Perrin v. Pioneer Nat'l Title Insurance Co.

8 Citing cases

  1. Brandon v. Caisse

    527 N.E.2d 118 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988)   Cited 4 times
    Noting that appellate judgment is final when entered

    The trial court may thereafter only do those things which are directed in the mandate and has no authority to act beyond its dictates. PSL Realty Co., 86 Ill.2d at 308; Perrin v. Pioneer National Title Insurance Co. (1982), 108 Ill. App.3d 181, 185, 438 N.E.2d 1359. When these rules are applied to the facts of the present case, it is apparent that the judgment of this court became final on August 11, 1986, when our opinion was filed with the clerk of this court.

  2. Moncelle v. C.A.P. Air Freight, Inc.

    2014 Ill. App. 3d 130121 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014)

    In such a case, the circuit court has no power to allow amendment of the pleadings, or to alter or change the decree." Perrin v. Pioneer National Title Insurance Company, 108 Ill. App. 3d 181, 183 (1982) (quoting Chickering v. Failes, 29 Ill. 294, 302 (1862)). The fact that the Justices and the trucking defendants were all named at the same time in the October 2011 complaint does not change the fact that the Justices were named as defendants in two closed cases in which they were never parties before the final judgments.

  3. Moncelle v. C.A.P. Air Freight, Inc.

    2014 Ill. App. 3d 130121 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014)

    In such a case, the circuit court has no power to allow amendment of the pleadings, or to alter or change the decree." Perrin v. Pioneer National Title Insurance Company, 108 Ill. App. 3d 181, 183 (1982) (quoting Chickering v. Failes, 29 Ill. 294, 302 (1862)). The fact that the Justices and the trucking defendants were all named at the same time in the October 2011 complaint does not change the fact that the Justices were named as defendants in two closed cases in which they were never parties before the final judgments.

  4. Dalan/Jupiter, Inc. v. Draper & Kramer, Inc.

    372 Ill. App. 3d 362 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007)   Cited 19 times
    Providing that where a supreme court rule conflicts with a statute on the same subject, the rule will prevail

    We see no reason to depart from the holding in Watkins. See Russell, 46 Ill. App. 3d at 664 (noting Rule 369(b) embodies the principle of law enunciated by the court in Watkins); Perrin v. Pioneer National Title Insurance Co., 108 Ill. App. 3d 181, 185, 438 N.E.2d 1359 (1982) (same); but see Coldwell Banker Havens, Inc. v. Renfro, 288 Ill. App. 3d 442, 445, 679 N.E.2d 1299 (1997) (where the court allowed a fee petition to go forward where it was filed within 30 days of the appellate court's reversal without remand, the party having requested fees in its counterclaim). We believe the court in Coldwell Banker misread Rule 369(b).

  5. Longo v. Globe Auto Recycling

    318 Ill. App. 3d 1028 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001)   Cited 41 times
    Finding that since there was no monetary sanction in contempt order, but only "reasonable attorney fees," there was no appellate jurisdiction under Supreme Court Rule 304(b)

    In regard to "other proceedings," Rule 369(b) contemplates only those proceedings which are consistent with the entry and enforcement of the final judgment. Perrin v. Pioneer National Title Insurance Co., 108 Ill. App.3d 181, 185 (1982). Therefore, we find that the trial court was without jurisdiction to vacate the October 8 order awarding contractual attorney fees for two reasons: (1) defendant's appeal was dismissed on March 24, 1999, and (2) the appellate mandate did not issue until August 11, 1999.

  6. Stein v. Spainhour

    196 Ill. App. 3d 65 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990)   Cited 22 times
    Holding the merger doctrine did not merge the subject lease into the judgment and refusing to bar enforcement of contractual provision to collect attorneys' fees even after judgment was entered

    As plaintiff points out, the focus must be on whether the trial court proceedings in this matter after the first appeal constitute "other proceedings" within Rule 369(b). In Perrin v. Pioneer National Title Insurance Co. (1982), 108 Ill. App.3d 181, 438 N.E.2d 1359, the court discussed Rule 369(b) in a case where no remand order was entered. The Perrin court noted the principle of law embodied in Rule 369(b) was enunciated in Watkins v. Dunbar (1925), 318 Ill. 174, 149 N.E. 14, and contemplated proceedings which are appropriate after the entry of a final judgment.

  7. In re Application of Kane County Collector

    135 Ill. App. 3d 796 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985)   Cited 25 times
    Describing abuse of discretion as being judicial action which is "arbitrary, fanciful or unreasonable"

    • 3, 4 Further, it has been established that the correctness of a trial court's action on remand is to be determined from the appellate court's mandate, as opposed to the appellate court's opinion unless, of course, the mandate directs the trial court to proceed in conformity with the opinion. ( PSL Realty Co. v. Granite Investment Co. (1981), 86 Ill.2d 291; Perrin v. Pioneer National Title Insurance Co. (1982), 108 Ill. App.3d 181.) Although the common law record provided this court by petitioner failed to include a copy of the mandate in violation of Supreme Court Rule 321 (87 Ill.2d R. 321), this court may take judicial notice of its own records in the same case before it.

  8. Jones v. Bd. of Fire Police Comm'rs

    127 Ill. App. 3d 793 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984)   Cited 20 times

    It has been held that where a cause is remanded to a trial court, the trial court is bound to proceed as the mandate, not the opinion, directs it to unless the mandate instructs the court to proceed in conformity with the opinion. ( Perrin v. Pioneer National Title Insurance Co. (1982), 108 Ill. App.3d 181, 185.) Consequently, the board here was to "avail itself of the opportunity to take further evidence to determine a proper disposition of this matter."