsistency with our decision in Perry Homes v. Cull, 258 S.W.3d 580, 587–92 (Tex.2008), and with the court of appeals' decision in In re Global Constr. Co., 166 S.W.3d 795, 798–99 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.), regarding the issue of whether courts or arbitrators should decide whether a contractual deadline bars a demand for arbitration. The inconsistency on this issue gives us jurisdiction, which permits us to address and resolve all of the issues that all of the parties raise in this case.

  7. Dall. Excavation Sys. v. Orellana

    No. 05-23-01149-CV (Tex. App. Aug. 21, 2024)

    We also review de novo whether a party has waived the right to arbitration by substantially invoking the judicial process. See Perry Homes v. Cull, 258 S.W.3d 580, 589 (Tex. 2008) ("Under a proper abuse-of-discretion review, waiver is a question of law for the court, and we do not defer to the trial court on questions of law.") (footnotes and related citations omitted).

  8. LaLonde v. Gosnell

    No. 16-0966 (Tex. Jun. 14, 2019)

    We need not decide whether prejudice—a conceptually distinct concept from waiver—is required to effect a waiver because prejudice is established on this record. In cases involving contractual arbitration and forum-selection clauses, we have noted that a "strong presumption against waiver" exists and that the presumption "should govern" in "close cases," Perry Homes v. Cull, 258 S.W.3d 580, 593 (Tex. 2008), such that "doubts" as to waiver are "resolved in favor of arbitration," In re Poly-Am., L.P., 262 S.W.3d 337, 348 (Tex. 2008); see also, e.g., RSL Funding, LLC v. Pippins, 499 S.W.3d 423, 430 (Tex. 2016) (arbitration); In re Nationwide Ins. Co. of Am., 494 S.W.3d 708, 718 & n.1 (Tex. 2016) (forum-selection clauses, which are "analogous to arbitration clauses"); In re D. Wilson Constr. Co., 196 S.W.3d 774, 783 (Tex. 2006) (arbitration); EZ Pawn Corp. v. Mancias, 934 S.W.2d 87, 89 (Tex. 1996) ("The FAA [Federal Arbitration Act] disfavors waiver, and there is a strong presumption against waiver." (citing Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983), and Prudential Sec. Inc. v. Marshall, 909 S.W.2d 896, 899 (Tex. 1995))).

  9. Green v. Velocity Invs.

    No. 05-20-00795-CV (Tex. App. Aug. 25, 2022)   Cited 4 times

    We review the denial of a motion to compel arbitration for an abuse of discretion, deferring to the trial court on factual determinations that are supported by the evidence and reviewing legal determinations de novo. Henry v. Cash Biz, LP, 551 S.W.3d 111, 115 (Tex. 2018); Perry Homes v. Cull, 258 S.W.3d 580, 598 (Tex. 2008); Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, LLP v. J.A. Green Dev. Corp., 327 S.W.3d 859, 863 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2010, no pet.). Whether a party waived its right to arbitrate is a question of law, which we review de novo.

  10. Vectra Infosys, Inc. v. Adema

    No. 05-18-01371-CV (Tex. App. Aug. 28, 2019)

    Finally, Adema noted that Vectra had set for hearing a motion for protective order regarding third-party plaintiff's depositions, but failed to appear for the hearing. Comparing Vectra's conduct to the conduct of the plaintiffs in Perry Homes v. Cull, 258 S.W.3d 580 (Tex. 2008), Adema asserted Vectra's conduct prejudiced him as Vectra "sought to have it both ways by switching between litigation and arbitration to its own advantage[,] obtain[ing] extensive discovery under one set of rules and now seek[ing] to arbitrate . . . under another, delay[ing] disposition by switching to arbitration when trial was imminent, and obtain[ing] orders from the court while limiting [his] and [Chintam's] rights to appellate review." The record reflects Vectra had also included a jury demand in its original answer, and Adema had included a jury demand in his original petition.