The workmen's compensation framework comprehends a more flexible attitude toward recovery for injuries than ordinary tort law, and recovery-oriented decisions in workmen's compensation cases, though consistent with the overall approach in that area, are not necessarily indicative of a court's attitude in ordinary personal injury cases. For an indication of the Louisiana courts' attitude toward estoppel to assert prescription in non-workmen's compensation cases we need look no further than three recent decisions cited by appellees: Perrodin v. Clement, 254 So.2d 704 (La.Ct.App. 1971); Gaspard v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 243 So.2d 839 (La.Ct.App. 1971); Dagenhart v. Robertson Truck Lines, Inc., 230 So.2d 916 (La.Ct.App. 1970). All three decisions indicate that contra non valentem continues to flourish in Louisiana law, but nothing in them signals any recent flowering of the doctrine beyond its pruned and cropped appearance in Staples.
4 Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 257 So.2d 434 (La. 1972). Perrodin v. Clement, 254 So.2d 704 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1971). Cf., Vance v. Ellerbe, 150 La. 388, 90 So. 735 (1922).
Prescription begins to run against an action to reduce an excessive donation on the date that the testament is filed for probate. Draper v. Van Leer, 197 La. 259, 1 So.2d 513 (1941); Succession of Dancie, 191 La. 518, 186 So. 14 (1939); West v. Gajdzik, 425 So.2d 263 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1982); Perrodin v. Clement, 254 So.2d 704 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1971), writ den., 260 La. 604, 256 So.2d 642 (1972). O'Neil Pollingue, Sr. died testate in 1960; his will was filed and probated and a Judgment of Possession was rendered and signed in his succession on October 30, 1962.
See also In re Andrus, 221 La. 996, 60 So.2d 899 (1952); Roach v. Roach, 213 La. 746, 35 So.2d 597 (1948); Draper v. Van Leer, 197 La. 259, 1 So.2d 513 (1941). Prescription begins to run against an action to reduce an excessive donation on the date that the testament is filed for probate. Draper v. Van Leer, supra; Succession of Dancie, 191 La. 518, 186 So. 14 (1939); Perrodin v. Clement, 254 So.2d 704 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1971), writ denied, 256 So.2d 642 (La. 1972). It is our opinion that the trial court incorrectly characterized plaintiff's action as one for an entire succession.
Our jurisprudence also holds that the doctrine in question is inapplicable to mental incapacity resulting from feeble-mindedness. Perrodin v. Clement, 254 So.2d 704 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 1971). Neither does it apply to an irrational plaintiff.
Prescription on an action to annual a testament begins to run on the date the will was probated. Perrodin v. Clement [La.App.], ( 254 So.2d 704).. Prescription normally would be interrupted by the filing of a suit, L.S.A. C.C. Art. 3518, but the plaintiff's motion to dismiss his suit of February, 1967, had the effect to treating the interruption as having never happened. L.S.A. C.C. Art. 3519.
Cartwright v. Chrysler Corporation, 255 La. 598 [ 255 La. 597], 232 So.2d 285 (1970). In cases involving mental incapacity; whether feeble mindedness (Perrodin v. Clement, 254 So.2d 704 La.App. 3 Cir. 1971, writ denied 260 La. 604, 256 So.2d 642, 1972); irrationality (Gaspard v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, 243 So.2d 839 La.App. 3 Cir. 1971, writ denied 258 La. 357, 246 So.2d 680); or institutionalization (Buvens v. Buvens, 286 So.2d 144 La.App. 3 Cir. 1973), there is no interruption of prescription until there is legal interdiction, that is, a formal placing of the person under interdiction. The jurisprudence requiring interdiction accords with Civil Code articles 3522 and 3554 which provide: