Opinion
Civil Action 5:22-CV-00004-DSC
08-08-2022
SANDRA AUTON PERRY, Plaintiff, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
DAVID S. CAYER, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Plaintiff's “Motion for Summary Judgment” (document #8) and Defendant's “Motion for Summary Judgment” (document #11), as well as the parties' briefs and exhibits.
The parties have consented to Magistrate Judge jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and these Motions are ripe for disposition.
The Court finds that Defendant's decision to deny Plaintiff Social Security benefits is supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the Court will deny Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment; grant Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment; and affirm the Commissioner's decision.
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The Court adopts the procedural history as stated in the parties' briefs.
Plaintiff filed the present action on January 13, 2022. She assigns error to the Administrative Law Judge's formulation of her mental Residual Functional Capacity. See Plaintiff's “Memorandum ...” at 1-2, 4-13 (document #9); Plaintiff's “Reply ...” at 1-4 (document #13). Specifically, she argues that the ALJ failed to account for mild limitations in each of the Listing 12.0, Paragraph B mental function areas in formulating her RFC. Id.
The Social Security Regulations define “Residual Functional Capacity” as “what [a claimant] can still do despite his limitations.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a). The Commissioner is required to “first assess the nature and extent of [the claimant's] physical limitations and then determine [the claimant's] Residual Functional Capacity for work activity on a regular and continuing basis.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(b).
Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ's alternative Step Five finding violates 20 C.F.R § 404.1520(a)(4) (“If we can find that you are disabled or not disabled at a step, we make our determination or decision and we do not go on to the next step.”). See also POMS DI 22001.001 (“if you can determine the claimant is or is not disabled at a given step, the sequential evaluation ends. Make the determination and do not go to the next step.”). Because the ALJ's Step Four conclusion is supported by substantial evidence, the Court does not reach this assignment of error.
The ALJ found that Plaintiff had the RFC to:
perform sedentary work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(a) except she was limited to occasional climbing of ramps and stairs; occasional kneeling, crawling, crouching, stooping, balancing; no climbing of ropes, ladders, or scaffolds; must have avoided concentrated exposure to fumes, dusts, gases, areas of poor ventilation, as well as extremes of cold; no more than frequent reaching overhead; occasional use of foot pedals; and no driving an automobile for completion of job tasks.(Tr. 38-39). Based upon this RFC, the ALJ found Plaintiff could perform her past relevant work and was not disabled.
II. DISCUSSION
The Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and § 1383(c)(3), limits this Court's review of a final decision of the Commissioner to: (1) whether substantial evidence supports the Commissioner's decision, Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390, 401 (1971); and (2) whether the Commissioner applied the correct legal standards. Hays v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 1453, 1456 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Hunter v. Sullivan, 993 F.2d 31, 34 (4th Cir. 1992) (per curiam). The District Court does not review a final decision of the Commissioner de novo. Smith v. Schweiker, 795 F.2d 343, 345 (4th Cir. 1986); King v. Califano, 599 F.2d 597, 599 (4th Cir. 1979); Blalock v. Richardson, 483 F.2d 773, 775 (4th Cir. 1972).
As the Social Security Act provides, “[t]he findings of the [Commissioner] as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). In Smith v. Heckler, 782 F.2d 1176, 1179 (4th Cir. 1986), quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971), the Fourth Circuit defined “substantial evidence” thus:
Substantial evidence has been defined as being “more than a scintilla and do[ing] more than creat[ing] a suspicion of the existence of a fact to be established. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”See also Seacrist v. Weinberger, 538 F.2d 1054, 1056-57 (4th Cir. 1976) (“We note that it is the responsibility of the [Commissioner] and not the courts to reconcile inconsistencies in the medical evidence”).
The Fourth Circuit has long emphasized that it is not for a reviewing court to weigh the evidence again, nor to substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner, assuming the Commissioner's final decision is supported by substantial evidence. Hays v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d at 1456 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Smith v. Schweiker, 795 F.2d at 345; and Blalock v. Richardson, 483 F.2d at 775. Indeed, this is true even if the reviewing court disagrees with the outcome - so long as there is “substantial evidence” in the record to support the final decision below. Lester v. Schweiker, 683 F.2d 838, 841 (4th Cir. 1982).
The question before the ALJ was whether Plaintiff became disabled at any time. Plaintiff challenges the ALJ's determination of her RFC. The ALJ is solely responsible for assessing a claimant's RFC. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1546(c) & 416.946(c). In making that assessment, the ALJ must consider the functional limitations resulting from the claimant's medically determinable impairments. SSR96-8p, available at 1996 WL 374184, at *2. The ALJ must also “include a narrative discussion describing how the evidence supports each conclusion, citing specific medical facts . . . and nonmedical evidence.” Id.
Under the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 301, et seq., the term “disability” is defined as an:
inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 monthsPass v. Chater, 65 F.3d 1200, 1203 (4th Cir. 1995).
