Perona v. Volkswagen of America, Inc.

61 Citing cases

  1. White v. DaimlerChrysler Corp.

    368 Ill. App. 3d 278 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006)   Cited 83 times
    Finding that allegations that tubular steel exhaust manifolds were "prone to cracking and failure," "would fail at unacceptably high rates," and that defendant was aware of a "high frequency of failures" fall short of the specificity required by the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act

    " Connick, 174 Ill.2d at 505, 221 Ill.Dec. 389, 675 N.E.2d 584. In Perona v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 292 Ill.App.3d 59, 225 Ill.Dec. 868, 684 N.E.2d 859 (1997), the plaintiffs alleged defendants knowingly concealed defects in their Audi vehicles that caused "unintended acceleration." As a result of the defects, plaintiffs claimed their vehicles had lost their resale value.

  2. Pappas v. Pella Corp.

    363 Ill. App. 3d 795 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006)   Cited 61 times
    Holding that "[c]oncealment [of a material fact] is actionable [under the ICFA] where it is employed as a device to mislead," even if the concealment occurs "by silence"

    " Connick, 174 Ill. 2d at 505. In a similar case, Perona v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 292 Ill. App. 3d 59, 61, 684 N.E.2d 859 (1997), the plaintiff's alleged defendants knowingly concealed defects in their Audi vehicles that caused "unintended acceleration." Plaintiffs alleged Audi was aware of the Audi 5000's safety problems but failed to disclose those defects.

  3. Kelly v. Sears Roebuck Co.

    308 Ill. App. 3d 633 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999)   Cited 15 times
    In Kelly, the court found that the plaintiff sufficiently established that Sears had defrauded its customers by selling used batteries as new ones.

    In reviewing a motion to dismiss under section 2-615, all well-pleaded facts are taken as true and all reasonable inferences from those facts are drawn in favor of the plaintiff. 735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 1996); Perona v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 292 Ill. App.3d 59, 67, 684 N.E.2d 859 (1997). This court must determine whether the allegations in the complaint, when viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, are sufficient to state a cause of action upon which relief can be granted. Connick v. Suzuki Motor Co., 174 Ill.2d 482, 490, 675 N.E.2d 584 (1996).

  4. Perona v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc.

    2014 Ill. App. 130748 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014)   Cited 34 times

    On appeal, in 1997, this court affirmed the circuit court's dismissal of the UCC and the Magnuson-Moss Act claims, but reversed the circuit court's dismissal of the Consumer Fraud Act claims on the grounds that the plaintiffs had "adequately alleged consumer fraud violation based on material omission as to the sudden acceleration problem." Perona v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 292 Ill. App. 3d 59 (1997). However, the Perona court limited the Consumer Fraud Act claims to those Audi 5000 automobiles purchased before Audi issued press releases acknowledging the existence of excessive unintended accelerations.Id. at 69. ¶ 4 On remand, on May 15, 2003, almost six years after the Perona court's decision, the plaintiffs filed the instant sixth amended complaint. The sixth amended complaint contained many of the same allegations as the fifth amended complaint but focused only on the violation of the Consumer Fraud Act claim relating to Audi 5000 vehicles with automatic transmissions and model years 1984 through 1986-the claim which this court had found to have survived dismissal in its 1997 Perona decision.

  5. In re Light Cigarettes Mktg. Sales Practices Litigation

    751 F. Supp. 2d 176 (D. Me. 2010)

    Although the Plaintiffs bring claims under individual state statutes, an element of all consumer fraud claims is "a deceptive act or practice by the defendant." Perona v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 684 N.E.2d 859, 864 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997). A deceptive act is "any false or misleading [representation] . . . which may, tends to or does deceive or mislead any person," Salazar v. D.W.B.H., Inc., 192 P.3d 1205, 1212 (N.M. 2008), including "[a]n omission or concealment of a material fact."