Plaintiff has the burden of establishing her RFC by showing how her impairments affect her functioning. See 20 C.F.R. §§404.1512(c) & 416.912(c); see also, e.g., Stormo v. Barnhart, 377 F.3d 801, 806 (8th Cir. 2004) (“[t]he burden of persuasion . . . to demonstrate RFC remains on the claimant, even when the burden of production shifts to the Commissioner at step five”); Plummer v. Astrue, No. 5:11-cv-06-RLV-DSC, 2011 WL 7938431, at *5 (W.D. N.C. Sept. 26, 2011) (Memorandum and Recommendation) (“[t]he claimant bears the burden of providing evidence establishing the degree to which her impairments limit her RFC”) (citing Stormo), adopted, 2012 WL 1858844 (May 22, 2102), aff'd, 487 Fed.Appx. 795 (4th Cir. Nov. 6, 2012).
In Mascio v. Colvin, 780 F.3d 632 (4th Cir. 2015), the Fourth Circuit held that “remand may be appropriate . . . where an ALJ fails to assess a claimant's capacity to perform relevant functions, despite contradictory evidence in the record, or where other inadequacies in the ALJ's analysis frustrate meaningful review.” 780 F.3d at 636 (quoting Cichocki v. Astrue, 729 F.3d 172, 177 (2d Cir. 2013)). This explicit function-by-function analysis is not necessary when functions are irrelevant or uncontested.
In Mascio, the Court also “agree[d] with other circuits that an ALJ does not account ‘for a claimant's [moderate] limitations in concentration, persistence, and pace by restricting the hypothetical question to simple, routine tasks or unskilled work.'” 780 F.3d at 638 (quoting Winschel v.Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1180 (11th Cir. 2011) (joining the Third, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits)). See also SSR 96-8p (where ALJ completes Psychiatric Review Technique Form (“PRTF”), mental RFC evaluation for use at Steps 4 and 5 "requires a more detailed assessment by itemizing various functions summarized on the PRTF"). “The ability to perform simple tasks differs from the ability to stay on task. Only the latter limitation would account for a claimant's limitation in concentration, persistence or pace.” Id.
Although the ALJ's finding of mild rather than moderate limitations in the Paragraph B criteria does not necessarily translate to a work-related functional limitation, “Mascio clearly imposes on the Commissioner a duty to explain why such mild mental health impairments found at step two do not translate into work-related limitations when [P]laintiff's RFC for work is considered.” Reinhardt v. Colvin, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50952 (W.D. N.C. 2015) The ALJ must consider the combined effect of both severe and non-severe impairments. Hines v. Bowen, 872 F.2d 56, 59 (4th Cir. 1989). SSR 96-8p explicitly directs:
In assessing RFC, the adjudicator must consider limitations and restrictions imposed by all of an individual's impairments, even those that are not “severe.” While a “not severe” impairment(s) standing alone may not significantly limit an individual's ability to do basic work activities, it may--when considered with limitations or restrictions due to other impairments--be critical to the outcome of a claim. For example, in combination with limitations imposed by an individual's other impairments, the limitations due to such a “not severe” impairment may prevent an individual from performing past relevant work or may narrow the range of other work that the individual may still be able to do.
Here, the ALJ sufficiently addressed whether Plaintiff's mild limitations affected her RFC. (Tr. 36-37, citing Tr. 353-360, 371-378, 559, 562, 590, 593, 595, 598, 606, 608, 613, 643, 647, 732, 740, 744, 789, 792, 798, 889, 936, 941, 945, 948, 954, 957, 960, 965, 971, 1131-38, 1149). Plaintiff reported no problems with memory, but claimed difficulty with stress, changes in routine, concentration and completing tasks. Her medical providers consistently found normal cognition and thought processes with no difficulty in concentration. Id. The ALJ described some of Plaintiff's activities, including traveling with her husband for work and participating in bowling tournaments. Id. The ALJ also considered the only opinion regarding Plaintiff's mental impairments. State agency medical consultant Dr. Kendra McCarty concluded that Plaintiff had no severe mental impairments. (Tr. 37, citing Tr. 137-149). While Dr. McCarty stated that Plaintiff had a medically determinable mental impairment, she found had no limitations in any of the Paragraph B criteria. Id.
The Court has carefully reviewed the record, the authorities and the parties' arguments. The Court finds that the ALJ's RFC determination was based upon substantial evidence. The ALJ applied the correct legal standards and his conclusion that Plaintiff was not disabled is supported by substantial evidence.
III. ORDER
NOW THEREFORE IT IS ORDERED:
1. Plaintiff's “Motion for Summary Judgment” (document #8) is DENIED; Defendant's “Motion for Summary Judgment” (document #11) is GRANTED; and the Commissioner's decision is AFFIRMED.
2. The Clerk is directed to send copies of this Memorandum and Order to counsel for the parties.
SO ORDERED.