  6. Lipinski v. Martin J. Kelly Oldsmobile

    325 Ill. App. 3d 1139 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001)   Cited 51 times
    Finding proper claim under Illinois CFA where plaintiff alleged that defendant knowingly concealed a defect in vehicle prior to sale, thus constituting an actionable omission

    The omission or concealment of a material fact in the conduct of trade or commerce constitutes consumer fraud pursuant to section 2 of the Consumer Fraud Act. Perona v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 292 Ill. App.3d 59, 67, 684 N.E.2d 859, 866 (1997), citing Connick v. Suzuki Motor Co., 174 Ill.2d 482, 504, 675 N.E.2d 584, 595 (1996). Section 2 of the Consumer Fraud Act provides:

  7. Pawlikowski v. Toyota Motor Credit Corporation

    309 Ill. App. 3d 550 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999)   Cited 18 times
    Holding that, absent objection, "the issue of the class certification is deemed waived"

    The Consumer Fraud Act prohibits any concealment, suppression, or omission of any material fact in trade or commerce with the intent that others rely upon the concealment, suppression, or omission. Perona v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 292 Ill. App.3d 59, 65 (1997). TMCC relies upon the court's decision in Lanier v. Associates Finance, Inc., 114 Ill.2d 1 (1986), in support of its argument that its alleged compliance with TILA bars liability under the Consumer Fraud Act.

  8. Schiffner v. Motorola, Inc.

    297 Ill. App. 3d 1099 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998)   Cited 40 times
    Holding that "principles of stare decisis" did not require court to follow a decision rendered by a separate division of the first district, a court of "equal" authority, and noting that "a split in authority between the divisions of the first district is not unprecedented and has led to an ultimate resolution by the supreme court."

    Notwithstanding our agreement with the Verb opinion on the preemption issue, we would not find the Verb opinion to be decisive on the damage issue because, unlike the Verb complaint, the instant complaint sufficiently alleged a compensable injury based on diminished value of the product due to defects associated with the product is a compensable injury in consumer fraud and breach of warranty causes of action. Claims for diminished value of an allegedly defective product without the pleading of any damage to the product or person were allowed in Connick v. Suzuki Motor Co., 174 Ill.2d 482 (1996), and Perona v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 292 Ill. App.3d 59 (1997). Moreover, even the Verb court would have accepted such damage allegations.

  9. In re Valsartan, Losartan & Irbesartan Multi-District Litig.

    19-md-2875 (RBK/SAK) (D.N.J. Mar. 26, 2024)

    . However, this Court finds that In re Ford and its cited reliance of Perona v. Volkswagen of Am., 684 N.E.2d 859 (Ill.App.Ct.1997) and Connick v. Suzuki Motor Co., Ltd., 675 N.E.2d 584 (Ill. 1996) do NOT support Ds blanket assertion that recall notices are never sufficient as pre-suit notice. To be clear, the facts in In re Ford, Perona, and Connick concerned very generalized recall notices of car manufacturers themselves.

  10. In re Ford Motor Co. E-350 Van Prod. Liab. Litig

    Civ. No. 03-4558 (HAA), MDL 1687 (D.N.J. Sep. 2, 2008)   Cited 35 times
    Holding that the purchase of a vehicle and any repairs to it affect product allocation and can constitute unjust enrichment

    The Supreme Court of Illinois recognized that the notice requirement can be fulfilled either by direct notice or under two exceptions: when a "seller has actual knowledge of the defects of a particular product" or, in certain circumstances, when a "seller is deemed to have been reasonably notified by the filing of [a] buyer's complaint alleging breach of UCC warranty." Id. (citing Malawy v. Richards Mfg. Co., 501 N.E.2d 376 (1986), and Perona v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 684 N.E.2d 859, 863 (Ill.App.Ct. 1997)). Ultimately, however, the Court dismissed plaintiffs' breach of warranty claims, holding that the plaintiffs failed to allege direct notice to the defendant and, importantly, were unable to rely on either exception to the direct notice requirement.